Commentary
Volume Seventy-eight, Number Two, August 1984

How to Cope With the Soviet Threat

Richard Pipes

WESTMORELAND vs. CBS
Donald P. Shaw & Zane E. Finkelstein

CHRISTIANITY'S BREAK WITH JUDAISM
Hyam Maccoby

NEOCONSERVATISM & IRVING KRISTOL
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THE JEWISH WAY OF CRIME
Jonathan D. Sarna

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED ON THE "BOUNTY"
Richard Grenier

Books in Review:
Joshua Muravchik
Elie Kedourie
Fernanda Eberstadt
Martin Sieff
Carol Iannone

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

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Commentary

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Cover: The Sheldon Group, Inc.

COMMENTARY (ISSN 0010-2601) is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee—Single copy is $3.00, $30 a year; 3 years $81; 5 years $120—Add $5.00 per year for all foreign, including Canada and Latin America—Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to COMMENTARY, 165 East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.
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EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICES: 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022

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Letters from Readers

Jesse Jackson

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I read Arch Puddington's article, "Jesse Jackson, the Blacks & American Foreign Policy" [April], with disappointment. Mr. Puddington's approach is simply to compare, disapprovingly, the foreign-policy attitudes of a number of black leaders and organizations with conventional American foreign-policy attitudes. It would have been more useful to consider the reasons for the differences.

As the subjects of discrimination, black Americans have a special sensitivity for the plight of oppressed peoples elsewhere and an ear specially attuned to the hypocrisy that justifies such oppression. Black Americans are aware that economic security is a fundamental underpinning of meaningful political liberties. Black Americans also realize that the freedom to choose among the many roads to self-sufficiency is itself a precious right.

Obviously these attitudes are in good part hard-won perceptions growing out of the unique black experience in America. That they do not entirely agree with conventional, i.e., white, perceptions cannot be unexpected.

Given these valid perceptions, there is bound to be a certain tolerance among black Americans for the Cuban revolution, or the Sandinistas, or the New Jewel Movement, or the PLO. There is also bound to be a certain doubt about the sincerity of American motives in opposing Castro (against the backdrop of his predecessor in power), in opposing the Sandinistas (against the backdrop of their predecessor in power), and in opposing the PLO (against the backdrop of the undeniable sufferings of the Palestinian people over the past forty years). To go further, the assistance that Communist governments have given many Third World efforts must stand in marked contrast to the ties between the United States and South Africa. Black Americans are far more likely to label South Africa the "evil empire" than the Soviet Union. And who can blame us for that?

Mr. Puddington does not claim that black American leaders or organizations deny the need to defend Western Europe from Soviet imperialism. He does not claim that they urge black Americans to refuse to bear arms in Europe, Korea, Grenada, or Lebanon. What he should have understood is that black Americans are skeptical of our nation's commitment to human rights, at home or abroad. In light of this skepticism, black Americans may well counsel that the United States should be slow to intervene abroad before it has demonstrated at home that it is dedicated to the cause of freedom.

The foregoing, I think, goes to the heart of the deficiencies in Mr. Puddington's article. There remains only the need to comment briefly on the evident distaste and disdain with which he speaks about most of the black leadership he discusses. This dislike is especially evident in his discussion of blacks and the American Communist party. How warmly he describes the number of blacks in prominent party positions before he reluctantly concedes that as a population black Americans have never shown much interest in the party's message.

The undertone of Mr. Puddington's article is that black Americans are unprepared to consider the rigors of international politics. Instead I conclude that Mr. Puddington is unprepared to come to grips with this topic.

RICHARD H. PORTER
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Arch Puddington showed generous restraint in his article on Jesse Jackson's foreign policy. Additional light would be shed on Jackson's kindness toward totalitarianism by acknowledging that he follows more in the anti-democratic tradition of Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X than in the democratic tradition of his early mentor, Martin Luther King, Jr. It isn't yet clear that the anti-democratic tradition will prevail, but Jackson's popularity among black people and his nearly complete exemption from criticism are indications that the civil-rights movement may take a turn that will make King's severest critics seem like prophets.

JOHN ROSINSKI
Raiford, Florida

ARCH PUDDINGTON writes:

In his relatively brief letter, Richard H. Porter has touched on many

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of the attitudes and assumptions that appear to instruct the foreign-policy positions of influential segments of the black political leadership. Let me examine his points one by one.

1. Mr. Porter speaks of a fundamental connection between economic security and political freedom. The link between a successful economic system and the flourishing of political liberties is too obvious to warrant lengthy comment. The problem emerges in Mr. Porter's apparent belief that Marxist or Communist economic models can perform as effectively as the mixed economies of the democratic West, at least where the Third World is concerned. To begin with, the political rights which Mr. Porter obviously values simply do not exist in the Communist world, and they are carefully limited, if they exist at all, in the majority of those revolutionary regimes which are so often cited as models for Third World development. More to the point, the economic achievements of radical Third World regimes have been notably unimpressive, especially when compared with countries which have adopted a market approach. Mr. Porter would do well to examine the record of Grenada, whose economy was left a shambles after four years of the New Jewel "experiment."

2. Mr. Porter speaks of "the freedom to choose among the many roads to self-sufficiency" as a "precious right." (Presumably he means self-determination.) We have heard variants on this theme for years. Usually it is formulated: "If people choose to have a Marxist system, then that is their right." The obvious answer is that *people* never choose to follow the Marxist path, with its absurd economic system, regimentation at the workplace, repression of religion and the press, and persecution of political dissenters. On those few occasions when people have initially welcomed the emergence of a Marxist leadership, the reason is that the leaders dishonestly portray themselves as democrats committed to expanding individual rights and strengthening the economy. Inevitably, the people turn against the revolution; the tragedy is that very often the elite leadership has by then built up an efficient police-state apparatus powerful and ruthless enough to obliterate all manifestations of resistance. At this point the people are repressed, coerced, collectivized, displaced if they happen to be minority groups, and in some cases massacred—all in the name of defeating the "counterrevolution." The Grenadian people escaped this fate only through an accident of geography.

3. Mr. Porter justifies black sympathies for regimes of the revolutionary Left as the consequence of "perceptions growing out of the unique black experience in America." I suggest that the opposite is in fact the case, that the history of the civil-rights struggle demonstrates that it is democratic societies which are most open to movements demanding fundamental justice for oppressed minorities. On the other hand, the persecution of ethnic or racial minorities is far more likely to continue unabated in undemocratic systems, particularly in those of the revolutionary Left. Where

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democratic guarantees do not obtain, minority struggle is futile, as evidenced by the examples of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, the Miskito Indians in Nicaragua, the Ukrainians and Baltic peoples of the Soviet Union, and Jews under Communism everywhere.

4. My concern is not the tolerance exhibited by segments of the black leadership for authoritarian regimes of the Left, but the frequent instances of outright preference for radical regimes. I do not ask that blacks ratify the policies of the American government, but simply that they not reflexively endorse any regime which adopts an anti-American, anti-Western stance.

A good example of what I'm speaking of is Jesse Jackson having repeatedly singled out the late Sékou Touré as a model Third World leader. By all standards, the Guinean dictator's rule stands as one of the great catastrophes of modern times, the most damning evidence being the fact that an estimated one-third of the Guinean people fled the country to escape his tyrannical rule. The facts about Sékou Touré's despotism had been thoroughly documented well before his death. Yet until the end he was extolled by Jackson and many others as a paragon of Third World strength and independence, a man who took the challenge of "self-determination" seriously. By all accounts the Guinean people were glad to be rid of their dictator, just as the Grenadians were relieved to see the last of the New Jewel Movement. The same, unfortunately, is not true for many Americans, black and white, who count themselves in the progressive camp. These people are guided by an abstract concept of self-determination in which the opinions and sufferings of real people count for nothing.

5. Mr. Porter's favorable reference to the PLO raises an obvious question: why, given the many political conflicts in today's world, do Jesse Jackson and other black leaders single out the Palestinian issue for special attention? And what possible "special interest" (Jackson's phrase) do American blacks have in the future status of the Palestinian Arab refugees? Clearly the notion that blacks have a particular kinship with the PLO is absurd on its face. The tactics and philosophy of the PLO are the antithesis of the values elaborated by Martin Luther King during his career. Today the protest struggle which most closely adheres to the nonviolent King tradition is Poland's Solidarity movement. Concerning Poland, Jesse Jackson has been largely silent; at the same time, TransAfrica, the most prominent black foreign-policy organization, has published an article belittling the Solidarity struggle and deriding the United States for paying too much attention to the events in Poland. I would suggest that the obsessive focus on the Palestinian issue has its roots in American domestic politics to a much greater degree than in any genuine sympathy for the plight of the Palestinian Arabs.

6. Black Americans are entirely justified in their abhorrence of South Africa; in this they are joined by many whites. But to link American policies toward South Africa with Communist assistance to the Third World is ludicrous. The recipients of Communist assistance include a high percentage of the most repulsive dictatorships of recent times, including Pol Pot's Cambodia, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Syria, Sékou Touré's Guinea, and the Bouterse regime in Suriname. To a substantial degree, the aid provided by Communist governments comprises military equipment designed to enable the local dictator to defend himself against his own people. And, of course, there are political strings attached. To wit: the Grenadian government's shameful vote in the United Nations against a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

7. I have a great deal of respect for the political achievements of black Americans. Nor do I believe that the opinions expressed by those blacks most intensely involved in the debates over foreign policy reflect the views of the majority of black officeholders, civil-rights leaders, or black people generally. The few polls which have sampled the foreign-policy attitudes of the black community suggest that while blacks do not agree with the policies of the Reagan administration, they also do not subscribe to the Third World-ist philosophy embraced by Jesse Jackson.

On one issue blacks have made themselves altogether clear. They have a strong appreciation for democracy, and are determined to utilize the civil and political liberties engrained in the American system to their fullest. It is altogether unfortunate that some prominent blacks have accepted the view that democracy and Third World development are incompatible, particularly when the evidence suggests that dictatorships deprive the people both of their liberties *and* of their economic well-being.

Vietnam

To the Editor of Commentary:

In "Vietnam: The Revised Standard Version" [April], Norman Podhoretz asks why some individuals have not acknowledged the cruelty of the present Vietnamese government. It is obvious that these are the same persons who have also ignored or were apologists for the genocidal regimes in China, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. One reason for this lack of concern must be blatant racism. . . .

Donald Engels
Needham, Massachssetts

To the Editor of Commentary:

I write to express my enthusiastic agreement with Norman Podhoretz's article on Vietnam and to provide a vote of encouragement for him to keep up his valuable work of uprooting myths. I too found people reluctant to talk about Vietnam and was upset by the distortions of the TV series. And I too detect the current pandering to isolationism in the U.S.

Ephraim Friend
Flushing, New York

To the Editor of Commentary:

Norman Podhoretz's criticism of the "revised standard version" of the war in Vietnam that features Ho Chi Minh as a great nationalist who embraced Communism only as a result of American policy "blunders" is well-taken. Indeed, it requires the most blatant historical blindness and an inordinate amount of wishful thinking to bring up this argument in connection with Central America. Did not the Carter administration do its best to avoid such "blunders," to prevent the sale of arms to Somoza's regime, and to support the rebels in Nicaragua? Did it not provide political and economic aid to the new rebel government? Yet all the liberal good will did not prevent the Communist takeover in Nicaragua, nor did it prevent Nicaragua from becoming a Soviet client spreading violence and subversion in Central America as Vietnam did in Southeast Asia.

Miriam R. Bensman
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

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To the Editor of Commentary:

As a Vietnam veteran, I agree with Norman Podhoretz's comments on the reluctance of so many people to face the consequences of the North Vietnamese victory. But I would like to suggest that a partial explanation lies in the fact that the relatively bad side won. Americans have been brought up to think that the good side will always win. From our Western movies to our romantic novels, the American mythology is that the good guy will always win the fight with the villain, marry the heroine, and live happily ever after. The fact that this didn't happen in Vietnam is so contrary to American ideas that many people have difficulty accepting it.

David F. Osgood

Hq V Corps
APO New York

To the Editor of Commentary:

Norman Podhoretz's article shows remarkable lucidity and realism and appears at a critical time in our history. In this election year there is likely to be a battle between those who recall the 1960's with nostalgia and those who recall the period as it really was. Those who recall it with nostalgia as one of open inquiry and questioning of traditional values will face the challenge of those (like myself) who recall it as a period lacking in attention to the facts. It was an era of sloganeering and eye-catching sign language. It was an era in which every issue was tied to Vietnam in such a way that reasoned debate was impossible. The civil-rights issue, the women's-rights issue, city decay, pollution, etc., were all tied in some way to the Vietnam war. . . .

The years that have passed since our withdrawal from Vietnam have shown that perhaps the much ridiculed "domino theorists" were correct after all. While no one now pretends that all Communist regimes are alike in all respects, we must at least agree that their continued existence as separate entities apart from the Soviet Union depends on the acquiescence of the Soviet Union (witness Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc.). . . .

Let us hope that we can learn something from the past besides the lesson that "war is ugly and horrible" or existence itself will become ugly and horrible as well. Pacifism is a defensible personal ethical choice but it is not a viable choice for a government to make for its people.

Ted P. McClatchey

Columbus, Ohio

To the Editor of Commentary:

We cringe from facing the overriding fact of Vietnam: no free nation ever endured the comparable showing of all-out media power to defeat that nation's military forces in the field.

How we deal with this untouchable subject—if we do—will spell out the future of the republic—if it has any.

Roy E. Traband

Tulsa, Oklahoma

To the Editor of Commentary:

As a Vietnam veteran, I was greatly relieved to find out in Norman Podhoretz's "Vietnam: The Revised Standard Version" that I need no longer weep about "what we are led to believe were atrocities" by American troops during the war, since it was the enemy who caused attacks on innocent civilians "by hiding behind civilians."

The warlords of feudal Europe had a habit of slaughtering the inhabitants of walled cities who had surrendered after a siege. They no doubt took similar comfort in the knowledge that it was really the enemy who was morally responsible for the carnage by virtue of not surrendering promptly when asked to do so.

In fact, this particular realization has a somewhat timeless aspect in its utilitarian value. Japanese troops who raped Manchuria, the German armies who decimated the Lowlands, and Latin American death squads—as well as innumerable other fine fighting units past, present, and future—may all find tranquillity in the awareness of their lack of responsibility for any unpleasantness.

Michael P. Morrissey

Oakland, California

To the Editor of Commentary:

I cannot allow to pass unchallenged Stanley Karnow's claims in his book, *Vietnam: A History*, which Norman Podhoretz uses as substantiation for his own view that the Vietnam conflict was essentially a matter of aggression against the South by the North; that North Vietnamese troops were sent South "long before Lyndon Johnson seriously considered the introduction of American battalions into Vietnam"; that by the fall of 1964, "The first complete North Vietnamese unit . . . had already departed for the South. . . ."

If the first complete North Vietnamese unit wasn't introduced into the South until the fall of 1964, then the first Vietnamese unit wasn't in fact committed until well after Johnson had seriously considered the introduction of American troops, and well after American troops had been introduced.

By November 1963, President Kennedy had committed about 16,000 American troops to Vietnam. Before he was assassinated, Kennedy had ordered that 10,000 American troops be withdrawn, but soon after Johnson became President, he canceled Kennedy's withdrawal order.

Mr. Podhoretz quotes Karnow as saying: "Throughout 1964, an estimated 10,000 North Vietnamese troops went South. . . ." However, during 1964, Johnson sent more troops to South Vietnam, and at the end of 1964, 23,000 American troops were in South Vietnam.

After Johnson's massive troop commitments beginning in early 1965, the North Vietnamese did respond by sending more troops South. But it should be remembered that the North Vietnamese sent large numbers of troops South only after the United States began its savage "Rolling Thunder" bombing campaign against the North, and only after the United States had sent large numbers of troops into the South to thwart the unity of North and South. The first engagement between American and North Vietnamese units did not take place until November 1965, a few miles from the Cambodian border, in the Ia Drang Valley. . . .

The deterioration of the Diem regime in the South which prompted Kennedy to begin committing troops was brought about by the activities of the Vietcong against Diem's corrupt rule.

The Vietcong consisted almost exclusively of persons who had spent their entire lives in the South, had fled North to escape oppression, and had then come back to the South to unite their nation. The Vietcong at the time of the American commitment of ground forces was receiving only a trivial amount of aid from the North. The Vietcong was essentially an indigenous Southern group that shared with North Vietnam the common goals of driving out foreign control and unifying Vietnam. The

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Vietcong looked to Ho Chi Minh as the leader of the nationalist movement in Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh was not prevaricating when he claimed he wanted for Vietnam only what George Washington and Abraham Lincoln wanted for America: freedom from foreign control and national unity. It is incorrect to think of Ho Chi Minh as some sort of brainwashed patsy of the Russians or the Chinese or an imaginary "international Communist conspiracy." The fact that Ho received some aid from the Russians and the Chinese does not mean he was their brainwashed patsy, and that his supporters were all brainwashed patsies too. The Russians and Chinese gave aid to North Vietnam because they thought it was in their national interest to do so. The acceptance of Russian and Chinese aid no more made the Vietnamese liberation movement the puppet of Russia and China than the acceptance of French aid by George Washington made the American Revolution the tool of a foreign power.

Ho Chi Minh and his followers felt that Communism with its socialistic approaches adapted to Vietnam would best advance the social and economic interests of the Vietnamese people. They adopted Communism out of nationalistic considerations. The traditional authoritarianism and collectivism of Vietnamese culture blends in well with Vietnamese Communism. The rest of the world does not have American and Western European traditions. The Vietnamese do not have our ideals of freedom and liberty; it is incongruous to justify the American involvement in Vietnam as a fight to defend the freedom of the South Vietnamese people.

JOSEPH FORBES
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

NORMAN PODHORETZ writes:

If Michael P. Morrissey is still unable to detect the difference between the deliberate murder of civilians and the inadvertent collateral casualties caused by actions against military targets, I see no way of opening his eyes. But his letter is a vivid reminder of the contempt for moral and political distinctions which marked the antiwar movement and which continues to obfuscate the American record in Vietnam.

For its part, Joseph Forbes's letter is a vivid example of the obdurate refusal to face up to the new evidence that has emerged since 1975. The issue raised by Stanley Karnow's figures is, precisely, which side first escalated the war in 1965. The antiwar movement has always blamed the U.S. We now know for certain that it was Hanoi. We also now know that the Vietcong was not an indigenous Southern movement, but was created by Hanoi and controlled by it from the beginning.

As for Ho Chi Minh, he was not the "patsy" of an "imaginary international Communist conspiracy"; he was a trained agent of the Comintern, a term which of course

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

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stands for Communist International and about which there was nothing in the least imaginary. This was always known, but what we have learned since 1975 from countless Vietcong defectors and other boat people is that they would happily welcome back the Diem and Thieu regimes now that they have had a taste of Ho Chi Minh's "Communism with its socialistic approaches." Unlike these Vietnamese, but like many Americans, Mr. Forbes refuses to learn.

Euphemism

To the Editor of Commentary:

Joseph Epstein certainly entertains us, and nicely reveals himself, with his engaging and old-fashioned views about sexuality ["Sex and Euphemism," April]. But doesn't he manifest a prurient righteousness, a kind of hidden delight, in finding (for example) the passage he quotes from James Gould Cozzens "repulsive"? How could anyone, anymore, be so refined? I suggest that it is possible *to go just too far* with euphemism and propriety—to the point where constraint itself becomes subtle indecency.

But essentially it is as a literary critic that Mr. Epstein goes astray. Of course he is right, with Yeats, that sexual bluntness can be artistically self-defeating. But that depends on context—and it is not always the case. Let me try a musical analogy. There are no dissonances, or chords, that are bad in themselves and should be absolutely forbidden, even in Australia. But what works in Stravinsky could not appear in Mozart.

With respect to descriptions of sexuality, what Joyce does Tolstoy couldn't, and what Mailer does, Austen couldn't. What Mailer does now, by his own admission, he could not do when he was younger. But we are dealing with new dissonances, new literary discoveries, new artistic practices, new challenges to indirection and evasion—and they are not to be measured against old sensibilities. Mailer, Updike, and Roth know exactly what they are about, as Stravinsky did when he wrote his *Rite of Spring*; the manner and scope of their sexual themes are measured choices, and constitute new artistic tensions and fulfillments. . . .

Morris Grossman
Fairfield University
Fairfield, Connecticut

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . It might, perhaps, be interesting for Joseph Epstein to know that an enormous number of sexual euphemisms are astonishingly similar in English and Russian—for example, "Boston marriage," "to sleep with," "servicing," etc. From the 19th century on, "an interesting condition" has been a favorite expression of the Russian lower-middle class. In fact, many of these euphemisms are exactly the same in Russian and English, which is rarely so with other expressions.

Leon Steinmetz
Cambridge, Massachusetts


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To the Editor of Commentary:

Joseph Epstein is unkind to the Bureau of the Census in limiting its contribution to euphemisms to the awkward phrase "spouse equivalent." The Census bureaucrats have also provided us with a delightful euphemistic acronym: POSSLQ—Persons of Opposite Sex Sharing Living Quarters, pronounced pos'l-q.

My legal POSSLQ prefers pronouncing the first syllable with a long o͞o sound, as in "smooching." I agree, because then the category not listed by the Census Bureau but just as useful, Persons of *Same* Sex Sharing Living Quarters, could be differentiated by pronouncing it with the short ŭ sound.

Louise M. Espy
New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

Since "the most freely used Australian verb" is grammatically, at least, weak, the point may be purely academic, but in the following sentence Joseph Epstein wants "past participle" rather than "simple past": "Women, they feel, have been [most freely used Australian verb, simple past] over. . . ."

William H. Wiatt
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana

Joseph Epstein writes:

I am afraid that I don't at all agree with the general drift of Morris Grossman's letter, which holds that greater sexual detail in fiction implies new discoveries, new challenges, new artistic tensions, and the rest of it. My view is that our novelists write more and more about sex because they know less and less about life apart from sex. I would also like to amend one of Mr. Grossman's phrases. Instead of "What Mailer does, Austen couldn't," I should prefer "What Mailer does, Austen *wouldn't*." And I wonder if the sentence, "What Mailer does now, by his own admission, he could not do when he was younger," wouldn't make a lot more sense if its meaning were exactly reversed. Ah literature! Ah life!

Islamic Jewry

To the Editor of Commentary:

This is just a brief "fan letter" on Bernard Lewis's fine article, "The Decline and Fall of Islamic Jewry" [June]. It serves a most instructive purpose: to remind everyone that past relationships between Arabs and Jews have scarcely been a bed of roses; hence that current PLO-style propaganda about binational statism (in Israel, of course) is as mythic as it is nefarious. In any event, Mr. Lewis's article is not simply of historical importance but, no less, of policy relevance.

Irving Louis Horowitz
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey

The Moscow Trials

To the Editor of Commentary:

Sidney Hook, in his "Memories of the Moscow Trials" [March], rebuts Walter Duranty's conclusion that Trotsky was guilty as charged on the grounds that Duranty's "type of thinking would lead to the conclusion that Lenin was in the pay of the German Imperial Army to overthrow the regime of Kerensky."

I was under the impression that material from the German Foreign Office definitely establishes that Lenin's party was indeed "in the pay of the German Imperial Army to overthrow the regime of Kerensky" (see G. Katkov, "German Foreign Office Documents on Financial Support to the Bolsheviks in 1917," in *International Affairs*, vol. 32, April 1956). While nobody has yet been able to come up with a receipt bearing Lenin's signature, Z.A.B. Zeman and W.B. Scharlau, in their biography of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus), *The Merchant of Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 1965), demonstrate that those Bolsheviks who *did* receive the "German gold" (and sign for it!) were among Lenin's most trusted confidants and personal agents in the party, and can therefore be assumed to have been acting on his wishes, whether expressed or implied.

What this fact suggests for Duranty's logic and conclusion, and Mr. Hook's rebuttal, I will leave for Mr. Hook to evaluate.

Tom Milstein
New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

Sidney Hook's article brings to mind a conversation I once had with D.N. Pritt, one of the ablest advocates of his time at the English bar, who had been present throughout the Moscow trials. Pritt was well known for pro-Soviet views, but he was not a member of the Communist party. He was a Member of Parliament from 1935 to 1950, first as a member of the Labor party, and from 1940 as an independent socialist. In 1962, Pritt led the team of lawyers assembled by well-wishers to defend Jomo Kenyatta at his trial in Kenya on charges of directing the Mau Mau rebellion. In 1970, when I was writing my biography of Kenyatta, I had several discussions with Pritt about Kenyatta's trial, and in the course of them asked him about the Moscow trials. His reply astonished me. "I thought they were all guilty," he said, referring to Bukharin and his co-defendants. It was as simple as that; Pritt made no attempt at political justification, but reaffirmed what was for him a matter of clear professional judgment.

Is there a clue here to the point Mr. Hook makes about the capacity of Western liberals to evade truth through double standards—in this case, an ability to separate historical truth from judicial truth? In terms of the Soviet Union's own judicial system, Pritt said, he firmly believed the defendants in the Moscow trials were guilty as charged. It was an argument which came oddly from the man who defended Kenyatta.

Pritt went on to tell me he thought Kenyatta's evasive manner under cross-examination would have told against him had he been tried in front of a jury. Kenyatta was found guilty anyway by the magistrate who conducted the trial under the British colonial judicial system. In retrospect, the Kenyatta trial can obviously be seen as political. I am not sure Pritt thought so at the time. A passionate opponent of colonialism, Pritt hoped to make political capital out of the trial by obtaining Kenyatta's acquittal. He was confident he would win the case on appeal to the Privy Council in London, and he was more upset by his failure to do so than by the original verdict of guilty in Kenya.

Is not the best comment on these matters the one made by A.T. Cholerton, then Moscow correspondent of the London *Daily Telegraph*, which Malcolm Muggeridge is fond of quoting? Asked whether the accusations against the Old Bolsheviks standing trial were true, Cholerton replied: Yes, everything was true, except the facts.

Jeremy Murray-Brown
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Sidney Hook writes:

The evaluation of Walter Duranty's logic and conclusion is unaffected by the data cited by Tom

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Milstein. Duranty argued to the guilt of Trotsky *solely* on the basis of: (a) Trotsky's opposition to Stalin; (b) Hitler's opposition to Stalin; (c) the fact that both men had organizations at their disposal; (d) the possibilities for contact between these organizations.

My simple point here is that Duranty, confronted by analogous premises: (a^1) Lenin's opposition to Kerensky; (b^1) the opposition of the German High Command to Kerensky; (c^1) the organizations at the disposal of Lenin and the Germans; (d^1) the possibilities for these organizations to meet, would never in his wildest fantasy have concluded that this proved that Lenin was in the pay of the German Imperial Army. His inference of Trotsky's guilt was therefore completely irresponsible.

The evidence that Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership received financial support from the German High Command or its representatives is indeed weighty, if not conclusive. It goes far beyond the speculative possibilities Duranty cites in his severe indictment of Trotsky. To this day, not a shred of evidence that Trotsky conspired with Hitler or Hirohito has ever surfaced. Even the GPU and its successors, with almost unlimited resources at their disposal, have been unable to manufacture any.

In reply to Jeremy Murray-Brown: the significance of D.N. Pritt's infamous defense of the infamous Moscow frame-up trials must be appraised in the light of Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's crimes available to the public (outside the Soviet Union) long before Pritt's avowals to Mr. Murray-Brown. Pritt cannot have been unaware of them.

Pritt's role can be paralleled by that of notorious apologists of the Soviet regime in other countries. Few, however, have had the hardihood to defend so brazenly a position abandoned by the Kremlin itself.

Nor is it true, as Pritt averred, that at the time of the Moscow trials the verdict was in accordance with Soviet legal procedure. For there was absolutely no material evidence substantiating the charges against the defendants or their confessions. The confessions, exacted by threats and torture, physical and psychological, whose precise nature has never been disclosed, consisted largely of alleged "conversations about conversations."

East Europeanists

To the Editor of Commentary:

The experiences of Mark Pinson ["East Europeanists Need Not Apply," May] are familiar to those of us who recently entered the federal job market after extensive studies in distinguished graduate programs designed to fill the so-called "national need for East European specialists." A year ago, I was a junior fellow in the Averell Harriman Institute for the Advanced Study of the USSR while completing my M.A. degree requirements in Columbia University's School of International Affairs. Like Mr. Pinson, I found a job market that held very little demand for my "expertise" in Soviet affairs.

The shortage of governmental positions requiring a regional foreign-policy expertise continues despite the growth of graduate programs in this field. Mr. Pinson, however, harbors a common misconception that I shared until I began full-time employment here in Washington, D.C. As recent graduates, we qualify for entry-level positions in the public or private sector. At this level, however, there is very little need for the so-called "specialist." Rather, these positions require good general analytical skills that can be applied to the variety of subjects that may arise. The national need for specialists, nevertheless, is a real one. The problem for recent graduates is that this need is at the senior level.

Eventually, as this generation moves up into senior-level positions as policy-makers, its specialized education will pay dividends. In the meantime, students must not forget that their education is primarily designed to develop basic analytical skills for their chosen field. The language skills, travel experience, and specialized regional knowledge of today's graduate are the tools with which a regional expertise can be developed.

In the field of international affairs, students tend to feel their regional knowledge alone provides sufficient understanding of American foreign-policy interests in that region. Senior-level policy-makers may lack knowledge of a particular region of concern to them, but they have the more important understanding of how to serve U.S. foreign-policy interests. Today's graduate programs are designed to improve the regional knowledge of the young professional destined to become a policy-maker, but not to replace our foreign-policy experts with regional specialists.

Basic analytical skills are still the prime qualifications for entry-level positions in the public and private sector. Apparently, Mr. Pinson is not aware that he has not yet been trained to handle U.S. foreign-policy questions as an East European specialist. First, he must learn to apply his analytical skills so that he can develop expertise as an East Europeanist. . . .

Many knowledgeable students . . . fail to perceive this relationship between their education and careers. Our national need for specialized knowledge requires that today's graduates learn to apply and adapt their education rather than spending their time searching for nonexistent and unnecessary entry-level positions as specialists.

William M. Moon
Washington, D.C.

To the Editor of Commentary:

Mark Pinson's experience trying to find useful applications for his East European skills rang an old, familiar bell. In 1958 I returned to Washington, D.C., after a year's Fulbright overseas, assuming I would resume freelance translation of unclassified East European language material for the U.S. government agency with which I had worked the previous five years. This was six months after Sputnik, and the general cry was "we must know more about what the Soviets are writing." Imagine my dismay when I learned that the agency had been reorganized in my year's absence and I would have to wait five or six months for "clearance." But I needed work then and I was fortunate to find another job.

The irony is that the job I was able to get, in that panicky summer of 1958, was as a researcher on a government-supported project attempting to program a computer to translate from Russian into English—because of the severe shortage of skilled translators. Machine-translation research was not a success in the long run, of course, and the project folded.

I am now a university professor teaching computing to humanities students. I love my work, but now and again I think wistfully of those East European languages I worked so hard on.

Philip H. Smith, Jr.
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario

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TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mark Pinson's description of his job-hunting in Washington, D. C. is a classic. Some say there is a shortage of specialists; some claim no openings exist. Only one thing, as usual, is certain—confusion.

The same problem Mr. Pinson discusses came up at the conference last May of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. Supposedly enormous piles of data on the USSR lie neglected, awaiting research specialists, yet little if any hiring is done.

Confusion, remember, is not only a lack of certainty, but the *act* of mistaking one thing for another. This happens in Washington all the time. . . . It's just unfortunate that well-intentioned people come to the capital, apply normally and rationally for jobs, and then discover a "hoax." . . . Washington, everyone should know, is not only the nation's capital—it's also the confusion capital.

RISTO MARTTINEN
Falls Church, Virginia

MARK PINSON writes:

William M. Moon apparently studied international affairs, and did additional work on the USSR, with the intention of becoming a policy-maker. With M.A. in hand he went to Washington to seek employment and found little need for the knowledge he had gained in his M.A. program. His ambitions are entirely legitimate, but they were and are not mine or those of the vast majority of my friends and colleagues not only in East European studies but in Middle and Far Eastern studies as well. We have spent not one or two years on an M.A. but seven to ten years on a Ph.D., including in most cases long stays in the area or country of study. We are interested in area work for itself, not as an elevator in the policy-making structure.

Moreover, the reports which I read and discussed in my article cite shortages not of policy-makers but of those with area expertise within certain disciplines. For one recent example, Mr. Moon should look at the May 2, 1984 issue of the *Chronicle of Higher Education* which featured on its first page a story on a new report done by academics together with the Pentagon calling for—the training of more language and area experts, not policy-makers.

Better foreign-policy planning begins with the best possible study of the situation in a given country. For this, an applicant, long immersed in the study of the particular country, is better trained than someone who might have studied the same amount of time but spent a substantial portion of that time on general theoretical work such as "Comparative Studies in . . ." or the study of U.S. policy. And which is longer and harder—to reach an adequate level of proficiency in Polish and Polish affairs, or to reach an adequate level of proficiency in understanding U.S. policy?

Not only is there no compelling need for area analysts to be supremely well-versed in the making of policy, it would in fact be better if they were not involved in policy-making. One does not have to apply superior "analytical skills" to discover recent disastrous instances of country/area analysis being shaped to favor particular policy options.

On one point I made in my article, the shortage of economists specializing in the Soviet Union, I must correct myself. Only after my article had gone to press did I learn of a study by Professor James Millar, a leading expert on the Soviet economy, in which he identified 130 other such specialists; I subsequently found out that a number of these, of junior status, cannot find jobs.

An interesting footnote to all this was provided recently by the New York *Times*. On May 6, 1984 James Reston published an article asserting that President Reagan's trip to the Far East pointed up the great need for people trained in Far Eastern studies. The following day, a doctoral student in East Asian studies at Harvard wrote the *Times* to say that there were quite a number of people with advanced training in East Asian studies who were not being hired, for various reasons, including an underestimation of what had been needed to bring them to a level of proficiency in their area. (Two years earlier, I had written a similar letter to the *Times* disputing the claims of an article it ran on the "shortage" of East Europeanists; my letter was never published.) When Reston's article was called to my attention I wrote him to suggest that what was true for East European studies might be true for Far Eastern studies as well, and enclosed a copy of my COMMENTARY article. While Reston did not answer my letter of May 17, on May 22 the *Times* ran the student's letter, under the heading "Asian Specialists Need Not Apply."

Monteux

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It's about time someone wrote about Pierre Monteux, and to have it done with the style, elegance, warmth, affection, and perception which Samuel Lipman brought to the subject made his article, "A Conductor in History" [January], at least doubly enjoyable. In fact, the entire article was, in its own way, comparable to the best of the *Maître*'s performances, and I am sure he would have been pleased. . . .

I have been enjoying Samuel Lipman's articles for some time now, and look forward to many more. He is one of the few really intelligent writers on music around these days. . . .

JOHN CANARINA
Drake University
Des Moines, Iowa

Correction

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I regret that my memory played me false in "No Hitler, No Holocaust" [March]. I confused *Esprit* with a different journal and circle of Christian leftists in France. What I wrongly said about the former applies more accurately to the latter.

MILTON HIMMELFARB
New York City

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

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How to Cope With the Soviet Threat

A Long-Term Strategy for the West

Richard Pipes

To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill . . . what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.

—Sun Tzu, 4th century B.C.E.

In 1947, with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the United States took over from Great Britain the responsibility for maintaining a global equilibrium. It was a task that Britain had first assumed in the 17th century, when it began to use a combination of diplomacy, subsidies, and naval force to contain any power—first France, then Russia, and finally Germany—that threatened to gain hegemony over the European continent and the approaches to it. Its empire broken up and its economic resources depleted by two world wars, Britain could no longer afford to carry out this traditional policy. The mission was assumed by the United States, which, in the aftermath of World War II, committed itself to containing the Soviet Union in Europe and in any other part of the world on which it encroached.

America's global interests, however, were much less extensive than Britain's: it had no empire to defend, and its foreign trade accounted for a much smaller portion of the national economy. For this reason, U.S. global policy since World War II has tended to display an abstract and ideological quality: it has been less a defense of national interest than of a general international order. In dealing with the Soviet Union, U.S. policies strove above all to persuade it to join the international community by showing it that aggression did not pay, whereas restraint and cooperation did, inasmuch as the one brought rewards and the other punishments. In the words of President Carter: "Our long-term objective must be to convince the Soviet Union of the advantages of cooperation and the costs of disruptive behavior."

This kind of didactic diplomacy has been the basic premise of U.S. policy toward the USSR in times of the cold war as well as those of détente. Under this approach, the Soviet Union is treated rather as if it were a wayward child, which has to be taught proper manners by the application of pain and pleasure. Why the Soviet Union misbehaves—that is, acts aggressively—is a question which hardly anyone bothers to address, if one leaves aside the opinion of dilettante "experts" who believe that Russia has suffered an extraordinary number of foreign invasions and developed, as a consequence, a collective paranoia that expresses itself in aggression.*

But this, surely, is the critical issue. Experience of the past sixty-seven years indicates that no attempt to influence Soviet behavior has succeeded: neither diplomatic ostracism, nor Yalta-like concessions, nor nuclear threats, nor economic bribery. This record of failure indicates that the cause of Soviet aggression lies deeper—that it is systemic. If this is the case, then it is vain to hope to modify Soviet behavior without modifications in the system which causes it.

The causes of Soviet aggressiveness are varied and many, some of them being rooted in Russian geography and history, others in Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. But perhaps the single most important of these causes resides in the fact that the Soviet Union and its dependencies are run by self-appointed and self-perpetuating elites

Richard Pipes is Baird Professor of History at Harvard and served in 1981-82 at the National Security Council as Director, East European and Soviet Affairs. The present article is adapted from his new book, *Survival Is Not Enough*, to be published by Simon & Schuster in the fall. Copyright © 1984 by Richard Pipes.

* It would take much more space than is here available to dispel this widespread myth. Suffice it to say that in 1898 a group of Russian military specialists completed a comprehensive history of Russian warfare and concluded, with pride, that in the thirty-eight wars which it had waged since 1700, Russia had fought only two defensive campaigns—the other thirty-six were offensive (*nastupatel'nye*). N. N. Sukhotin, *Voina v istorii russkogo mira* [*War in the History of the Russian World*] (St. Petersburg, 1898), pp. 13-14.

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whose extraordinary power, privileges, and wealth cannot be justified in any other way than by the alleged threat of "imperialist aggression" to the countries they rule. Their status is thus directly related to the level of international tension. They can best keep their restless subjects under control by demonstrating to them that Communist power is invincible, that it will eventually spread around the globe, and that, therefore, all resistance to it is futile. It is through aggression abroad that the Communist elite best safeguards its position at home.

Unfortunately for the Communist elite, Soviet political and economic institutions are in serious trouble. As the bloodless Polish revolution of 1980-81 has demonstrated, a Communist party that grows thoroughly corrupt and self-seeking loses contact with the population and becomes irrelevant. Since the death of Stalin, the Soviet Communist party elite has managed to shed the heavy hand of dictatorial authority over itself and to turn into a parasitic class that picks ever weaker leaders who will not challenge its interests. The economy, overcentralized and lacking in proper incentives, shows ever slower growth and becomes less and less capable of sustaining the regime's military and imperial commitments. Unable to provide Soviet citizens with a standard of life remotely resembling that of the other industrial nations, the Communist elite has no choice but to tolerate the emergence of a free-enterprise "second economy" that threatens its hold on economic resources as well as the levers of power.

The Soviet leadership faces an agonizing choice between holding on to full power and privilege, thereby risking major internal turmoil such as has occurred in Poland, and forestalling it with costly and unpalatable concessions. It naturally prefers to have its cake and eat it. In this it is assisted by gratuitous friendly gestures from the West, whether these take the form of bowing to Soviet nuclear blackmail, acquiescing in double standards in international relations, or helping the Soviet economy out of its doldrums. All such actions help the Communist elite postpone the inevitable; all encourage it to keep intact the regime which pushes the country toward constant aggression.

Rather than seek to modify Soviet *behavior*, the West should assist those forces within the Communist bloc which are working for a change of the *system*. This is best accomplished by refusing to play the game of international relations in the manner which Moscow prefers, and by denying it the opportunities to exploit military, political, and economic relations with the West to its own advantage. The West cannot destabilize the Soviet Union, but neither should it help the Soviet elite to stabilize a system which is increasingly strained by the incompatibility of the means at its disposal and the objectives which it pursues.

The comments which follow will deal with the preferred Western response in the military, political, and economic fields.

1. *The Military Aspect*

THE mission of the military forces of NATO is and has always been a defensive one, namely, preventing Soviet military encroachments on the territories of Western Europe. There is nothing the countries of the Soviet bloc possess that could conceivably tempt the Western alliance to commit aggression against them: neither natural resources (these can be gotten cheaper elsewhere), nor industrial or other forms of man-made wealth (poor and primitive by Western standards), nor markets for their goods (insignificant for lack of hard currency). It would produce an economic disaster of the first magnitude were the West to conquer the Eastern bloc and assume responsibility for administering and feeding the area—the Marshall Plan would look like a grant-in-aid by comparison. The West would be well advised to decline the Communist bloc if offered it free of charge: it certainly cannot have the slightest interest in going to war to seize it by force. Nor do the Communist ideology and way of life exert such attractions as to threaten Western societies with internal subversion.

All these considerations explain why the contingency plans of NATO have always been defensive. Whatever they say in public—and totalitarian regimes have a habit of ascribing to others their own intentions in order to disguise their aggressive designs as defensive reactions—Soviet leaders are well aware of these facts. This is demonstrated by their willingness to maintain most of their military forces, nuclear ones included, on low levels of alert, something they would never dare to risk if they feared coming suddenly under attack.

Most succinctly defined, Western conventional forces have the task of containing the potential enemy, and Western nuclear forces that of deterring him. The relationship between the two types of forces, however, is not well thought out in Western strategic doctrine, which may create some uncertainty in the mind of the Soviet general staff, but is certain to cause chaos and confusion in Western ranks should hostilities ever break out.

Advocates of nuclear disarmament usually balance their calls for unilateral Western cutbacks or declarations of "no first use" with demands for improvements in conventional forces. Their argument rests on the twin assumptions that the shift from nuclear to conventional deterrence would diminish the risks of nuclear war and, at the same time, permit reductions in defense budgets.

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The first of these propositions is doubtful because it assumes that the decision to employ nuclear weapons is one for the West to make and depends on the ability of its conventional forces to stop the advance of the Warsaw Pact. Given the central role assigned to nuclear weapons in Soviet strategy, such an assumption seems unrealistic. As will be pointed out below, it is far more likely that recourse to nuclear weapons will be initiated by Moscow.

The second proposition is demonstrably wrong. Nuclear weapons are relatively cheap: they absorb between 10 and 15 percent of the military budgets of the U.S. and the USSR. It is conventional forces that eat up defense allocations in both countries. Reductions of nuclear arsenals may bring all kinds of desirable results, but if they are accompanied by increases in conventional forces, such measures certainly will not reduce defense outlays—not, at any rate, in the West. Furthermore, in any competition restricted to conventional forces, the Soviet side has a marked advantage in that it pays its troops such low salaries that it can devote a much larger proportion of the defense budget to weapons and equipment—by some estimates, between two and three times as much as the United States.*

Setting aside the issue of the most efficient use of defense funds, the amount of money allocated for this purpose must clearly be measured against the military threat with which it is meant to cope and not against domestic needs, however urgent these may be. It is illogical to urge cuts in defense appropriations on the ground that there are higher "priorities" in education or medical services. One may legitimately question whether the United States needs the MX or Britain the Trident submarine, but the argument has to be decided on military, not on social, criteria. Since defense expenditures, both in general and in particular, are designed to meet concrete threats posed by foreign powers—that is, powers outside the reach of our will—they cannot be treated as if they were wholly discretionary.

Nor is it sensible to question defense appropriations on the specious grounds that America's strength lies in other than military fields—that "the biggest deterrent to the Russians is a healthy economy in America," as the head of the National Association of Manufacturers has recently put it. Quite apart from the fact that a healthy American economy is precisely what whets the appetite of the Russians, the statement is absurd: for, if it were correct, then a healthy body would be the best deterrent against rape or murder, which is not quite what experience teaches. Economies do not stop armies any more than do schools or hospitals—only armies stop armies. It has been correctly pointed out that since every country has an army on its soil, the only choice citizens can exercise in the matter is to decide whether this army will be their own or someone else's.

IT SHOULD be self-evident that the size and structure of military forces are determined by their mission, and that their mission, in turn, is, or at least ought to be, dictated by the size and structure of the forces at the disposal of the potential enemy. For a variety of reasons, however, this is not always the case. Military strategists are inclined to regard their discipline as something of a science, and hence of universal validity. They are disinclined to take seriously other strategic doctrines, especially if such doctrines deviate significantly from their own. This phenomenon almost always bodes disaster for the party that is on the defensive: one need only recall the tragic consequences of the Allied attempt in 1940 to wage a stationary war against an enemy who was making open preparations for a campaign of rapid movement.

Something similar seems to be recurring today. Western strategists have no difficulty confronting the threat posed by the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, since it is of a familiar kind, but they do not show the same receptivity to innovative Soviet nuclear strategies. To be sure, the concept of escalation from a conventional to a nuclear defense has formed the backbone of NATO's "flexible-response" doctrine since the 1960's. But the United States seems not to have thought through the uses to which nuclear weapons would be put, should circumstance require that the nuclear threshold be crossed.

It is altogether difficult to know how seriously to take this doctrine now that Robert S. McNamara, who served as Secretary of Defense when "flexible response" was adopted, has gone on record that in his time the first use of nuclear weapons was not even seriously contemplated: "In long private conversations with successive Presidents—Kennedy and Johnson," he has recently revealed in the Fall 1983 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "I recommended, without qualification, that they never initiate, under any circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons. I believe they accepted my recommendation." This authoritative statement constitutes an admission that the centerpiece of NATO's whole strategy has been a bluff since its inception, and that the civilian leaders have been deceiving their citizens for over twenty years in a matter of the greatest national importance.

This underscores the confusion and emotionalism surrounding the entire issue of nuclear weapons in the minds of both military personnel and the public at large. Hardly anyone lacking in professional competence dares to intrude on the discussion of NATO's conventional forces and their

* A Soviet soldier is paid four rubles a month, which at the official exchange rate amounts to slightly over five dollars, but at black-market rates comes to less than one dollar. Since this is as much as no pay, the bulk of the Soviet army may be said to consist of temporarily bonded serfs. The U.S. private by comparison receives nearly $600 a month.

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strategy: this is a matter gladly left to the experts. But nuclear weapons have become everyone's business; indeed, any citizen who would claim incompetence on such issues as the MX or START would risk being accused of social irresponsibility. Certain circles interested in U.S. unilateral nuclear disarmament are not averse to bringing even children into the debate, apparently in the belief that the more important a subject is the less one needs to know about it. People who would not dream of advising a chef on preparing hollandaise sauce dispense advice freely when the topic is the immensely complicated one of nuclear weapons and strategy.

In the West, it is well-nigh axiomatic that nuclear weapons, "in the ultimate analysis," can perform only one function, and that is to deter or to serve as a kind of monstrous scarecrow, and that as long as this deterrent makes a sufficiently frightening impression, it will never have to be resorted to. Axioms being self-evident, the consequences of the deterrent's failure to deter have not been seriously considered. From what is known of Soviet doctrine, one must conclude that there exists by now an ominous discrepancy between Allied defensive and Soviet offensive plans—whereas one party (the West) draws a sharp distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, the other treats the two as different wavelengths on a single and continuous spectrum of the instruments of war.* It is almost certain that should war ever break out, the Allies would find themselves thoroughly confused by the enemy's offensive moves and have to improvise their defenses in desperate haste—that is, if they will be given time to do so.

Considering the close correlation between Soviet theoretical writings and deployments, one might expect that Western opinion would come to acknowledge that Moscow does look at nuclear weapons differently and assigns them different missions. Yet this is not the case; indeed, any attempt to call attention to the discrepancy in the two views arouses public anger as if some taboo were being broken.

IN THE view of much of humanity, nuclear weapons are not weapons in the ordinary meaning of the word but instruments of cosmic destruction, the expectation of which forms part of what Carl Jung called mankind's "collective unconscious." It is an unsettling but by no means unusual experience in the 1980's to attend professional symposiums at which so-called conventional war, which from 1939 to 1945 claimed 50 million lives, is calmly discussed as an acceptable alternative to nuclear war. Such discussions serve to confirm that nuclear weapons are in a category of their own and not only because of their destructiveness.

As a rule, religions that posit the existence of God or gods believe that the world came into being from a deliberate act of divine will. A corollary of this belief is the expectation that the world and life are transient, since whatever had a beginning must also have an end. In widely dispersed regions of the globe, long before the Christian era, legends circulated about the coming doomsday. Some religions envisaged it as taking the form of floods and earthquakes, others as inundations by molten metal flowing out of mountains. But the most prevalent doomsday vision was that of a cosmic holocaust—that is, the annihilation of the earth and life by an all-consuming fire. It is a theme that occurs in the epic of ancient Babylon, in the Indian Vedas, and in the Mithraic tales of Iran. It can be found also in the legends of classical Greece (e.g., the story of Phaeton whose theft of a chariot belonging to his father, Helios, nearly caused the universe to be destroyed by fire), in the epics of the Indo-Germanic peoples, and in Nordic tales.

The Jews seem to have come under the spell of these images as well: in the Bible, the vision of the Last Judgment is closely linked to that of a fiery holocaust:

> Neither their silver nor their gold
> shall be able to deliver them
> on the day of the wrath of the Lord.
> *In the fire of His jealous wrath,*
> *all the earth shall be consumed;*
> *for a full, yea, sudden end*
> *He will make of all the inhabitants*
> *of the earth. . . .*
>
> —Zephaniah, 1:18

> Blow the trumpet in Zion;
> sound the alarm on My holy mountain!
> Let all the inhabitants of the land tremble,
> for the day of the Lord is coming, it is near,
> *a day of darkness and gloom,*
> *a day of clouds and thick darkness! . . .*
>
> *Fire devours before them,*
> *and behind them a flame burns. . . .*
>
> —Joel, 2:1-3

The author of the two books of Peter in the Christian Bible wrote in this tradition when he prophesied that "the day of the Lord will come like a thief, and then the heavens will pass away with a loud noise, *and the elements will be dissolved with fire, and the earth and the works that are upon it will be burned up*" (II Peter 3:10).

Because it is so ancient and almost universal, so frequently reiterated in religious works that until recent times have been the main source of human knowledge and wisdom, the expectation of an inevitable final holocaust has embedded itself deeply in the human psyche; it is a classic archetype with which argument is powerless to contend. Once it had made its appearance, "the

* My views on this subject were stated in "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," COMMENTARY, July 1977.

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bomb" filled a role that had awaited casting for thousands of years. One can find surprising anticipations of this weapon in literary works unrelated to religion and religious visions.

Thus, in Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*, published in 1721, in Letter 105 there occurs out of the blue the following passage: "I am always afraid that they will eventually succeed in discovering some secret which will provide a quicker way of making men die, and exterminate whole countries and nations." How did this thought cross Montesquieu's mind? Since in his time there were no scientific grounds for such a supposition, one must assume he was echoing fears whose sources lie in mythology. It is known that so-called Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO's) were reported at least as early as the 1550's, because there exist published accounts and illustrations to this effect dating from that time. Hence it is not fanciful to interpret the atomic mushroom cloud, which the "peace movement" likes to use for its logogram, as a modern version of the "flaming torch" of the Prophet Zechariah and the "high flame that reaches to the sky" of the Nordic epic.

The instantaneous pulverization of two Japanese cities by weapons that the public neither anticipated nor understood set off mass anxieties absent in the case of other calamities, of comparable if not greater destructiveness. Mankind apparently can tolerate the death, by starvation, in the man-made famine of the 1930's, of nine million Ukrainians and Russians, the annihilation by poison gas and bullet of six million Jews, the massacre by Communist forces of between one and two million Cambodians. These calamities, being man-made, are "natural." Nuclear weapons, however, though manufactured by man, are treated as supernatural: for they come from the sky, destroying by invisible rays. The dread of this magic power has even affected its peaceful uses. It touches on the rawest nerve in man's collective psyche.

The hundreds of thousands who march to protest nuclear war are not giving expression to their political convictions, since no one clamors in favor of such a war. Rather (when they are not being manipulated), they take part in pseudo-religious rituals meant to propitiate, by tokens of awe and fear, the evil spirits whose abode is neutrons and protons. Anyone who disparages such emotional displays and calls for a dispassionate analysis of the issues or, worse yet, for defenses against nuclear weapons, violates powerful taboos and is appropriately punished by the multitude. This helps to explain why so many proponents of the "freeze" and other forms of unilateral disarmament express no interest in the facts of the case, such as Soviet nuclear doctrine and Soviet nuclear deployments and their combined effect on Western security.

George F. Kennan, whose record shows him to be an eminently well-informed and sober analyst of international relations, as soon as he approaches nuclear issues abandons his customary detachment and even scholarly curiosity. The facts, such as the numbers of missiles and warheads in the Soviet and U.S. arsenals, he dismisses as irrelevant—"I have no patience with 'worst-case' estimates of Soviet military strength"; "I have no confidence in sweeping quantitative figures"; "I have no confidence in statistics"; "I must totally reject. . . ."—none of such *obiter dicta*, drawn from just two pages of a recent exchange, is supported with any evidence. What Kennan does is castigate man for his wickedness and predict his imminent destruction, more in religious than in political or military terms.

The same applies to Jonathan Schell, whose *The Fate of the Earth* has been praised as a major contribution to the national debate. Actually, it is nothing of the kind. It is, instead, a long-winded jeremiad on the familiar horrors of nuclear war, which never even raises the questions that would really matter in a debate: do Soviet generals think in the same way? If so, why are they piling missile upon missile long after they have crossed the line of "overkill"? And if they do not, what should our response be?

The tragedy of people who approach nuclear matters in archetypal religious terms is that in the genuine Jewish and Christian religious vision (as contrasted with its secular travesty), the holocaust was followed by the Last Judgment, which set the just apart from the wicked and restored Eden; from their heavenly abode the virtuous were to observe the eternal torments of the condemned. But following the general decline of belief in God and the afterlife, man is left with the appalling prospect that his fate has passed into human hands; the unleashing of the holocaust, once the prerogative of God or gods, is now the prerogative of a few mortals with fingers on the "button." In a man-made holocaust, the virtuous will not be saved but will perish along with the sinners. Thus, agnosticism intensifies an anxiety that has its origins in religious beliefs, leaving the horror but robbing it of hope. It produces an overpowering sense of helplessness that the unscrupulous exploit for their own political ends.

THE emotionalism that surrounds the whole issue of these weapons transforms the process of nuclear-arms negotiation from what it ought to be—namely, matter-of-fact bargaining—into a quasi-religious ritual whose success is measured not by the results obtained but by the "sincerity" with which it is approached. In the 1970's Western planners could not even decide on deploying a modest force of intermediate-range missiles partly to offset Soviet SS-20's without coupling such deployment to arms negotiations with the Soviet Union: this double-track policy, hailed as the acme of polit-

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ical sophistication, has had the effect of giving Moscow a seat in NATO's councils. Whenever the USSR commissions, tests, and deploys new missiles, which happens routinely, it never seems to occur to its leaders to make such actions dependent on Western approval. Feelings on this subject, however, run so high that democratic politicians have no choice but to yield to public clamor. President Reagan, who on assuming office had intended to proceed in this matter more deliberately than his predecessors, soon found himself swept up in the emotional tide and compelled first to initiate arms-control talks before he was ready for them, and, secondly, to shift them from the periphery of his foreign policy, where they properly belong, to its very center.

Soviet leaders, who are free of such domestic pressures, attach little importance to arms-control negotiations, except as they help to restrain *Western* advances in technology and to divide *Western* opinion. In internal Soviet literature on security issues, the subject is hardly ever mentioned. The USSR has not bothered even to establish a counterpart to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Soviet personnel involved in these negotiations are dominated by the military, who, insofar as can be determined, are accountable to the General Staff, an institution not normally associated with disarmament. Evidence from SALT I, SALT II, and START negotiations suggests that the Soviet side first determines what weapons it requires to meet its strategic objectives and then concentrates on constraining, through negotiations, America's ability to respond. In the words of the French General Pierre Gallois, "[The Soviets] do what they want and negotiate about what you're going to do."

The American experts who in 1972 concluded SALT I with the USSR did not believe in the military utility of nuclear weapons on either the strategic or the theater level. To them, an arms agreement was primarily a political device, the second pillar of détente (the other being credits and trade). As one European specialist put it at the time, "There's a lot of eyewash in these agreements, but their significance lies in the extent to which they reflect the mutual recognition of the need to cooperate in the nuclear-disarmament field." In other words, the terms did not matter as much as did the political atmospherics. From the beginning it was indeed the political process, cynically manipulated for its public-relations effect, rather than the deadly reality of the nuclear balance, that the U.S. and its allies regarded as the foremost priority. As a result of this attitude, the U.S. has allowed some very disadvantageous features to intrude into these accords, of which the public at large is quite ignorant.

The Soviet side has from the outset refused to furnish comprehensive data on its strategic systems—in itself a most extraordinary procedure. Since, however, negotiations on limiting numbers could not very well proceed without agreement on what these numbers were, Moscow has consented (without prejudice) to accept the data for its side furnished by the United States. The United States could account for only those Soviet systems of which it had solid evidence from its intelligence-gathering sources, not those that were beyond their scope. Although the Soviet Union subsequently agreed to furnish random data on its nuclear forces, the information at the disposal of the United States is certain to reflect only the minimum dimension of the Soviet nuclear arsenal; the precise dimensions of this arsenal were not and are not known. It would certainly be difficult to find a businessman prepared to enter into relations with a company that refused to provide him with complete information on its assets and debts; in the field of national security, unfortunately, different standards prevail.

BECAUSE the United States has been compelled to rely on its "national means of verification" (mainly satellites and electronic intelligence) to verify Soviet compliance with the limits established by SALT, it had to choose a unit of measurement that lent itself to observation by these means. The choice, by mutual consent, fell on "launchers." In the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), a launcher is a hole in the ground called a silo. A silo can be seen from the air, whereas a missile can be concealed. In real life, however, it is not silos but missiles that fly and their warheads that inflict damage. Knowledge only of launchers (silos, submarine tubes, and bombers) furnishes an inadequate idea of the other side's destructive capacity. The United States, therefore, cannot be said to dispose of accurate information on the number of missiles and warheads in the Soviet arsenal; the figures used in SALT and START postulate that each launcher holds a corresponding number of missiles, and that no missiles are unaccounted for.

This is almost certainly an incorrect assumption. In the case of Soviet ICBM's, the number of stockpiled missiles must exceed that of known launchers (silos), because the USSR has been observed experimenting with "cold launch" techniques that allow the missile to fire its boosters after ascending from the silo so as to leave the latter intact for the insertion of a second missile. This practice presupposes a strategic-missile reserve the size of which is not known. The SS-20 intermediate-range mobile missile is believed to be equipped with two missiles per launcher, although in the publicly released balance-of-forces statistics only one is assumed and counted.

More disturbing still is the realization that the USSR need not emplace its ICBM's in silos at all; the more accurate American missiles become, the less reason Moscow has to place its main strategic force (ICBM's account for three-quarters of So-

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viet launchers) in static silos where they are vulnerable. On these grounds, some American experts question whether the silos that satellites are busily observing and counting are not either decoys or expendable goods, while the bulk of Soviet ICBM's intended for use is concealed to be launched in wartime from soft pads, such as sheds and other places of storage, beyond the range of U.S. observation.

THE United States, in its insularity, consented in SALT and START to define a missile as "strategic" if it is capable of striking the continental United States from the Soviet Union and vice versa. Since the nearest distance between these two countries (across the Bering Strait) is a few miles, the range was arbitrarily set to be equal to the distance separating the northeastern U.S. from the northwestern USSR, that is, 5,500 kilometers. Only weapons capable of this or greater ranges come within the purview of SALT limits. Such a definition would perhaps make sense in a narrow "Fortress America" context, under which the United States would have neither forces overseas nor overseas allies whom it was committed to defend. It makes little sense in the context of global strategy. The rules to which the U.S. has agreed have given the Soviet Union, which controls the center of the Eurasian land mass, the license to deploy unlimited quantities of nuclear launchers with ranges just below the "intercontinental" threshold yet capable of striking targets in all the areas adjacent to its immense frontier in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and East Asia.

The Soviet Union accepted this definition of "strategic" only for the purpose of negotiating with the United States; in structuring its own nuclear forces, it has never adopted such a standard, since all its missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers come under the command of the Strategic Rocket Forces—a procedure that inadvertently throws light on Soviet thinking about the uses of nuclear weapons. So it has happened that quite lawfully, within the terms of SALT I and SALT II, free of any numerical constraints, the USSR has been able to deploy since the 1970's a massive force of modern, mostly mobile, intermediate-range nuclear systems.

When NATO awoke to this reality and decided to counter it by deploying some intermediate-range, land-based missiles below the 5,500-kilometer range but capable of striking Soviet territory from Western Europe, the USSR charged that these missiles fell within the definition of "strategic." Thus, the West's lack of attention and foresight has already caused it no end of trouble. Even with the Pershing 2's and cruise missiles in place, the USSR will still enjoy an immense advantage in substrategic systems.

The United States assiduously collects data on Soviet compliance with the provisions of SALT I and SALT II, the latter of which, although not ratified by Washington, is, by mutual consent, treated as though it were. Such investigations have revealed a consistent pattern of violations of the spirit and even the letter of these agreements. The information, however, has not been given much publicity, because committed advocates of arms control, afraid lest it undercut public support for the process, intimidate those who wish to bring it into the open. The fanaticism of some of these people goes to such lengths that instead of blaming the Soviet Union for violations of arms-control agreements, they accuse the United States of ill will for calling attention to them. When President Reagan, in one of his speeches, referred to the poor Soviet record of compliance, he came under certain attack from legislators and journalists for his alleged "insincerity" about arms negotiation. This is a dangerous variant of a theory popular in contemporary liberal circles that the victim of a crime is as guilty as, if not more than, its perpetrator.

Quite apart from its inequities and inconsistencies, the arms-control process has so far failed to achieve its principal stated objective, which is to stop the growth of nuclear arsenals. In 1970, when SALT I was being negotiated, the Soviet Union had approximately 1,400 strategic warheads; in 1977, as SALT II talks neared completion, its arsenal had grown to nearly 5,000 warheads; in 1983-84, during START talks, this arsenal had risen further to 8,700 warheads. This growth represented a six-fold increase. During this same time, the United States, mainly by MIRV'ing its missiles to match the Soviet build-up, had more than tripled the number of warheads in its arsenal (from 2,200 to 7,600). If this is arms control, it might be interesting to experiment for a while with an honest arms race.

IN DEALING with nuclear weapons nothing is more important than demystifying them, that is, severing the psychic bonds that connect them, in our conscious and subconscious, with ancient religious myths. These are man-made weapons. The Soviet nuclear arsenal is at the disposal neither of gods nor of evil spirits but of ordinary men, many of them overweight and overworked, scared of losing what they have, observed to suffer from dandruff and bad breath. Our main purpose should be to convince these men that they cannot intimidate us. Fear of nuclear weapons, especially in its overt and hysterical forms, does not contribute to peace; on the contrary, it serves to encourage those in the Soviet Union who want to use them to terrorize and blackmail foreign powers and their citizens. It should also be made eminently clear to these people that if they ever should dare to carry out their strategic plans and fire nuclear missiles in anger, they and their families will perish.

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It is only when the magic and the taboos that surround it are removed that one can deal with this real danger realistically. The analogy with cancer comes to mind. Not so long ago the very name of this dread disease could not be pronounced for fear of inviting it. Today, cancer is openly discussed, even by its victims, and it is this honest acknowledgment that has made it possible to deal with it more effectively. Nuclear weapons, which are a kind of cancer of the international body politic, should be looked upon with the same dispassion. The beginning of morality, as Pascal has taught, is clear thinking.

It is essential for anyone concerned with nuclear weapons, whether in a professional capacity or as a layman, to familiarize himself with Soviet nuclear doctrine and programs. They are the reality against which U.S. strategies and programs must be matched. In all deliberations on the matter at the public level, the issue should not be settling scores between American liberals and conservatives, nor the undisputed horrors of nuclear war, nor America's social and other domestic needs, but solely the nature and extent of the Soviet threat. Any statements on the subject of nuclear weapons and strategy that fail to address themselves to this central subject ought to be dismissed as irrelevant.

The strategic forces of the United States should be designed not simply to deter aggression and to punish it after it has been committed, but to prevent threats of subsequent damage. This means, among other things, that it would be good for the United States formally to renounce the policy—as barbaric as it is futile—of retaliatory strikes aimed at the civilian population. The target should be the true culprits of such aggression, the Soviet elite and its armed forces.

Specialists estimate that there are in the Soviet Union between 10,000 and 20,000 objectives of political and military significance. If that assessment is correct, then the United States needs that many accurate warheads left *after absorbing a Soviet first strike*; this capability alone will provide a deterrent credible to Moscow. It makes little sense to measure existing U.S. strategic forces against those available to the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces command (even assuming that it is known precisely what these are) because the U.S. has no first-strike doctrine or capability whereas the Soviet side has both. The only force that counts, therefore, is the one left following a Soviet first strike. While the present survivable force could inflict grueling punishment on the USSR's civilian population, it could not destroy its political and military organizations and the nuclear forces at their disposal.

IMPROVING NATO's conventional forces is indisputably desirable, but it is unlikely in itself to prevent a war from turning nuclear. The assumption that underlies Western strategy—that the decision whether or not to resort to nuclear weapons will be for the West to make—may have made sense when first devised, but it seems unrealistic today in the light of what is known of Soviet plans and capabilities in this regard. A military command that has built its armed forces around a nuclear core is unlikely to defer use of it until the enemy has given it an excuse to do so. The USSR is not in a position, either politically or economically, to engage in a military war of attrition. Such a war would exacerbate all its latent problems and unleash an internal crisis under the worst possible circumstances. Should it decide that war has become unavoidable, therefore, it will almost certainly have prompt recourse to nuclear weapons since they alone offer it a chance of gaining a rapid and decisive victory. Tactical nuclear weapons are fully integrated into Soviet land forces, down to the divisional level, each commander disposing of rocket systems of a range appropriate to his mission, which suggests that they are meant to be fired in the first hours of combat. To cite the conclusions of a recent study of the European nuclear "balance":

> Soviet theater nuclear weapons are not simply "there," as a "reaction" to NATO nuclear capabilities or even in some vague back-up role for Soviet conventional operations. Rather, they were developed, produced, and deployed in response to *specific requirements within a concept of offensive operations*; they are assigned specific missions within that concept; and they thus form an integral part of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact posture in Europe.

The scenario for the use of these forces has been depicted by General Gallois, as quoted in the Fall 1981 issue of *Orbis*, as follows:

> It is a fact that the Kremlin leaders know that they may only engage their armed forces in a victorious war. Therefore they would have recourse to the strategy, tactics, and weapons of success. With their ballistic arsenal, utilizable with the advantage of total surprise, they now have possession of such weapons in quantity.... [T]he way it today deploys its conventional contingents, NATO obligingly offers up for destruction some 400 to 500 crucial targets that, when neutralized, will leave all resistance completely paralyzed. And these targets are planes in their air fields, the antennae of fixed radars, munition and tank depots, military headquarters, among others. Precision ballistic weapons carrying nuclear warheads, all the more powerful the greater their precision, could destroy the majority of these targets without considerable collateral damage. Thus, and only after having launched this initial salvo, the Warsaw Pact tanks and airborne units would occupy the previously disarmed and practically intact territories.

These considerations suggest that it is as naive to envision a potential East-West conflict being

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waged on the model of World War II—that is, with tanks and bombers—as it was to expect in the 1930's to fight another war with Germany in the trenches. Should World War III ever break out, the Soviet Union is likely swiftly to take the initiative with all the weapons at its disposal, including nuclear ones. It makes little sense, therefore, to concentrate one's attention on preventing nuclear war as such, as if conventional war were a viable alternative; one must strive to avoid war altogether, because any general war with the USSR probably will not remain in a conventional mode for any length of time, if at all.

The West would do well to emulate Soviet planners and pay greater attention to defensive measures. The Reagan administration has taken steps to improve the protection of U.S. command, control, and communications networks, which is welcome news since they are a declared prime target of Soviet strategic forces. Because an effective program of civil defense does not seem practical in a democracy as large and diverse as the United States, there is reason to devote greater effort to antiballistic-missile-defense programs.

Those who dismiss the idea as science fiction might change their minds by taking a close look at Soviet efforts in this direction. The deployment of an elaborate ABM system around Moscow suggests that the Soviets take defenses against missiles seriously. There are so many other indicators of intense Soviet work on missile defenses that some American military analysts fear a technical breakthrough followed by Soviet renunciation of the treaty limiting ABM deployments. Once its arsenals are overflowing with offensive weapons, it would make sense for Moscow to shift its attention in this field to defensive measures which, in any event, have always played a major role in its strategic thinking. Should such a development take place, it would pose a serious threat to U.S. security. Opposition to nuclear defenses on the grounds that they are "destabilizing" should go the way of the advocacy of mutual assured destruction (MAD), whose ill-begotten child it is.

Should political conditions make meaningful arms-control agreements possible, at least three cardinal requirements ought to be met. The most important of those is on-site verification, because the existing "national means," marvels of technological ingenuity though they are, do not provide the requisite certainty. The second is agreement on a sensible unit of measurement which, once verification on the ground has been agreed upon, will assuredly be something other than launchers. The third calls for the adoption by the United States of a definition of "strategic weapons" that corresponds to the Soviet one; this measure will eliminate the possibility of the USSR being free to construct a panoply of nuclear weapons that, though unable to reach the continental United States, can very well reach and destroy its allies. Arms-control agreements concluded under different circumstances and on other terms are either pointless or deceptive or both.

The rearmament program inaugurated by President Reagan, when completed, should allow the United States to match Soviet military capabilities. This effort is commendable but it is not sufficient. The true military balance lies not in equality of military forces alone but in the combination of force and strategy. The history of warfare knows many examples of superior strategic skill defeating larger armies. Napoleon routinely beat armies that on paper were stronger than his own, only to be crushed, in turn, by the Russian army which, too weak to give him battle, retreated, and in retreating chanced upon a strategy that rendered him helpless. In 1940, the Allied force in France was larger and in many respects better equipped than the Germans, but it was burdened with a strategy that looked backward. Arming oneself, therefore, is not enough; an even greater threat than being outgunned is being outsmarted.

2. *The Political Aspect*

THE chief instrument of Soviet global strategy is political attrition, which, in practice, means exploiting the open character of democratic societies for the purpose of inciting internal divisions among different social groups and between their citizens and their elected governments, as well as sowing discord among the allies. This strategy cannot be completely neutralized if only because democracies will not remain democracies once they disallow conflicts of interest and differences of opinion. But its pernicious effect can be significantly reduced when it is realized what it is and how it functions.

Ideally, political parties in democratic countries should seek to pursue a strictly bipartisan policy in regard to the Soviet Union. That such a policy is possible was demonstrated in the late 1940's and early 1950's in both the United States and West Germany. The breakdown of bipartisanship that has occurred subsequently as a result of the Soviet shift to "peaceful coexistence" provides Moscow with excellent opportunities to play on internal political rivalries in democratic countries by encouraging parties that are not in the least degree pro-Soviet or pro-Communist to assume, for narrow partisan interests, the positions it favors.

It was a sorry spectacle to see the candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination in the United States trying to outbid one another with pledges of being the first to fly to Moscow to "settle" U.S.-Soviet differences with its leader. In several countries (e.g., Great Britain and Germany) socialist parties, in the quest for support from the neutralist segment of the electorate,

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have taken positions that come dangerously close to unilateral disarmament—positions they would inevitably abandon if elected to office, but which they can irresponsibly exploit as long as responsibility for defense rests on the other party, the party in office. Such pressures from the opposition, in turn, compel heads of state to seek a rapprochement with Moscow at any price, for they cannot afford to find themselves in the exposed and dangerous position of being the "party of war." If the democracies persist in allowing intraparty rivalries to overshadow the fundamental interest all their citizens have in maintaining their way of life, the day may come when they will lose the right to engage in party politics altogether.

It is essential for the West not to allow Moscow to insinuate itself into its domestic politics and not to give it any opportunity for exploiting the "rifts" in the enemy camp which Lenin regarded as the prime objective of his political strategy. Not that there must be no disagreements in the Western camp, but rather that the West should instantly close ranks whenever the Soviet Union attempts to take part in them. Instead of giving Moscow such an opening, the West would do well to strike back and challenge the Soviet effort to seal off its domain from any outside interference. Through radio broadcasts (and, in the future, possibly television transmissions as well), through speeches of its statesmen, and through symbolic acts, it should be possible to raise in the minds of citizens of Communist countries doubts about the omnipotence of their regimes. To allow the Soviet Union to meddle in Western affairs but to desist from meddling in its affairs is to play into the hands of Soviet strategists.

THE Soviet Union is even more successful in exploiting divisions in the Western alliance, whose cohesion, were it realizable, would constitute a most formidable obstacle to Soviet global ambitions.

It requires no elaborate proof to demonstrate that the alliance binding the United States to the countries of NATO, and, once removed, Japan, is of immense value to its members. The industrial democracies linked by this alliance enjoy vast technological and industrial superiority over the Communist bloc. Their combined gross national product is at the lowest reckoning three to four times that of the Soviet bloc and probably considerably in excess of that; the GNP of Western Europe alone is nearly double that of the USSR and its colonies. Were the Soviet Union to succeed in establishing hegemony over Western Europe and Japan, its industrial capacity would in a short time double or treble, enabling it in one fell swoop to overcome all the economic difficulties that now constrain its imperial ambitions. Should this occur, the United States would be left alone to confront the Soviet threat: under these conditions, the survival of free institutions in the United States would become most problematic. This is why the United States stands prepared to defend Western Europe as if it were its own territory, and why the Soviet Union, on its part, regards Western Europe as a prime objective of its grand strategy.

The defensive ties binding the United States to Europe were, from the outset, territorially restricted to Europe, North America, and the Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer. This arrangement created serious problems because Soviet strategy is not regional but global in scope. The result was that all the areas outside the North Atlantic community came within the purview of other regional alliances tied to the United States but not to NATO: among them, the Baghdad Pact, SEATO, and the Rio Treaty. Inasmuch, however, as all regional defensive treaties except for NATO proved to be paper compacts, the United States has had to assume principal responsibility on its own behalf, as well as that of its European allies, for the security of the entire non-Western world outside the North Atlantic region.

Such an arrangement made sense in 1949, when NATO came into being, because at that time Europe was still incapable of insuring its own protection, let alone the defense of distant regions. Today it is difficult to justify either on grounds of equity or military expediency, for it imposes on the United States excessive burdens of protecting the approaches to Europe as well as coping with Soviet expansionism in the Third World. The defense of the Middle East, without whose oil Europe could hardly carry on, is entrusted to the United States, as is that of the mineral resources of Africa, not to speak of the strategic areas in East Asia and Central America. Whenever Communist forces commit acts of aggression in these outlying areas, Europe assumes the stance of a neutral observer. The detachment with which its leaders react to such events sometimes conveys the impression that they are not unhappy to have Russia dissipate its aggressive energies far away from the European continent.* There seems little awareness in European thinking (a few honorable exceptions apart) that the Soviet Union pursues a global and not a continental strategy, that the invasion of Afghanistan has some bearing on the security of Europe's oil supplies, that a series of successful Communist revolutions in Central America may have the consequence of diverting American attention away from NATO.

* This is nothing new: Napoleon and Hitler encouraged Russia to expand in the direction of India, while Kaiser Wilhelm II incited it to move against China and Japan. In all three cases the motive was to keep Russia so busy elsewhere that it could not meddle in the affairs of Europe. As early as 1638, the French statesman, Maximilien de Bethune Sully, in his "Great Design," urged the European powers to expel Russia from Europe and leave it alone to fight the Turks and Persians and, presumably, other Asians.

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These matters, which do not happen to impinge on Europe's territorial interests but affect its security in every other respect, are left to the care of the United States and such smaller non-European countries as Washington can persuade, bribe, or cajole into rendering it assistance.

An alliance, so inequitable in its principles and kept in place long after the circumstances that had shaped it have disappeared, is a monument to the short-sightedness of American diplomacy. It really is not so much an alliance as an insurance policy, extended by the United States to Western Europe at no expense to the insured but at an immense cost and risk to the insurer. As such, it offers Moscow superb opportunities for driving wedges between the U.S. and Western Europe. Moscow can, and does, deliberately exacerbate its differences with the United States, while offering "security" to Western Europe, so as to reduce artificially the East-West conflict to one that involves only the two "superpowers," which allegedly does not affect Europe's interests and from which it had best keep out. It heightens this effect by maintaining a stable East-West border in Europe and committing acts of aggression exclusively in regions outside the confines of NATO, where it runs into American but not European resistance. In this manner, Moscow succeeds in implementing the *divide et impera* principle which lies at the heart of its political strategy.

The unwillingness of a fully reconstructed and prosperous Europe to join the United States in a policy of global defense and its political and military parochialism have been the principal causes of the discords troubling the alliance during the past twenty years. True, the United States is also annoyed that its allies, although equally affluent, contribute proportionately less to the common defense, but it is not defense budgets that American participants in a 1982 NBC poll had on their mind when four out of five of them responded negatively to the question whether the allies were "providing the right amount of support for American foreign policies." They meant that the United States was too often left in the lurch to confront Soviet and Soviet-sponsored aggression while the allies looked the other way, as had happened in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, El Salvador, and throughout the Middle East.

The American public takes a very sober, even cynical, view of domestic politics. Its attitude toward foreign policy, however, is a different matter. Essentially insular, Americans see no reason to involve themselves in foreign ventures unless it is to promote some ethical ideal, to make the world better, safer, or more democratic. *Realpolitik* in foreign policy makes no sense to them, since realism tells them to stay home and mind their own business.

Given this attitude, it should cause no surprise that the American public takes a very dim view of allied behavior. In the late 1940's, it had let itself be persuaded to abandon strongly held, traditional objections to "entangling alliances," and committed the country to the defense of the "Free World," understanding this to mean literally the *Free World* and not a military "forward base" for the protection of the continental United States. Rightly or wrongly, the American public sees no connection between the security of Western Europe and that of the United States. It believes that it is acting selflessly in placing troops in Europe and subjecting the continental United States to the risk of a Soviet nuclear attack. Consequently, it is bewildered and angered by Europe's lack of cooperation in other regions of the world, by its unconcealed contempt for the moral element that Americans always inject into their foreign policy and lacking which they cannot be drawn out of their insularity, and by Europe's reluctance to accept nuclear weapons mutually agreed upon to be essential for the Continent's defense.

This mood carries the risk that some day public support in the United States for NATO will erode to the point where its chief executive will no longer be able to call for the sacrifices that the alliance demands. Some European politicians, in private conversation, profess to be untroubled by this prospect on the grounds that the United States needs Europe more than Europe needs the United States, and hence has no choice but to accommodate itself to Europe's actions and inactions. This argument is wholly irresponsible. For one thing, "need" is a subjective concept; the objective reality is that the average American simply is not aware that he needs Europe to defend his country. Nor is the military premise of such thinking sound; for, as Walter Hahn has written, while Europe indeed serves as America's first line of defense, it happens to be Europe's last.

Of all the allied powers, it is the Federal Republic of Germany that makes the greatest contribution to NATO and causes the greatest problems within it. Germany occupies a location of unique importance, in that any military conflict on the Continent is certain to begin on its territory and there to find its decision. Germany has the largest economy in Europe and provides NATO with the largest contingent of troops. The Soviet leadership, aware of these facts, concentrates its political offensive in Europe on West Germany. It knows that should it succeed in neutralizing Germany, NATO would fall apart and the Continent would become indefensible.

To all appearances, the West German population is fully committed to the alliance. Public-opinion polls indicate that most Germans approve of NATO—78 percent desire to remain in NATO, and 63 percent regard it as essential to

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their security. Although anti-Americanism is not uncommon in Germany (it has become for some Europeans a psychological surrogate for anti-Semitism), its sporadic manifestations do not reflect the feelings of the population at large. The personal popularity of Americans is relatively high and if anything it is increasing: in 1957, only 37 percent of Germans responded affirmatively to the question, "Do you like Americans?," whereas in 1981 the proportion of such respondents rose to 56 percent. Fifty-three percent of Germans consider "good relations with the United States" essential for the security of the West, which happens to be a higher proportion than in any other nation of NATO. (By comparison, only one-quarter of British citizens hold this opinion). The Germans, who are among the most heavily polled people in the world, give such answers consistently no matter how the questions are phrased, which indicates a solid majority in favor of the alliance and collaboration with the United States.

But this holds true only as long as the Soviet Union is excluded from the equation and the choice reduces itself to a simple alternative: with NATO and the United States or without them? The instant the USSR is introduced as a factor, the picture turns murky. A good part of the German public wants close association with the NATO allies, but only on condition that this relationship not irritate or appear to menace the Soviet Union. It is as if many Germans wanted the alliance to confine itself to political formalities, largely devoid of military or economic substance; such an alliance would serve Germany as a guarantee that it will not be left alone to face the giant who borders it in the east, that it will have friends to fall back on in the event of trouble, all without having to commit itself to anything faintly anti-Soviet, even if only in a defensive sense.

Thus, 40 percent of West Germans unconditionally oppose the stationing of U.S. nuclear missiles on their soil, regardless of how many such missiles the Soviet Union deploys and targets on Germany. Nearly the same proportion rejects resort to nuclear weapons, even in retaliation for Soviet nuclear strikes. These results indicate that fully two-fifths of German citizens are prepared to surrender once it becomes certain that the alliance cannot defend itself conventionally against either a conventional or a nuclear Soviet assault. Asked whether Germany should cooperate more closely with the United States or the Soviet Union, 56 percent express a preference for the first option, and only 1 percent for the second, but an important bloc (32 percent) want "an even-handed" policy toward both Washington and Moscow.

These results indicate that there exists in Germany a sizable body of committed neutralists—between one-third and two-fifths of the population—who have psychologically opted out of the alliance and regard it either as altogether undesirable or at best as a symbolic bond that imposes no serious obligations on their country. Sociological inquiries indicate that a high proportion of these neutralists consists of mass-educated young people—teachers, students, and functionaries—products of the ambitious higher-education programs of postwar Germany, who live in a cultural no-man's-land and whose prospects for securing jobs commensurate with what they consider their skills and abilities are so low as to breed in them a permanent state of discontent.

The mood of its electorate obliges every German administration, regardless of its own preferences, to conduct an ambivalent foreign policy in which professions of undying loyalty to the Western alliance are coupled with assurances to the Soviet Union that it can count on Germany being a reliable "partner," and an "intermediary" between East and West. ("Our national interest does not allow us to stand between East and West," Chancellor Brandt pronounced cryptically in 1970. "Our country needs cooperation and harmony with the West and agreement with the East.") German governments are indubitably committed to the defense of the central front, which, after all, cuts across their own territory. They are also willing discreetly to provide money and political support to nations threatened by the Communists: this they have done with excellent results in Portugal and Turkey. But they are emphatically not prepared either to withhold economic and technical aid from the Soviet bloc or to participate in any effort to cope with Soviet military expansion outside the confines of NATO.

In some measure this ambivalence can be explained by geography and history. Germany—Communist and democratic alike—is the focal point of East-West confrontations and the battlefield in any potential war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This location makes Germans particularly sensitive to any worsening of relations between the two blocs. Another factor is the memory of Nazism, which has the effect of discrediting both militarism and anti-Communism; for many Germans, the notion of an anti-Communist alliance evokes sordid associations with the Axis. But probably the most important consideration influencing German attitudes toward the East-West conflict is the division of Germany: Germany is the only politically bifurcated country in Europe, one-fifth of whose population and nearly one-third of whose territory are under foreign occupation.

GERMANS have never reconciled themselves to the status of a truncated nation, and the desire for reunification is a powerful force in their politics. Theoretically, there are two ways by which reunification can be accom-

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plished: by force or by conciliation. Force is not a realistic option under any conceivable circumstances; even if Germany decided to resort to war to recover its eastern marches, it could not do so alone, and not a single ally would support it. It is the alternative, conciliation, that appears feasible and attractive. Since the 1960's German policies toward the USSR have been strongly affected by the hope that *Ostpolitik*, the German variant of détente, will increase contacts between the two Germanys to the point where somehow, in the end, reunification will occur. The expectation is almost certainly misplaced: there is not the remotest chance that the Soviet Union will ever allow East Germany—its military and political springboard against Western Europe—to join with West Germany except on terms that would amount to the Federal Republic being detached from its allies and transformed into a Soviet client state. Nevertheless, the hope persists and affects policy in many ways.

Extensive commercial relations with Moscow are one price that Bonn must pay and is not averse to paying for access to East Germany. In the 1960's, West Germany tried to make direct contact with its Communist half but that endeavor was thwarted. It discovered eventually that the road to East Berlin required a detour through Moscow. Moscow closely monitors relations between the two halves of Germany and exacts a price for its friendly services—when Bonn is accommodating, it facilitates contacts; when not, it blocks them. Should West Germany ever dare to join the United States in a program of embargoes and boycotts, it would promptly find its lines of communication with East Germany—a very important matter to the millions of Germans who have relatives there—reduced or even cut. West Germany is for the Soviet Union the most important trading partner in NATO, and since East-West trade generally calls for Western credits and subsidies, it is also the recipient of generous German economic aid.

THIS economic aid is extended to the Soviet Union and its East European colonies not only directly, but also indirectly, by way of East Germany. The founders of the European Economic Community (EEC), which came into being in 1957, in a special protocol attached to the Treaty of Rome, decided to treat Germany as a single political entity. This little-known provision has made Communist East Germany a de-facto member of the EEC, able to enjoy its bounties but exempt from its obligations. The critical factor is that trade between the two halves of Germany is regarded as internal trade, which means that West German firms can import goods from East Germany without having to pay the duties imposed on the other members of the EEC whenever they import from non-members. Through this loophole, East Germany can unload its merchandise in the EEC duty-free. The protocol is so strictly enforced that the exact dimensions of the intra-German trade cannot be determined because Bonn treats it as an internal matter and refuses to share the information with its allies. The arrangement brings no mean profits to the West German economy as well. It is common practice, for instance, for West German firms, eager to profit from lower labor costs there, to subcontract to East Germany; as long as the contractor is West German, the manufactured goods (they are said to include uniforms for the West German army!) are admitted duty-free.

Nor does Bonn's assistance to Communist Germany stop at trade. It has generously lent it vast sums of money (at latest reckoning, East Germany's debts amount to $13 billion, most of it owed to West Germany). When, in 1983, East Germany could not meet its interest payments and teetered on the brink of insolvency, Franz-Joseph Strauss, Germany's leading right-wing politician, came to its rescue by arranging a one-billion-deutschmark ($400 million) loan to East Germany, without political strings attached and without the usual stipulation that the money be used to purchase West German products.

West German subsidies to the East German economy also assume some highly exotic forms. It is estimated, for example, that in the past twenty years, Bonn has ransomed from East German jails 20,000 political prisoners at an average price of 50,000 DM ($20,000) per head, which amounts to the transfer of nearly half-a-billion dollars. In 1983, West Germany completed the construction of a superhighway connecting Berlin with Hamburg. Its ostensible purpose is to ease the economic isolation of West Berlin, but it might just conceivably someday also help solve the transportation problems of Soviet armored units stationed in East Berlin in their race to the North Sea.

When confronted with the evidence and criticized for it, Germans are prone to respond that geographic proximity and age-old contacts have made them uniquely qualified to understand the Russians and to deal with them. One would feel more encouraged by this self-confidence were it not for the historical record. After all, it was the Germans who in World War I had made it possible for the Bolsheviks to come to power in Russia and to hold on to it when in 1918 they were near collapse. In World War II, it was they who brought Russia into the eastern half of Europe. Many of them pride themselves today on conducting a highly sophisticated policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy that someday will pay rich dividends. But one wonders whether they are not once again deceiving themselves, and instead of doing the manipulating are not themselves the victims of manipulation, who will end up fatally weakening the Western alliance without obtaining anything from Moscow in return.

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THESE various strains and inequities call for a reassessment of an alliance that no longer meets the needs of the time. However the matter is worked out in practice, if NATO is to remain viable, changes seem unavoidable. One alternative is for NATO to expand its responsibilities beyond its present confines, to include at least some areas contiguous to Europe, particularly the Middle East. But since it is the unanimous opinion of knowledgeable persons that European parliaments would never approve such a revision of the terms of the alliance, one may have to look for another solution, namely, creating a separate alliance with selected members of NATO to assume this responsibility.

An alternative arrangement would be for the allies to take upon themselves a greater share of the burden of self-defense while the United States withdrew the bulk of its forces from Europe to be able to fulfill its global responsibilities better. It is difficult to see how the United States can continue to meet the global Soviet threat when the overwhelming bulk of its forces is allocated to the defense of Europe and the forces of its European allies are exclusively committed to this end.

Whatever the best solution, clearly something must be done about a treaty that is more than a third of a century old, that was conceived before the USSR had missiles and an oceangoing navy and Western Europe had a GNP greater than that of the United States.

In objection to such proposals, it is said that, should the United States withdraw its troop contingents, Europe would turn neutral and arrive at an accommodation with the Soviet Union. To this argument there are two rejoinders. First, if, indeed, all that prevents Western Europe from Finlandizing itself is the presence of U.S. troops, then it becomes questionable whether it can or should be defended; the function of NATO, after all, is to safeguard Europe from the Soviet Union, not from itself.

Secondly, the threat need not be taken very seriously. Western Europe desperately does not want to become dependent on the Soviet Union, let alone share the fate of Europe's eastern half. Under the present arrangement, it can avoid either fate because it has U.S. guarantees, purchased at almost no cost. Having persuaded themselves and the United States that NATO primarily serves the interests of U.S. security, not their own, America's allies are in the comfortable position of being able to eat their cake (conduct a militarily limited and politically semi-neutralist policy) and have it too (enjoy U.S. military protection if this policy fails). One cannot blame them for taking advantage of such an opportunity: NATO probably represents a singular instance in history of an alliance in which the senior partner asks too little rather than too much of his allies.

For these reasons one need not worry that a gradual shift of responsibility for the defense of Western Europe to the Europeans would lead to a disintegration of the alliance and the loss of the continent. Michel Tatu, a prominent French journalist, argued this point very convincingly in the July 1975 *Foreign Affairs*:

> Every government and every society seeks security not in order to become part of one or another system and thus as an end in itself, but because security will permit the government or the society to maintain its identity and its values. Just as a shipwrecked person who has lost one plank will not let himself drown but will look for another plank, so there is no reason to suppose that the European governments, not abandoned by America but simply invited to take charge progressively of their own defense, will immediately give up the values in whose name they [have] so long attached themselves to America. . . .
>
> Must one believe that the European attachment to liberalism and democracy is valid only so long as the United States is willing to guarantee these values? Or is it rather the contrary, that the alliance with America springs from the Europeans' own attachment to these values? The argument that Europe would turn herself into another Finland lacks dignity as well as cogency.

Should Western Europe confront the prospect of Finlandization or still worse, it is certain to galvanize its resources; but this can happen only if and when the United States extricates itself from the psychological dependence on the alliance, which allows many Europeans to pretend they are doing the United States a favor in allowing themselves to be defended.

3. *The Economic Aspect*

IN THE West it is widely believed that the Soviet economy is self-sufficient and that commercial relations with the West are an option that Moscow is at liberty to exercise or to reject. This assumption makes it possible to argue that there is no point in resorting to sanctions and embargoes to withhold equipment and technology from Communist states: the only effect such measures have is to push the Soviet Union toward autarky, to deprive Western firms of business, and to worsen the climate of international relations.

For all its popularity, this argument rests on a fallacious premise. Solid evidence that no one so far has been able to refute shows that the Soviet economy has never been self-sufficient and today is less so than ever. From 1921 on, almost without interruption, the USSR has been importing from the West significant quantities of materiel and know-how to modernize existing industries and to introduce new technology. In the words of Anthony Sutton, the author of the most compre-

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hensive survey of the subject, "From 1930 to 1945 Soviet technology was in effect Western technology converted to the metric system."* The debt of the Soviet Union to Western assistance is not widely known because neither of the parties involved wishes to advertise it—the Soviet Union wants to avoid the embarrassment of conceding that it is more or less permanently dependent on the "capitalist camp," while Western firms are coy about doing business with a power that most Westerners view as hostile and spend great sums to arm themselves against. (To this day, the U.S. Department of Commerce will not release lists of industrial corporations granted export licenses to the Soviet Union, although such business is perfectly legitimate.)

Western assistance to the Soviet economy began as early as 1921, with the inauguration of Lenin's New Economic Policy. At that time the not inconsiderable industrial plant that the Bolsheviks had inherited from the czarist regime lay in shambles; Russian industry, for all practical purposes, had ceased to function. The first foreigners invited to help with industrial reconstruction came from Germany, with which Moscow had signed a trade agreement in 1921. Their assistance helped Soviet industry attain prewar production levels by 1927. In the late 1920's, the USSR switched most of its business to the United States, whose corporations became a major factor in the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan. At that time, Ford Motors constructed in Soviet Russia a huge integrated plant at Gorkii to build Model A cars, trucks, and buses. General Electric helped with the development of the Soviet electrical industry, while DuPont contributed to the chemical and RCA to the communications industry. Sutton estimates that during this critical phase of Soviet industrial development, at least 95 percent of Soviet industries benefited from Western assistance.

This cooperation continued during the 1930's. The McKee Corporation of Cleveland designed the famous Magnitogorsk steel mill, a copy of the U.S. Steel plant at Gary, Indiana, then the largest integrated iron and steel plant in the world. All the refineries in Russia's principal oil-producing area at Baku were constructed by U.S. firms, which also furnished them with the bulk of their drilling and pumping equipment. Most of the plants built during the third Five-Year Plan (1936-40), with the exception of those working exclusively for the military, were planned and in many cases constructed by Western companies, including (for a while) even those from Nazi Germany. Later on, during the war, U.S. Lend-Lease provided the USSR not only with expendable military materiel but also with advanced equipment, which is estimated to have increased Soviet industrial potential by one-third.

The point is that Western involvement was at no time marginal and therefore a matter of choice; it was all along essential to the entire Soviet industrialization drive. "During the period from 1930 to 1945, Soviet technology was almost completely a transfer from Western countries. . . ." Sutton concludes, "No major technology or major plant under construction between 1930 and 1945 has been identified as a purely Soviet effort."

So much for the vaunted Soviet-self-sufficiency under Stalin. In the decade immediately following World War II, the USSR imported little from the West because it needed time to absorb its Lend-Lease equipment and the immense quantities of war booty that it had seized in Germany and Eastern Europe. The purchase of Western equipment and know-how resumed in the late 1950's, this time on a grander scale than ever before.

The critical factor which made such an expansion of individual imports possible was a change in the attitude of Western governments: whereas before they had been rather neutral toward trade with Moscow, they now began actively to encourage it. It is difficult to tell whether in this case economic interest was the driving force and the expectation of political benefits a rationalization, or the other way around; the consequences were the same. Since the late 1950's, Western governments have cooperated with their banks and business corporations to promote exports of industrial equipment and technology to the USSR and Eastern Europe, as well as to enhance the latter's ability to earn hard currency with which to pay for these goods. Since the USSR is relatively poor in cash and usually suffers an unfavorable balance of trade with the industrial countries, no significant expansion of East-West trade could take place without Western credits, and no credits could flow without government participation.

The latter assumes two forms: Western governments lend directly to Communist countries to enable them to pay for purchases from their business firms, or they guarantee repayment of the loans extended to the exporting firms by private banks. By availing themselves of this credit, Warsaw Pact countries have run up a debt of over $80 billion, most of it in the decade of the 1970's. The USSR normally insists on paying interest rates on its loans that are substantially below (as much as 5 percent) those prevailing on international markets. The purpose of this practice, with which Western governments and banks connive, is to help the Soviet Union maintain the reputation for unique credit-worthiness

* *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945* (Hoover Institution, 1971), p. 329. In his three-volume detailed account of Soviet purchases of Western equipment and technology, of which this is the second volume, Sutton comes to conclusions that are uncomfortable for many businessmen and economists. For this reason his work tends to be either dismissed out of hand as "extreme" or, more often, simply ignored.

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and, in this manner, to enhance its international prestige. As a rule, the USSR discreetly compensates its creditors for their losses on interest by paying premiums for the goods and services purchased with the borrowed money.

An interesting variant in East-West trade practices are the so-called "compensation" deals under which the USSR repays its loans not in cash but in the product that the loans had made possible. This method has been employed in financing the Siberian pipeline, the costs of which are to be recovered in future deliveries of natural gas.* For a while the Soviet leadership believed that it had found in "compensation" arrangements a kind of financial perpetual-motion machine: Western firms would develop Soviet industrial capacities and natural resources at little or no cost to Moscow, receive payment in the product, reinvest the proceeds, and so on, in perpetuity. Unfortunately, it soon dawned on the Soviet Union's European partners that by so doing they were competing against themselves and as a result compensation deals became much less popular than expected.

WESTERN economic involvement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the 1960's has been deep and consequential. Once again, as had happened in the 1890's and 1930's, Russia has secured in the West help essential to modernizing those industries that advances in technology had rendered obsolete and learning about technologies that it has not been able to master on its own.

A survey of the technology acquired by the USSR from the West in the past quarter-century shows the following:

Motor vehicles: Italy has built for the Soviet Union at Togliatti a giant automobile plant (equipped mainly, it is to be noted, with U.S. machinery) to turn out copies of Fiat passenger cars, while Pullman-Swindell of Pittsburgh, a subsidiary of the M. W. Kellogg Company, has constructed for Moscow on the Kama River the world's largest truck plant. The two establishments account for the production of one-half of Soviet passenger cars and heavy trucks, respectively.

Oil industry: the equipment purchased by the USSR from the West has enabled it to raise its oil production substantially, by some estimates as much as two million barrels a day, which at 1984 prices brings in (or saves) $21 billion a year; in effect, this imported technology subsidizes Soviet energy exports to Eastern Europe.

Chemical industry: the USSR has carried out an ambitious program of importing chemical plants from the West. These have largely freed it from the necessity of buying chemicals abroad.

Electronic industry: the Soviet Union has made abroad significant purchases of integrated-circuit technology.

Steel: Moscow has purchased abroad the equipment to produce high-grade specialized steel; currently, the French company Creusot-Loire is constructing in the USSR a mill capable of turning out seven million tons of such steel annually.

Ammonia: Western equipment has enabled the USSR to become the world's leading exporter of industrial ammonia.

Natural gas: the story of the Yamal pipeline, built with the assistance of critical Western technology (large-diameter pipes and compressors) and capital is well known. At present, negotiations are quietly under way to continue such development beyond the existing line. In addition, the German company Mannesmann, AG, is negotiating for contracts to build in the Soviet Union synthetic liquid fuel plants estimated to be worth as much as $16.5 billion.

Shipping: The bulk of the Soviet merchant navy —the largest in the world—consists of vessels built by foreign shipyards.

Unusual reticence accompanies these and other industrial endeavors, as if the parties had a gentleman's agreement to keep the information privileged.

THE industrial assistance given to the Soviet Union helps its military effort directly and indirectly—directly, by providing so-called "dual-use" technology which can be applied to the production of both military and non-wartime equipment; and indirectly, by strengthening the Soviet military-mobilization base. The development of Soviet energy resources has the effect of providing the USSR with hard currency which its own economy cannot generate; normally most of it is spent on acquiring abroad equipment of some military application.

The "dual-use" technology, lavishly sold to the USSR in the 1960's and especially the 1970's, has had a most impressive effect in enhancing Soviet military power. While basic Soviet military equipment is of native manufacture, the West and Japan have supplied the Soviet war industry with specialized and advanced technology which Soviet engineers integrate into their output—it makes all the difference between equipment of passable and of superior quality. A plant built by a U.S. corporation to manufacture rock-drill bits to explore for oil can be and very likely is used to turn out anti-tank ammunition. Specialized steel, sold to the USSR, has a variety of applications in tank armor and submarine hulls. Integrated circuits,

* After these costs have been repaid, the income generated by gas sales is expected to be used by Moscow to buy imports from Germany and the other countries in Western Europe. It was the desire to place cash in Soviet hands for such purchases rather than the alleged need to diversify energy supplies that motivated the German government, financial institutions, and corporations to promote the Siberian pipeline with such single-minded determination, even at the risk of conflict with the United States.

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knowledge of which was acquired in the West, make critical contributions to electronic warfare. And it takes no great imagination to realize that the heavy trucks that the Kama River truck plant turns out are either shipped to the Red Army or earmarked for it in the event of hostilities. The same applies to the merchant marine, which in peacetime fishes and transports cargoes, but forms an integral part of the Soviet Navy and operates under its command.

The most shocking instance of the contribution that Western technology has made to Soviet military capabilities was the sale by the U.S. in the early 1970's of equipment to manufacture miniature ball bearings. In 1959-60, the Soviet leadership decided to proceed with the mass-production of nuclear weapons. German technology, acquired after World War II, combined with native science and industry, provided nearly all the components required.

Among the equipment that could not be produced domestically, however, was machinery to manufacture large quantities of miniature ball bearings for missile-guidance systems. At the time, Soviet representatives approached the only firm that made such machinery, the Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, of Springfield, Vermont. In 1961, with Soviet orders pending, Bryant applied for a license to sell this equipment to the Soviet Union, but Defense Department objections caused President Kennedy to deny the application. In 1972, in the more favorable climate of détente, Bryant applied once again for a license to ship its Centalign grinders to the USSR. This time, permission came through. The ball bearings produced by this U.S. equipment are almost certainly integrated into the guidance system of Soviet missiles. In the opinion of some experts, they have materially contributed to the enhancement of the accuracy of Soviet missiles, to the extent of putting at risk the U.S. force of Minuteman ICBM's and requiring the development of the MX.

NATO long ago recognized the need to withhold from the USSR, and from countries likely to pass on to the USSR, equipment with obvious and direct military applications. In practice, enforcement of this principle has been hopelessly lax, especially since the inauguration of détente.

The agency charged with monitoring technology transfer to the East is known by the acronym COCOM. Formed by NATO countries in 1949 with headquarters in Paris, and joined a few years later by Japan, COCOM maintains lists of embargoed technology, agreed upon by the allies. Alas, COCOM is virtually powerless to carry out its mandate. It is assigned an absurdly small budget (under $500,000 a year) with a correspondingly minuscule staff and can only recommend but not enforce its recommendations. In practice, it routinely processes and approves requests for the sale of equipment and technology to the Soviet bloc; and on the infrequent occasions when it turns down a request, it has no means of insuring that its decisions are implemented, because it has neither the necessary authority nor the personnel. After President Nixon assumed office, the U.S. relaxed its more stringent national rules on exports to Communist countries, which in turn caused a further dilution of COCOM.

If one adds that the neutral countries of Europe—Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria—do not receive COCOM recommendations and both sell embargoed material and provide transit for it, it becomes evident that few effective restrictions exist on the transfer to the Communist bloc of advanced technology with direct military application. The West, notably the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Japan, which together account for nearly two-thirds of the technology sold to the USSR (1979), constitutes a giant supermarket of military know-how where the USSR shops (often with borrowed money) for goods to integrate into its arsenal of destruction.

The United States seems most aware of the danger of such sales and makes an earnest effort to control them. But Washington has difficulty maintaining its resolve in the face of unremitting pressure from both the allies and domestic commercial interests, usually backed by the Departments of State and Commerce, which argue that such restrictions serve only to divert Soviet business elsewhere. In his first eighteen months in office, President Reagan tried to enforce industrial controls, but his resolve weakened as the allies refused to cooperate and U.S. business firms loudly complained. By the end of 1983, he seemed to have given up trying.

The sad reality is that while there are powerful vested interests lobbying for exports, no one has a vested interest in restricting the flow of technology to the potential enemy. Private enterprise does not seem especially concerned with who buys its product, as if oblivious of any connection between technology and military power; and governments lack the will to impose considerations higher than immediate profit on business. So it happens that while the West busily arms itself, it also helps arm its opponent.

THE transfer of military technology, however, is not the only problem; another major Western contribution to the Soviet military effort lies in assistance extended to its mobilization base. In the Soviet Union the line separating the military and civilian economies is so indistinct as to be almost meaningless, inasmuch as the leadership views the entire national economy as either actually or potentially destined for military ends: we are dealing here with a war economy operating on an intermediate level of mobilization. Soviet military person-

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nel participate closely in economic planning and carry a strong, probably critical, voice in decisions on allocations for the civilian sector of the economy. The central planning agency, Gosplan, makes no major investments unless the generals on its staff are satisfied that they meet the needs of wartime mobilization. Furthermore, each major industrial establishment has a military office that supervises those departments working for the armed forces. On the eve of World War II, the German high command compiled a list of Soviet war industries: it turned out to have been virtually identical with a list of Soviet industrial establishments of that time.

Nothing indicates that matters have changed in this respect. Since the Soviet leadership views all industries in the light of their contribution to the war effort, it must view industrial imports in the same manner; from which it follows that *any* contribution to Soviet industrial potential is at the same time a contribution to its war-making potential. Help extended to the Soviet Union to construct plants for the manufacture of goods which ostensibly serve peaceful purposes, such as automobiles and trucks, tractors, or specialized steel, in fact serve a double purpose, partly civilian, partly military, with the military one always paramount.

The other objection to technology and equipment transfer has to do with its effect on the Stalinist system. Foreign technology and foreign credits help prop up an economic regime which shows every sign of having lost its vitality; they also enable Moscow to allocate its capital and resources in a manner that continues to favor the military sector. It is in the interest of the West that the USSR reform its labor policies, raising productivity by greater incentives and decentralized decision-making. This would represent a step toward weakening the economic and political power of the Soviet elite. To the extent that it helps to make the system more efficient, Western technology makes it easier to avoid such reforms. If one can imagine a Soviet economy that would be 100-percent automated and able to dispense with human labor altogether, such an economy would be entirely freed from the need to take the human factor into account. Of course, such an economy is not possible; but everything that contributes to the automation of Soviet production, that supplies it with that which the Stalinist system cannot provide, serves to solidify the despotic arrangement.

IT IS difficult to tell whether the democracies, constrained as they are by vested interests, public opinion,and political rivalries, are capable of sustaining an indirect, long-range policy, which requires the courage of quiet firmness and patience. Unquestionably, it is much easier to evoke a response from a democratic electorate with either calls to arms or promises of eternal peace. What can be said with confidence is that as long as the present, essentially Stalinist, system prevails in the Soviet Union, war will remain an ever-present danger which neither rearmament nor accommodation can entirely avert.

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Westmoreland vs. CBS

Donald P. Shaw & Zane E. Finkelstein

THE months of charges, counter-charges, investigations, and denials following the airing by CBS-TV of *The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception* on January 23, 1982, took a step toward resolution when retired General William C. Westmoreland filed a $120-million libel suit against CBS. Westmoreland, the Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) before and during the Tet offensive of January 1968, contends that CBS committed the libel by portraying him as the principal villain in a conspiracy to falsify and suppress critical intelligence data describing Vietcong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) strength before the Tet attack. Like Tet, the road to the courts has already had a tangled history, but unlike Tet, the last shot has yet to be fired.

Even before *The Uncounted Enemy* went on the air, CBS News opened the public engagement with newspaper ads which flatly proclaimed that the network had found a "conspiracy" of "decisions made at the highest level of military intelligence to suppress and alter critical information.... A deliberate plot to fool the American public, the Congress, and perhaps even the White House...." The widely-placed CBS ad demanded to know "who lied to us," and why, and promised to answer all those questions. Introducing the 90-minute prime-time documentary itself on the air, Mike Wallace, serving as "chief correspondent," said that "Westmoreland chose not to inform the Congress, the President, not even the Joint Chiefs of Staff" of evidence that the U.S. was losing, not winning, the war in Vietnam.

The Uncounted Enemy was greeted by the acclaim of some nationally-known pundits and the outraged denials of those involved in the national-security apparatus at the time of Tet, inside Vietnam and out. The morning after the program a New York *Times* editorial accepted CBS's conspiracy theory in toto, and warned darkly that President Reagan had better protect himself today by finding out what LBJ knew about Tet and when he knew it. Nor was General Westmoreland slow to make himself heard; three days after the CBS broadcast he (along with others who had played a part in the intelligence effort in 1968) categorically denied the allegations, and presented evidence designed to establish that there was no conspiracy, that U.S. intelligence procedures worked properly, and that the elected national leadership in Washington was well aware of the internal situation in South Vietnam long before Tet.

The press conference Westmoreland held to make these statements availed him little. On January 28, Hodding Carter III wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* that "appalling lies," fabricated by "good," that is, duplicitous, soldiers, plus CIA acquiescence in the process, led to bad policy, and he hoped that we would not find out about a similar intelligence scam in El Salvador fourteen years after the fact. Even William F. Buckley, Jr. found the CBS film a "truly extraordinary documentary" which "absolutely" established General Westmoreland's complicity in suppressing vital intelligence data. Philip Geyelin, a Washington *Post* columnist, joined Buckley in applauding the CBS program, saying it laid bare the "sorry record" of our intelligence community's successful effort to lie about crucial intelligence matters. Like most of those who wrote about *The Uncounted Enemy*, Geyelin drew grim parallels with ongoing intelligence estimates, with particular reference to Central America.

CURIOUSLY, however, the virtually unmixed blessings conferred by those charged with the national conscience did not secure a place for *The Uncounted Enemy* on the shelf reserved for honored documentaries. Rumblings from within the industry, even some from inside CBS itself, surfaced. Finally *TV Guide*, in a unique departure from previous editorial policy, launched an investigation of its own into the documentary and published the results on May 29, 1982. In their "Anatomy of a Smear: How CBS Broke the Rules and 'Got' General Westmoreland," Don Kowet and Sally Bedell, both then of *TV Guide*, concluded that CBS News, Mike Wallace, George Crile (the producer), and

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others not only violated the commonly accepted rules of their business, but traduced the network's own internal guidelines as well.

Kowet later went on to write a book-length account of how the CBS team put the documentary together. Claiming to be the complete inside story, *A Matter of Honor*,* like virtually every other part of the CBS-Westmoreland imbroglio, became a matter of controversy even before it hit the bookstores in May of this year. Macmillan, Kowet's publisher, charged that it was the victim of a "seemingly orchestrated" program of harassment designed to keep the book from being released, or to discredit its message. CBS asserted that Kowet never spoke to the people he quoted, and "fabricated" many of the conversations and behind-the-scenes events he described. In what must have been a delicious interlude for the Westmoreland camp, CBS demanded that it be covered "responsibly," charged Kowet with violating the canons of journalistic practice, and promised to hold Macmillan responsible for knowingly publishing "falsehoods and misrepresentations."

But let us return to the events unfolding in 1982. In a reaction to the *TV Guide* findings that was as surprising as that magazine's story itself and was perhaps an industry first, CBS launched its own internal investigation, under an "independent" ombudsman, Burton Benjamin, then a senior executive producer of CBS News. Benjamin's lengthy report of his six-week investigation was not made public, but a memorandum purportedly summarizing the findings was released by Van Gordon Sauter, the president of CBS News, on July 15. Sauter acknowledged the accuracy of a majority of *TV Guide*'s eight findings, including those regarding retaping to achieve "stronger interviews," failing to identify Sam Adams (a former CIA analyst who appeared on the program) as a paid consultant rather than as a disinterested participant, and "insufficient" efforts to seek out and interview more of those who contended there was no conspiracy.

One of the more interesting results of the legal process of "discovery" in connection with the Westmoreland suit has been to force CBS to release the full text of Benjamin's report. While there is much of interest in those findings, one is of immediate concern here. Benjamin confirms what Sauter had earlier not tried to hide: the basic premise of the documentary was that a conspiracy did take place. Indeed, the detailed outline of the program used the words "conspiracy" 24 times, and "conspirator" five times. The report also quotes a June 1982 memorandum from George Crile to Mike Wallace which states, "The documentary they got is the documentary they commissioned."

On August 10, 1982, General Westmoreland asked CBS for a public apology, to be accomplished by his appearance on the network for forty-five unedited minutes, plus unspecified monetary compensation for the damage done to his reputation. CBS countered with an offer of fifteen minutes of airtime as part of a follow-up to its documentary. Westmoreland refused, and the follow-up show fell victim to the alleged refusal of several others invited to participate. Westmoreland's lawsuit was filed soon after, on September 13, 1982.

The *TV Guide* article, and most of Kowet's book, focus on the journalistic failures of the documentary, those largely technical media "lapses" acknowledged even by CBS in its internal investigation. But what about the substance of the alleged deception—the numbers themselves? Here, in the realm of fact, there were three major charges:

First, General Westmoreland was the principal in a conspiracy to alter and falsify hard intelligence figures indicating a vast increase in VC/NVA capabilities prior to the enemy's January 1968 Tet offensive.

Second, Westmoreland and his senior intelligence staff suppressed and concealed the actual strength of the enemy from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, the Congress, and the American people.

Third, because of these misleading indicators, our forces in Vietnam were surprised by the VC/NVA offensive of late January 1968, and as a result suffered large and unnecessary casualties.

Before dealing with these charges, an important point must be made. *The Uncounted Enemy* treated VC/NVA strength as the most decisive indicator of U.S. progress in Vietnam, the dominant influence on strategic and political decisions about the war. That basic premise simply does not hold true in war, any more than an individual's financial position is determined solely by his bank account, or his health by his temperature; wars, like men, have many vital signs. In Southeast Asia, the numerical strength of the enemy was but one of many indicators, and probably not the most important at that.

Now to those supposedly perverted, hidden numbers. What was it that the U.S. and South Vietnam were trying to count, and why? What was the enemy "order of battle" General Westmoreland and others allegedly lied about?

"Order of battle" (OB) is military shorthand for the identification, strength, location, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of a military force: who they are, where, and when; what equipment they have; and how they are organized to fight. One of the greatest disservices done by the CBS program was to imply that the discovery of such facts

* Macmillan, 317 pp., $16.95.

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about the enemy, and their interpretation, is an exercise as simple as counting sacks of potatoes in a warehouse. It may not be that simple even for potatoes; for an order of battle, such a conception is nothing short of idiotic.

The enemy's order of battle is one of his core valuables. It is the key to his house, the code to his thoughts, the path to his future, something he will go to enormous lengths to conceal. Therefore the process of puzzling out the enemy order of battle begins with the deadly adversarial relationship of war, or potential war: one side will risk life and treasure to penetrate what the other side is trying equally desperately to hide.

Given this, how do intelligence agencies build a picture of the adversary's order of battle? The sources of information are defectors, POW's, spies, diplomatic gossip, captured documents, intercepted radio and electronic messages, aerial photography, and so on. These sources are of varying reliability and are often misleading. What part of an ingratiating defector's story can be believed? Is a terrified or wounded POW telling the truth? What about a captured document reporting that unit-recruiting goals have been met, or that collections have exceeded norms? Is the document accurate, or something an overzealous commander may want his superiors to believe? Is an intercepted radio message real, or is it planted to mislead?

The products of this pool of uncertainty are themselves pushed through permeable layers before they reach the form of a printed estimate. An informer, anxious to be retained on the CIA payroll, may be convinced he had better come up with something good; an interpreter may be convinced that the safety of his job in province headquarters depends on favorable POW interrogation reports; a U.S. Province Senior Adviser may think twice about reporting developments which indicate a rapid change in security. On and on it goes, through every human motivation, from gritty determination to report every detail to the lowest springs of personal ambition.

Military professionals know all this; they also know that real gold can be panned from this often dirty stream. But the panning itself adds another element of disagreement and confusion. What are the rules for accepting the evidence and determining what weight is to be assigned to it, and who makes those rules? Each source of information develops its own disciples. Those in "human intelligence" (HUMINT), who deal with people as sources, are confident that they alone can sort the reliable ore from the erroneous, contradictory dross; specialists in "signal intelligence" (SIGINT), who deal in electronic intercepts, are equally sure. And so it goes, through every subsystem of a very arcane business. Advocates are not just officers or analysts, but become partisan carriers of the truth.

The intelligence effort is also compartmentalized; those at each higher level usually have access to more diverse and more numerous sources than do those at levels below, and generally are not allowed to share the information with subordinates. The chief, at whatever echelon, is bombarded with conflicting and strongly held estimates from different organizations, as well as from the different parts of his own. If changes in the estimates occur after the low-level analyst—or the high-level officer—has become convinced of the accuracy and sagacity of his own special insights, he can think of but few explanations, none worthy, of why he has been overruled; ignorance, bias, institutional loyalty, or mindless bureaucractic conformity. Agreement—on a number, a unit, a total—is therefore generally a grudgingly achieved consensus among sovereigns, each trying to compromise with divine revelation.

THUS the order of battle is never graven in stone or conclusively established. When Clausewitz wrote passionately of the fog and friction of war, he underestimated the intelligence process, particularly in a guerrilla war. The enemy's order of battle is a matter of endless controversy always under revision, a controversy barely held in check by discipline, professional respect, loyalty, and bureaucratic imperatives.

And sometimes it is not held in check at all. Certainly inside MACV intelligence channels the disagreement over categories of enemy and their numbers was durable and deep. In a huge "Memorandum in Support of Defendant CBS's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment," CBS's lawyers have produced a number of sworn statements from military officers involved in the OB process that there was indeed a deliberate effort to distort the data. So what appears here as a sort of philosophical argument about how to describe enemy strength was actually a bitter fight involving much more than numbers.

In part, the problem arose from the fact that in several ways the task in Vietnam was more complex than that faced by the U.S. in other wars. U.S. forces, when they arrived in the country, inherited the unsophisticated Vietnamese intelligence structure, and it took some time to organize and develop the U.S. collection effort. Further, it was not until U.S. forces began to achieve major success in the field that a data base for accurate intelligence estimates could be built. It was the hundreds of thousands of captured documents, dug out of areas long denied to South Vietnamese forces, that finally began to reveal the face of the enemy. Ironically, it was our supremacy on the battlefield that led to the current controversy: we found out how little we really knew about the strength of the enemy only in the process of successfully beating that strength down—a situation of great potential confusion. Lastly, the final order of battle for U.S. use was part of a *national* process, and involved a significant contribution from a civilian agency, the CIA.

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According to CBS, the numbers of enemy soldiers coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail in the months before Tet were vastly larger than Westmoreland permitted to be reported. Westmoreland himself seemed to lend credence to this charge when he told Wallace on camera that the infiltration rate in the fall of 1967 was "about 20,000 a month." There was an immediate flashback to a *Meet the Press* program of November 19, 1967, on which Westmoreland had estimated the rate as being between "5,500 and 6,000 a month" during the same period.

But was this juxtaposition as damning as it seemed? The Combined Intelligence Center for Vietnam (CICV), composed of U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence resources, published a monthly OB summary. A part of this summary was a tabulation, an estimate, of traffic "down the trail." Obviously, there had to be a lag between collection, evaluation, and publication. The numbers were continuously revised as more and better information was gathered.

The first CICV estimate of the Tet infiltration total appeared in the OB summary for February 1-29, 1968. It included these totals for the last three months of 1967, the pre-Tet period of interest, and for the month of the offensive itself:

October 1967	2,670
November 1967	3,385
December 1967	2,190
January 1968	19,390

In December 1970 CICV did a retrospective study of "North Vietnam Personnel Infiltration into the Republic of Vietnam" which took account of additional information assembled over the days and months of a major and costly collection effort.* Its numbers were a little higher than the 1968 estimate, but it is clear from both studies that the large jump took place not before Tet, but during (and after):

December 1970 Study	
October 1967	5,300
November 1967	6,500
December 1967	8,800
January 1968	24,000

These numbers were the best the intelligence community was able to produce at that level of classification, and are consistent with the postwar chronicles of North Vietnam's victorious generals.

Conclusion: no massive pre-Tet infiltration into South Vietnam was concealed from anybody. There were sufficient enemy forces already in South Vietnam to launch the Tet attack. Indeed, if, as CBS asserted, there were huge uncounted numbers of troops *already* in Vietnam by 1967, why were scores of thousands more needed to launch an attack never estimated by anyone to involve more than 90,000? The answer, of course, is that such numbers were not needed. What was needed were *replacements*, more fodder, and these troops were sent down the trail, but sent down mainly *after* Tet. The VC/NVA leadership had no need of "20,000 a month" for "months" before Tet—units subject to B-52 attack, or friendly-force discovery, engagement, and decimation. It needed men *after* Tet, to fill units badly depleted by a brutal mauling; it needed them for other offensive operations.

Wallace asked Westmoreland, who had not been fully informed of CBS's real intent, to dredge up fourteen-year-old numbers out of the mass of figures cluttering the memories of his thirty-five years of service. Westmoreland did not, in Nixonian terms, misspeak; he just made a mistake. It is not necessary to be a defender of Westmoreland or the war in Vietnam to reach this conclusion; it is only necessary to look to logic and the record, a record long in the public domain.

Westmoreland taped his interview with the Crile/Wallace team on May 16, 1981. On June 9, 1981 the General wrote to say that he had made a mistake, and that his original statements on *Meet the Press* in 1967 were accurate; he sent CBS documents he considered "corrective." Nonetheless, CBS reported on the air eight months later that "in an interview General Westmoreland surprised us by contradicting his official record. . . ." That record, so far unchallenged, must stand: there was no massive unreported infiltration into South Vietnam in the fall of 1967.

In addition to altering and suppressing the figures on infiltration, Westmoreland was charged by CBS with concealing the actual strength of the enemy from his superiors in Washington and from the American people. Thereby hangs a tale.

In the fall of 1966 Sam Adams, then a CIA researcher in Vietnam working with captured materials, discovered a "document" which revealed that the number of "guerrillas and militiamen" in a province long known as a center of VC strength was larger than that reported in existing estimates. As he continued to develop and extrapolate information on enemy forces, Adams was struck by the contradiction between what he seemed to be finding out about VC/NVA strength and the progress reports sent back from South Vietnam by U.S. officials. At the time Westmoreland's command was using enemy-force figures totaling fewer than 300,000; Adams's estimates found that they were in the "500,000 range, perhaps even . . . higher."

As Adams would later write: "I didn't keep this information secret . . . word of my memorandums reached the White House, cables were

* Note that this retrospective study was done long after the departure of Westmoreland and any others with any stake in a cover-up.

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passing back and forth between Saigon and Washington." As a result of this controversy over the numbers, General Earl G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the request of Walt W. Rostow, President Johnson's Assistant for National Security Affairs, convened a meeting in Honolulu in January 1967 to examine the evidence. Adams was there but his views did not prove persuasive. In September 1967 he presented his case again in Saigon, and again he failed to convince. He did no better in Washington where, in November 1967, before the independent Office of National Estimates, he was given an almost unprecedented two hours to make the case for his figures. The Deputy Director of the CIA also discussed Adams's charges and findings with the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and Adams himself was interviewed by Patrick Coyne, the Executive Secretary of the board. Still he did not prevail.

In August 1967 a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of the capabilities of the "Vietnamese Communists to conduct military operations in South Vietnam over the next year or so" was drafted; after tough debate, it was published (though classified Top Secret) in November 1967. After noting a substantial improvement in the quantity and reliability of the information available, this study pointed out that the "unconventional nature" of the war made for difficult intelligence problems, with "complex methodological approaches which cannot rise above the uncertain data inputs." In short, many of the figures were questionable and difficult to interpret with confidence.

Nonetheless, Communist forces were divided into seven categories—as opposed to Adams's vague "guerrillas and militiamen"—of varying capabilities and missions, each described and, where deemed possible counted. The U.S. estimators were "reasonably confident" about the "regular forces," the NVA and the VC Main and Local Forces, assigning a total of 118,000 men to these "well-armed" units. But with this one exception, they found that all the other elements (service units, political units, guerrillas, and other irregulars) had been *previously underestimated*, and set about to provide new data—all this several months before Tet. In the careful conclusion of the estimate:

> In sum, the Communist military political organization is complex, and its aggregate numerical size cannot be estimated with confidence. Moreover, any such aggregate total would be misleading since it would involve adding components that have widely different missions and degrees of skill or dedication. The . . . military force is now at least 223,000-248,000. It must be recognized, however, that this military force constitutes but one component of the total Communist organization. Any comprehensive judgment of Communist capabilities in South Vietnam must embrace the effectiveness of all the elements which comprise that organization, *the total size of which is of course considerably greater than the given figure for the military force.* [Emphasis added]

According to CBS, this failure to include the VC "irregulars" in the military OB constituted a ploy by Westmoreland to understate enemy forces. CBS charged that during the SNIE negotiations Westmoreland was "suddenly saying" that an "entire category of the Vietcong army" no longer posed a military threat and must "henceforth be treated as if [it] didn't exist."

WHY DID MACV insist that the VC irregular forces—called by the Communists "self-defense forces," "secret self-defense forces," and "assault youth"—be dropped from the *military* OB? The answer was not a conspiracy, but MACV's belief (and the CIA's) that it now had the capability to give a more accurate description of the VC's complex organizational structure and its military weight. If the data punched into MACV's computers showed that the enemy's fighting organizations (the NVA and VC Main and Local Forces) were being badly mauled on the battlefield, they also showed that some of his shadowy support elements had been undercounted. These irregular units were largely untrained and unarmed, and of limited utility; they were, however, a part of that manpower pool from which the VC could and did draw in the areas it controlled. Including estimates for these large but spongy elements in the military OB would distort the enemy's fighting strength in a war which had, by 1967, become increasingly a large *unit* war. MACV believed that its revised estimate was more descriptive, coherent, and useful than the earlier scheme.

The revised estimating process was consistent for the friendly side as well. There was a South Vietnamese (SVN) counterpart to the VC irregular forces. Called the Hamlet Militia, these poorly armed and trained adjuncts to local defense were administered by the Department of Interior, not Defense, and were not included in the SVN OB.

That same consistency of judgment ran through the U.S. forces themselves. MACV Directive 381-46 of December 1967 provided policy guidance for handling POW's and "detainees." POW's were defined as members of NVA and VC Main and Local Forces. All others (including "guerrillas"), unless captured "while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act under arms," or who admitted or could be proved to have participated in such activities, were to be treated as *civilian* detainees. Detainees were subject to trial by SVN law, not held in POW status. This distinction applied even if the person caught was engaged in "terrorism, sabotage, or spying."

It is clear from all this that MACV's effort to

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make a careful distinction among the categories of enemy forces was more than a policy ploy; it was the result of what its leadership considered the best use of the intelligence available.

One of the SNIE's objectives was to describe, and where possible quantify, the "Vietcong army"; it did that. Further, according to Adams himself, as well as other sources, it was not Westmoreland but Adams's CIA boss, George Carver, who suggested that the intelligence on the irregulars was too "soft" to count. By contrast, as we have just seen, the SNIE stressed that structures other than Main and Local Forces *did* matter, and that U.S. estimators had previously undercounted them. These structures were large, and any "comprehensive" judgment of enemy capabilities in South Vietnam had to consider them a significant part of enemy strength.

The President's office, the Congress, and the military establishment all got the 1967 SNIE. No repression or concealment there. But what about the American people? Were they deceived?

The answer is in the public record. On November 24, 1967, Brigadier General Winant Sidle, General Westmoreland's Public Affairs Officer—after the Hawaii OB conference, after the Saigon conference, after the SNIE was published, and with apparent inter-agency clearance—met with the press in Saigon. In remarks close to the SNIE wording, Sidle said:

> Information from documents captured this year strongly suggest that the guerrilla forces have been *considerably larger* than we believed. . . .
>
> Whereas the guerrillas are a definite "military threat" our newest intelligence indicates that the other subdivisions in the old "irregular" total—the self-defense and secret self-defense forces—should not be considered part of the *military* order of battle. We have, therefore, removed them from the order of battle. . . .
>
> Now, let me turn to the Vietcong political structure. . . . From now on we will carry an estimate of these cadres but they will not be carried as a part of the total *military* strength. . . .
>
> For a long time we have carried a figure of 39,000 to 40,000 for this political infrastructure. . . . Our increased intelligence now permits us to focus on the infastructure in much more detail and we have modified that . . . estimate to a figure of 75,000 to 85,000. . . .
>
> The function of the political cadre is not military. Therefore, we will no longer carry them in our *military* order of battle. . . . We must consider them in enemy estimates even though we have separated them out from the armed forces estimates. [Emphasis added throughout]

The next day, November 25, 1967, General Sidle's briefing was reported by Tom Buckley in a special dispatch to the New York *Times*.

Bearing in mind, then, that the question is not whether the "irregular" enemy forces should have been included in the military OB—that is still debatable—but whether General Westmoreland and others conspired to "suppress and alter" the "true nature of enemy strength," and concealed the fact that they had done so, the answer must be no, they did not.

Now the third issue: the Tet "surprise." Before the Detroit Economic Club on December 18, 1967, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that there was still "heavy fighting ahead . . . there may be a Communist threat similar to the desperate effort of the Germans in the . . . Bulge. . . ." On January 17, 1968, still two weeks before Tet, the Washington *Star* carried an article on the situation in Vietnam under the headline, "Viet War in Lull, Tet Offensive Seen by Westmoreland." The piece quoted Westmoreland as expecting "a resurgence of enemy initiatives just before or just after Tet." The *Star* was not alone; other newspapers and magazines picked up the warnings that heavy fighting could lie ahead around Tet. The January 18 Washington *Post*, for instance, reported that "Westmoreland Sees Hard Fighting Soon," and *U.S. News & World Report* on January 29 saw "Taking Shape: Big New Clash in Vietnam."

The alerts being sounded in the printed media (though rarely on television news) were just echoes of those heard in military headquarters from Saigon to Washington. On December 8, an army intelligence summary predicted "a general counteroffensive and a general uprising." By December 20 Westmoreland was warning his superiors in messages (unclassified by 1981 and freely available to CBS researchers) that the enemy had decided to "undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period." U.S. units scheduled to be sent to Vietnam were hurried into the country; inside Vietnam, forces were shifted to meet the major assaults predicted to take place in the north, near the DMZ.

It is unlikely that General Westmoreland, or any other leader, U.S. or Vietnamese, believed that the VC/NVA leadership would violate the customary Tet ceasefire, but Westmoreland sought, and obtained, President Johnson's permission to shorten the truce traditionally arranged for the period, and to cancel it altogether for large parts of northern South Vietnam. A former South Vietnamese intelligence official has noted that in contrast to his own country's forces, U.S. troop units were placed on alert forty-eight hours *before* the enemy offensive began, and that our intelligence "took no chances."

President Johnson was well aware of the storm warnings being flown for the Tet period. He had taken them sufficiently to heart to warn the Australian Cabinet, in a December 1967 visit there,

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that he expected a maximum effort, with "kamikaze" attacks around the holiday. *But he did not warn the American people.* Years later, looking back on early 1968, Johnson was "convinced I made a mistake by not saying more about Vietnam in my State of the Union report on January 17, 1968." Instead, he relied on background briefings provided to the press "for many weeks" which had "stressed the heavy action to be expected soon," and the dispositions made to defend U.S. forces against attack. In his memoirs Johnson judged himself "too cautious" in one of those "delicate situations" in which "we had to try to inform our own people without alerting the enemy to our knowledge of its plans." In his 1972 book, *Diffusion of Power,* Walt Rostow, Johnson's National Security Adviser, confirmed the President's detailed knowledge of the coming onslaught; he also told CBS about it in more than three hours of taping done for the program—not a word of which was ever broadcast.

It is difficult to accept CBS's contention that Tet caught the "mighty American army . . . unprepared." It is even less likely that the President was exposed to the "enemy's intentions" but not "his capabilities," as CBS charged. Producer/reporter Crile wrote to Rostow on January 15, 1982 to assert that "We did not suggest that the enemy's attack at Tet came as a surprise to the White House or the American military command" —yet that assertion *would* come as a surprise to any of the program's publicists or viewers.

Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own facts. The evidence available indicates that:

- There was no deceit in the enemy order of battle.
- There was no concealment of a pre-Tet buildup.
- There was no "Pearl Harbor" surprise at Tet.
- There was no conspiracy to suppress or alter the estimates.

On October 14, 1972, by his own account, Sam Adams tried to peddle his piece of the then still Top Secret SNIE analysis to Congressman Lucien Nedzi of the House Intelligence Committee. He also pushed his estimate on the General Counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Neither was inspired to action. Adams then went public in *Harper's* in May 1975, and on September 11, the House Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee) listened to him for about two-and-one-half hours of open testimony, followed by several hours of rebuttal from a number of witnesses. The Pike Committee, together with Les Aspin and Ron Dellums, long counted among the most outspoken critics of the military in Congress, were so unimpressed with his story that they did nothing about it. No headline, no bold print, no hue and cry. The entire "story" was also set out at length in Thomas Powers's 1979 biography of Richard Helms.

Why then did CBS in 1982 repeat—in a hot, calculated way—such reports from the past? These things could have been expected in the emotionally charged days of the war, but why now? Was this, as *TV Guide* charged, just another media smear, a TV hatchet job? Was it, as Don Kowet writes in *A Matter of Honor,* a story CBS got wrong because of bias? Was CBS out to "get" a retired general?

Perhaps. Others imagine that by attacking the integrity of the wartime military commander, plus that of his staff, the Defense Department, and the intelligence sources, not just the judgment but the probity of all intelligence estimates is being put to question, undermining the credibility of our whole intelligence structure. It is to be hoped that the trial will show why, during a period of high and increasingly unpopular military budgets, and of anxieties over "another Vietnam" in Central America, CBS should have seen fit to devote ninety minutes of prime time to a story like this.

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Christianity's Break with Judaism

Hyam Maccoby

WHICH is the true continuation of the ancient Israelite religion—the Christian church, or the Jewish synagogue? To simple believers on each side, the answer has always seemed obvious, and the opposite answer absurd. To Christians, it has seemed plain that since Jesus fulfilled the Old Testament prophecies, the Christian church was entitled to the designation "Israel," which no longer belonged to the renegade Jews. To Jews, an unbroken chain of tradition, from Moses to Hillel and onward, combined with a continuity of kinship and attachment to the Holy Land, has made it unthinkable that they were anything other than the true House of Israel.

More sophisticated Christians have used more sophisticated arguments. In these, a prominent role has been played by non-canonical books which were alleged to show a continuity between the Old Testament and the New Testament. In Judaism, according to one such Christian argument, there was a breakdown of inspiration after the last prophets of the Old Testament; from there to the Mishnah, the body of law codified in the 2nd century C.E., there was only a desert, and the Mishnah itself was but the barren culmination of five centuries of legalism. In this scheme the non-canonical books represent an underground current of religious inspiration which finally broke out into the full stream of Christianity. For in them we find concepts—visions of God, of the heavens, and of the Last Days—that stand in contrast to the regulation of a humdrum life by rules which is what Judaism after the Old Testment is alleged to have become.

This at any rate is the view that governed the labors of R.H. Charles, the general editor of the great work in two volumes, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* (Oxford, 1913), which has held the field until now. The works which he collected comprised not only the well-known books of the Apocrypha (literally, "hidden books"), preserved as semi-canonical by the Christian church—including such familiar titles as the Book of Judith, the Book of Tobit, and First and Second Maccabees—but also much more recondite works, some of which had to be translated from Ethiopic or Slavonic, since their originals, whether in Greek, Hebrew, or Aramaic, had long been lost. To these latter works he gave the general title of Pseudepigrapha, since nearly all of them professed to be written by great figures from the biblical past, like Enoch, Solomon, or Ezra. The term, however, is somewhat misleading; some of the books included in the canon of the Bible are themselves pseudepigraphical (like the Book of Daniel), and Charles in his collection included works which were *not* pseudepigraphical (like the Ethics of the Fathers). Nevertheless, the term has stuck, meaning simply books connected with figures of the Old Testament and not included in the collection known as the Apocrypha.

Now we have the first volume of a new collection of Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, edited by James H. Charlesworth.* The unifying theme of this first volume is apocalypticism; that is to say, the works collected here mostly contain visions of the Last Days—though they also contain much else. A second volume, not yet published, will include non-apocalyptic material, ranging from expansions of Old Testament legends, such as Eldad and Modad or the Martyrdom and Ascension of Isaiah, to the surviving fragments of a play in Greek verse on the theme of the Exodus written by an Alexandrian Jewish playwright named Ezekiel. It is clear from the high standard of scholarship of the first volume that, when completed, Charlesworth's will be accepted as the standard collection of Old Testament Pseudepigrapha or "para-biblical" writings, to use a term he himself suggests.

IF THE governing standpoint of Charles was that the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha provide continuity between the Old and New Testaments (leaving rabbinic Judaism on the sidelines), what is the governing standpoint of Charlesworth? There has certainly been a tremendous change, involving in the first instance a new and much more respectful assessment of rabbinic Judaism. It is no longer thought that there was a rigid, official, "normative Judaism," centered in

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* *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha: Vol. 1, Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments,* Doubleday, 995 pp., $35.00.

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Jerusalem, with a tiny fringe of rebel souls keeping alive the flame of inspiration and preparing for the advent of Christianity by writing a few heterodox books. Instead, we have the view that there was no "normative Judaism" but an explosion of heterogeneous sects, producing a wealth of creative literature.

When Charles made his compilation, he had little idea of the extensiveness of this literature; the Dead Sea Scrolls, for example, had not yet been discovered. It is now thought that the books that have survived are only a fraction of those produced. As Charlesworth points out, hardly a single work in his compilation of the Pseudepigrapha can be assigned with any certainty to a known named sect. This contrasts with Charles, who was certain that there were four and only four Jewish sects—Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, and Zealots—and fairly confident which books were to be assigned to which sects.

Thus, Charles's picture of a desert of legalism containing only small pockets of creativity has been smashed. Nor can his characterization of the Pharisees as dry and formalistic be sustained, for quite apart from the evidence of Pharisee liturgy and other sources, there is proof of Pharisee involvement in mysticism and apocalypticism, concerns which Charles thought alien to them. Included in the present volume is an example of such mysticism, the so-called Third Book of Enoch (more authentically called *Sefer Hekhalot*), written in the name of Rabbi Ishmael, the 2nd-century contemporary of Rabbi Akiva, and describing his ascent to the heavens where he conversed with the angel Metatron, who on earth had been Enoch. For Charles to have included this book among his Pseudepigrapha would have wrecked his whole conceptual scheme. If he knew the work, he probably thought of it as very late. It is indeed no earlier than the 5th century, but it is an example of a genre that goes back to the pre-Christian era and formed an element in Pharisee religion. And the Pharisees themselves, according to the new wisdom, are not to be singled out from other sects, or to be regarded as forming a dominant orthodoxy, or thought to have a narrower scope than others in their religious interests.

The new view also compels a changed assessment of the position of Christianity itself in the spectrum of post-biblical religion. Christianity now appears not as a startling new departure, or even as the end-product of a thin trickle of inspiration, but simply as one more Jewish sect, fully explicable in the light of the contemporary Jewish scene. When the Pseudepigrapha and Dead Sea Scrolls are taken into account, it is now said, Christianity can be seen to have drawn its entire content from Jewish sources. For example, the dualism of the Gospel of John, with its cosmic conflict between Light and Darkness, is paralleled in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in such pseudepigraphical writings as I Enoch. The idea of a divine or semi-divine messiah can also be found in the Pseudepigrapha, and thus cannot be considered Hellenistic rather than Jewish. Indeed the distinction between Judaism and Hellenism, like other distinctions cherished in the past, is under attack, for evidence is being adduced to show that even Pharisaic Judaism in Palestine was fundamentally influenced by Hellenistic modes of thought.

Thus, in borrowing or developing ideas that may once have appeared quintessentially Hellenistic, Christianity did not have to go further than Judaism itself, which had already assimilated these ideas from the Hellenistic environment.

THE wholesale breaking down of barriers and distinctions that is signaled in the new edition of *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* is in some ways a healthy phenomenon. Scholarship has now discarded the idea that Jesus was a unique visitant from heaven, bringing mint-new truths to the benighted Jews; the evidence shows conclusively that Jesus was, rather, a Jew rooted in his time. Moreover, instead of reading Jewish literature of the period solely for the purpose of "throwing light on the New Testament," scholars are now viewing the New Testament as one aspect of that literature, and are just as liable to read the Gospels for the light they throw on the Mishnah as the other way around.

All this is to be welcomed. But there are some essential distinctions that must be preserved. The New Testament differs fundamentally in certain respects from all Jewish literature, including the Pseudepigrapha, the Dead Sea Scrolls, and rabbinic works. The present edition of the Pseudepigrapha, despite its editor's intention, only serves to highlight this unbridgeable gap. I am referring in particular to the doctrine of salvation expressed in New Testament writings and stemming from the teaching of Paul. Nothing even remotely like this can be found in Jewish literature.

The New Testament tells us about the death of a god who was resurrected on the third day. Unless the death of a divine figure marks the end of an outworn religious cult, like the death of Pan, it can be given meaning only in terms of a scheme of salvation: and this is how the New Testament interprets it. The death of Jesus atones for the sins of mankind, who can escape damnation only by sharing in his death and resurrection.

Where in Jewish literature is the concept of the death of God to be found? The answer is simple: nowhere. Such a concept, associated everywhere in the ancient world with the renewal of nature in the spring, was banished forever from Judaism by its theology of a God superior to nature. "While the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease" (Genesis 8:22). This marks the end of sacrificial ceremonies designed to renew the universe.

In the Hellenistic world, the concept of the

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death and resurrection of a god, originally agricultural, was spiritualized to signify the salvation of individual souls. The cults of Osiris, Attis, Adonis, Mithras, and Dionysus provided a vocabulary and ideology that found their way into Christianity. But as for the Jews, however much they were influenced by Hellenism, this was one influence they utterly refused, since it would mean the negation of their whole history and theology. It would mean the negation, too, of their ethics, for it substituted an irreversible rebirth into innocence for the continual moral struggle, guided by the Torah, which for Jews gave life its significance.

This is not to deny that Christianity, in its origins, was a Jewish sect. Jesus' immediate followers, who after his death set up the Jerusalem church, were Jews of Pharisaic outlook who differed from their fellow-Jews only in believing that the messiah-claimant had not died but would soon come back to resume his mission of liberation from Roman rule. But when Paul interpreted Jesus' death and resurrection as a mystery, a sacrifice that made for salvation—and in so doing made Jesus' death not an interruption of his mission but its whole point—a sect of Christians arose that had taken a decisive step away from Judaism. It was this sect which eventually became the official Christian church and which edited the Gospels in their present form.

The gulf that separates Pauline Christianity from every form of Judaism has been documented in E.P. Sanders's indispensable work, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (1977), which stands opposed to the scholarly trend summed up in Charlesworth's compilation of the Pseudepigrapha. Sanders opposes this trend in two ways. Not only does he characterize Pauline thinking as un-Jewish, but he also, concomitantly, demonstrates that there *is* such a thing as "normative Judaism"—not in the sense of a dominant orthodoxy but in the sense of a substratum of essential belief (what Sanders labels "covenantal nomism") held in common by all Jewish sects.

In the many attempts that have been made to bridge the gap between Judaism and Christianity and thus to substantiate the current picture of Christianity as just another Jewish sect, the Pseudepigrapha play an important part; and in particular, I Enoch is often adduced to show that the idea of a divine messiah was not alien to Judaism. In this extraordinary book, which has been only slightly tampered with by Christian editors, a picture is given of a powerful angel called the Elect One who will have a special role in the Last Days as judge of the nations. He is not called "the messiah"—indeed, the messiah is mentioned elsewhere in the same book as a human personage quite distinct from the Elect One. Nor does he enjoy divine status; in I Enoch, the Elect One is carefully subordinated to God. Nor, finally, is there any suggestion that the angel is destined to undergo death as an atoning figure.

There is thus a world of difference between the figure of the Elect One and that of the dying-and-resurrected divine messiah of Christianity. Yet it is wonderful to see how a Christian scholar like W.D. Davies (in his book *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*) goes about trying to narrow this gap. First, Davies tries to find similarities between the description of the Elect One and that of the Suffering Servant of Isaiah. This done, he grafts onto the non-suffering Elect One the sufferings of the human servant. It is then only a step to a fully divine Sufferer. By such inch-by-inch projections it is hoped that a bridge can be constructed between the Christian salvation myth and a respectable Jewish background, without recourse to Hellenistic mystery-cults.

A similar process can be seen at work in a strange disagreement between Charlesworth and the individual editor of I Enoch, E. Isaac. Charlesworth carefully differentiates between the messiah and the angel, but Isaac simply identifies the two without discussion, calling the amalgamated figure "the heavenly messiah." This is cavalier treatment. The welding together of the angel of the Last Days with the hitherto human figure of the messiah was entirely the work of Christianity, which further elevated this compound figure to divinity as one of the persons of the Trinity.

There are, to be sure, certain undoubted similarities between the atmosphere of the Pseudepigrapha and that of the Gospels. But precisely for that reason it is important to characterize accurately what it is that separates both of them from rabbinic literature, and where exactly the dividing line falls between Jewish and non-Jewish sects and works. The basic point of difference has to do with the attitude adopted toward this life and this world.

In the Hebrew Bible this world, having been created by God, is regarded as good, and as the scene of the human drama, where all things will eventually find a solution. At the opposite extreme is the literature of the gnostic sects that flourished around the time of the emergence of Christianity; in its view this world is evil, the creation of an evil Power.

Some of the pre-Christian gnostic sects were Jewish in origin, in the sense that they parasitically drew on the Bible for their mythic content. But they were profoundly un-Jewish in the way they used this content. They took the view that this world was indeed created by the Jewish God, but he was an evil God. He had indeed given the Torah, but it was an evil Torah. They went through the Bible systematically reversing its meanings, making its heroes into villains and its villains (Cain, for example) into heroes. Their chief heroes, however, were certain non-Jewish biblical figures, like Seth, Enoch, or Melchizedek, who were considered to transcend the evil or limited values of the Torah and to be in touch with

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the High God beyond the skies who was the genuine good power of the universe. By means of the "knowledge" (*gnosis*) transmitted by the non-Jewish extra-biblical tradition, chosen souls (with the help of a descended "Son of God") could hope to escape from this evil world and attain the realm of the High God.

Some would argue that the gnostics were actually Jewish, since their material was taken from the Jewish Bible, just as later there were Christian gnostics basing themselves on the New Testament and related writings. It seems truer to say that the gnostics were the first anti-Semites, who, like later anti-Semites, were fascinated by the materials of Judaism and fashioned their world view out of a love-hate relationship with Judaism. Included in the present edition of the Pseudepigrapha is a gnostic work, the *Apocalypse of Adam*, from the library of gnostic texts found in Nag Hammadi, Egypt, in 1946. This is certainly a fascinating work, most probably an example of pre-Christian gnosticism—a genre often declared to be nonexistent by scholars who refuse to accept that Pauline Christianity was influenced by gnosticism. But whether it belongs in a compilation of Jewish Pseudepigrapha is very questionable. The *Apocalypse of Adam*, despite its biblical material, is profoundly anti-Bible, regarding the Jews as the chosen people of an evil God. Including it here is like including the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* in an anthology of modern Jewish literature.

The Pseudepigrapha proper hardly go so far toward the gnostic pole. They are Jewish works, based on belief in the Jewish God and the Torah. But they are permeated by a despair that is alien to the Hebrew Bible. They believe that this earth is the scene of man's destiny, but they think that it has gone so badly wrong that only a cataclysmic event can put it right. They thus place all their hopes in apocalypse. Their attitude is passive, in that they await a destined, inevitable outcome, written on God's heavenly curtain with its timetable of future events. They have lost the active spirit of biblical prophecy, which concerns itself with contemporary politics and exhorts men to immediate commitment.

Pauline Christianity has gone still further into despair, so much further that it is lost to Judaism. It believes that the world has gone so wrong that the Torah has become irrelevant and inadequate; even in doubt is whether this world is the scene of man's destiny. Like gnosticism, Christianity has a descending Son of God, come to rescue humanity, but here Christianity, unlike gnosticism, introduces ideas taken from the mystery-cults: the Son of God has come not to impart *gnosis* but to die a sacrificial death. Only participation in this mystery can save.

The Pseudepigrapha remain within the bounds of Judaism because they cling to the Torah and the Covenant. It is only in their unbiblical despair that they edge toward gnosticism, from which, however, they remain utterly separated. In his review-essay on Charlesworth in the *New York Review of Books*, Harold Bloom—despite some welcome new insights which appear to remove his own ideas from the gnostic camp to that of rabbinic Judaism—makes too easy an identification of the Pseudepigrapha with gnosticism, and thus endorses Charles's old estimation of the degree of continuity between the Pseudepigrapha and Christianity (though without Charles's approval of this connection or his placing of the Hebrew prophets in the same line of development).

Rabbinic Judaism lacks the pseudepigraphic note of despair. Though it is not free of apocalyptic yearnings, it does not depend on them for its stability. This is partly because rabbinic Judaism, unlike the Pseudepigrapha, has come to terms with the ending of prophetic inspiration. Contrary to what Charles thought, the Pseudepigrapha themselves testify to the end of prophecy; otherwise why should they adopt the name of prophets of the past rather than prophesying in the names of their true authors? And why adopt such a mechanical mode of prophecy, one in which the future appears as a rigidly tabulated scheme rather than as a free-flowing scenario affected by human decisions? In the Bible, the Book of Jonah teaches us that a prophet's warnings are always provisional; he should hope to be made a fool of. In the Pseudepigrapha, the "prophet" is not really prophesying at all, but reading off the results of a heavenly computer.

Rabbinic Judaism acknowledges that prophecy has ended, but does not regard this as wholly a loss. Now begins the age of the rabbi—in his way as considerable a figure as the prophet. The rabbi works not by individual inspiration but by close collaboration with his fellows (very like scientists today). The project is a rationalist one: exegesis, systematization, and the application of insight to everyday life. The tone is hopeful and activist. For such a project, prophetic methods are actually outdated; when Rabbi Eliezer tried to decide a halakhic matter by appeal to a voice from Heaven, he was sharply declared out of order, as was Rabbi Johanan ben Dahabai when he attempted to introduce legal rulings heard from ministering angels "behind the Curtain."

Not that prophecy will never return; it will be, the rabbis say, the precursor and accompaniment of the age of the messiah. But the present age has its own pattern and validation which precludes despair and is continuous with the this-worldly orientation of the Bible. Paradoxically, the rabbis preserved a greater continuity with the Bible by giving up prophecy than the Pseudepigrapha did by their vain effort to prolong it. And like the prophets of the Bible, the rabbis did their work in their own names.

Thus there was good reason for the rabbis to

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omit the Pseudepigrapha from their canon of the Bible. This kind of desperate gambling on catastrophe was alien to the spirit of the true prophets. (The only apocalyptic work the rabbis did include was Daniel, which, however, they did not classify as prophetic in the full sense; it was placed among the Writings.) As for the apocalyptic writings of the rabbis themselves, these occupied no central position in the religious repertoire, being the concern of peripheral mystical groups, respected but by no means held up as norms or exemplars.

On these grounds, one may raise a question about the inclusion in Charlesworth's collection of the so-called Third Book of Enoch, one of the rabbinic mystical tracts. True, it features the biblical figure Enoch (though not as the pseudepigraphic author of the book), and contains an apocalyptic section. But unlike the Pseudepigrapha in general it does not focus the main religious hopes of the sect from which it stems; on the contrary, it represents a kind of peripheral luxury, considered suitable for a few specially-endowed members of the community but unnecessary and even dangerous for the rest.

A COMPILATION of Pseudepigrapha which can include, at one end of the spectrum, a gnostic work and, at the other, a rabbinical work may seem commendably catholic. But just as Charles had his axe to grind, so has Charlesworth. We must be grateful to him for the wealth of material offered to us in new scholarly editions by leading experts, yet we must be wary of a point of view that seeks to abolish essential boundaries. Both gnosticism and Christianity are radically dualistic systems, seeing this world as captured by the power of Darkness in the course of its war against the power of Light. In this cosmic war, both gnosticism and Christianity identified the Jews as the earthly representatives of the power of Darkness.

The Pseudepigrapha and the Dead Sea Scrolls, both of which envisage a war between good angels and bad angels, and which may be thought of as a first step away from the unified, humanistic outlook of both the Hebrew Bible and rabbinic Judaism, nevertheless represent a milder form of dualism than that in either gnosticism or Christianity; a despair still controlled by loyalty to Torah and Covenant cannot be equated with a despair that has entered the abyss, and depends so heavily on salvation from on high. When Christianity adopted the standpoint of gnosticism and the mystery-cults, it made a decisive break with Judaism. We cannot hope to smooth away the Jewish-Christian conflict by reducing it to a family quarrel between groups that are basically akin.

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Neoconservatism & Irving Kristol

James Nuechterlein

NEOCONSERVATISM is a movement that, as far as most of its adherents are concerned, would rather not speak its name. If, by now, most neoconservatives have become resigned to the term, that is more in the nature of acceptance of the inevitable than of any positive choice. Not so with Irving Kristol, who has mockingly referred to himself as perhaps "the only living and self-confessed neoconservative, at large or in captivity." Kristol's acceptance, without chagrin, of the neoconservative label, an acceptance symbolized in the title of his new book, *Reflections of a Neoconservative,** tells us something important about him and about his place in the neoconservative spectrum.

Substantive matters for the moment aside, neoconservatism is frequently perceived as a movement of disillusioned leftists, men and women who in the recent unpleasantness of the 1960's turned from their accustomed radicalism or Left-liberalism because they could not abide to be associated with a political inclination rooted in anti-Americanism. Kristol fits that description only loosely. It is true that in his student days he belonged to the Trotskyite Young People's Socialist League and was an active participant, along with such other prominent political intellectuals of the future as Seymour Martin Lipset, Irving Howe, Daniel Bell, and Nathan Glazer, in the activities of the storied Alcove No. 1 in the CCNY lunchroom, where he and his fellow socialists (of various stripes) waged ideological warfare against the Stalinists in Alcove No. 2. But Kristol's socialism did not long survive his graduation in 1940, and while he continued to think of himself as a liberal, his was a liberalism that, when the time came, could flow without abrupt detour into the neoconservative channel.

It is, in fact, in the revisionist liberalism of the postwar era that one can find the roots of the neoconservative impulse. The revisionist or end-of-ideology liberals had learned from the failures and sentimentalities of the prewar Left to reject radicalism, populism, or facile dualism. They were, in negative terms, anti-totalitarian and anti-utopian; they identified comfortably with pluralism, consensus, and neo-orthodoxy. Their analytical categories emphasized ambiguity and paradox, and they were more likely to speak of the irony or even the tragedy of history than of its fulfillment.

Kristol fit in easily with the revisionist mood. After wartime service in the army, he began to build a career as a writer and editor at, successively, COMMENTARY, *Encounter*, the *Reporter*, Basic Books, and, beginning in 1965, the *Public Interest*. Kristol was one of the cold-war liberals, mildly progressive in domestic affairs and vigorously anti-Communist in foreign policy. But he was from the beginning a liberal with a difference, and it was the incendiary issue of McCarthyism that first aroused suspicion on the Left as to the legitimacy of his progressive credentials. In his March 1952 article in COMMENTARY, "Civil Liberties, 1952—A Study in Confusion," Kristol started an argument so fierce that it still remains alive more than three decades later.

The essay might be viewed as an early venture in neoconservatism, in that it began within liberal confines but moved in uncharacteristic directions. Kristol argued that many liberals, in their understandable reaction against McCarthy, had maneuvered themselves into an anti-anti-Communism that tended to obscure the distinction between liberal democracy and the totalitarian Left and that, in such disputed instances as the Hiss-Chambers case, the career of Owen Lattimore, or the affairs of the pro-Communist Lawyers Guild, led them into troubling historical and analytical evasions. Kristol suggested that in fighting McCarthyism (and it was here that he aroused insensate fury) liberals had fallen back into the Popular Front trap of viewing Communism as "a political trend continuous with liberalism and democratic socialism" rather than as the implacable enemy of all on the democratic Left. In identifying political sentimentalism as a liberal temptation, Kristol had laid down what would later become a preeminent perception of neoconservative thought.

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* Basic Books, 336 pp., $19.95. Kristol's two earlier collections of articles are *On the Democratic Idea in America* (1972) and *Two Cheers for Capitalism* (1978).

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But the Kristol of the 1950's and the early 60's could not reasonably be seen as a man of the Right. His controversial article identified McCarthy as "a vulgar demagogue" and made clear his antipathy to the McCarthyite cause. Beyond that, he exhibited no sympathy with that congeries of "irritable mental gestures" that, in Lionel Trilling's dismissive judgment, constituted postwar conservative thought. Kristol was neither a McCarthyite nor a free-market fetishist, and his criticisms of liberalism indicated no break with the near-universal assumption of the time that intellectual respectability could be found only on the Left.

The political disruptions of the 1960's, however, led to reappraisals everywhere on the political horizon. A number of traditional liberals, watching in dismay as their fellow liberals caved in to radical criticisms, began to suspect that liberalism's vulnerability lay deeper than a momentary failure of will. Kristol was particularly well-situated to see that liberals found it hard to resist radical attacks because they shared so many political assumptions with their radical critics. As it turned out, most of those to whom the label of neoconservative would later be attached resisted the loss of their identity as liberals. They understood the strategic disadvantage of any sort of conservative label, and they wanted in any case to maintain proprietary rights to an honorable tradition to which they felt deep ties of habit and affection.

But Kristol had moved farther and faster than most of his political colleagues, and he thus accepted with less resistance than they did the label that now best expressed the political position he occupied. The point was not simply that the liberal community had moved Left. In reacting to the political convulsions of the time, men like Kristol had come to understand that, whatever their lingering disagreements with the American Right, they now felt more comfortable than they could have ever earlier imagined with the philosophical assumptions of the conservative tradition. By the early 1970's Kristol was freely conceding that his political instincts were—that indeed any adult's political instincts ought to be—conservative.

Practice soon followed on profession. After having backed Hubert Humphrey in 1968 against Richard Nixon, Kristol in 1972 announced his support for President Nixon's reelection, and his subsequent open identification with the Republican party indicated that his 1972 vote went beyond a protest against the capture by McGovernism of the Democratic party. During the 70's most neoconservatives continued to resist, with varying degrees of intensity, ideological and political identification with conservatism in general and the GOP in particular. Kristol experienced his conversion with less sense of disorientation and discomfiture than most of his fellows, and he soon became a bridge between the neoconservative community and the establishment Right. His recent affiliations—as a professor in New York University's graduate school of business, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and a member of the *Wall Street Journal*'s Board of Contributors—all locate him firmly within the conservative camp. Not all neoconservatives followed precisely the same path, but in tracing Kristol's career and politics since the late 60's one can see the personification, in somewhat accelerated form, of where the logic of neoconservatism leads.

II

Politics begins in ideas, and the argument over neoconservatism has to do with which ideas ought to be dominant in American political thought and life. The stakes are high, and the argument is accordingly intense. Conservatism has always been a force to be reckoned with in national politics, but it has not ordinarily exercised more than peripheral influence in the world of ideas. Ever since the New Deal, liberal intellectuals have lamented the absence of a body of thought on their Right that might stimulate them to useful self-reflection. They have regularly complained that, given the unavailability of thoughtful conservative criticism, they have had to turn inward to find critical perspectives on liberalism worth attending to. Yet when that probing criticism appeared in the form of neoconservatism, liberals displayed no visible enthusiasm about its arrival. Indeed, they have turned on it with often extraordinary savagery. It seems that the Left has found in neoconservative criticism more than what it had, in the abstract, bargained for.

Peter Steinfels, who is no friend of neoconservatism, has nonetheless come up with an apt term for those who are part of the movement: he calls them counterintellectuals. The term suggests the spirit of the neoconservative impulse. The movement is made up of those who hold the usual intellectual credentials but who oppose the adversary stance toward the general culture that intellectuals typically adopt. Neoconservatives are, within the subculture where they live and work, a profoundly countercultural force. As Steinfels notes, the counterintellectual instinct is not a new one. It goes back to Burke, Tocqueville, and Weber and has included such modern exemplars as George Orwell, Joseph Schumpeter, and Raymond Aron. It has not, however, been all that common or significant in America—not, that is, until the emergence of neoconservatism.

Kristol personifies the counterintellectual instinct. He notes the pervasive sense of alienation from the "American way of life" among intellectuals, their sense of homelessness and hopelessness in the world this way of life creates. The great

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majority of Americans, he goes on, do not share that estrangement, and it is "the self-imposed assignment of neoconservatism to explain to the American people why they are right, and to the intellectuals why they are wrong."

Explanation in this case takes the form of defense of America as a bourgeois society; Kristol defines the neoconservative temper as one of "bourgeois populism." In the past, he explains, the Right has been ineffective in its support of the bourgeois ethos because of its aversion on principle to ideological argument. Traditional conservatism prefers to conceive of politics as, in Michael Oakeshott's phrase, "tending to the arrangements of society" in a prudent and sober manner. Kristol is no enemy of prudence and sobriety, but he contends that a purely prudential politics can only be sustained in a premodern context and that, under the conditions of modernity, "a nonideological politics is a politics disarmed."

Ever since the American and French Revolutions, Kristol argues, politics has had an inescapably ideological edge. Modern societies are by their nature dynamic and innovative, and under conditions that assume growth and change, politics must necessarily be as concerned with claiming the future as with affirming the past. And when the question of politics becomes "who owns the future?," we are inevitably caught up in ideological controversy. The issue comes down not to whether we will be governed by ideology but by which ideology we will be governed. A conservatism that refuses to face that reality, Kristol suggests, will consign itself to political ineffectuality. It may occasionally win elections, but it will never truly govern. A politics of nostalgia is a prescription for irrelevance.

Our problem, according to Kristol is that we—or at least our intellectuals—have been in thrall to the wrong ideology. Our modern distempers derive from the legacy of what Kristol describes, in rather schematic fashion, as the "French-Continental Enlightenment." First finding political expression in the French Revolution, this tradition, with its utopian expectations and statist implications, has come to dominate the thinking of the Left. It is preoccupied with planning, equality, and the transformation of social values away from individualism toward concern for the collective needs of society. It presupposes the radical reconstruction of human institutions and even of human nature. Such grandiose ambitions breed gnostic imaginings of exotic and redemptive truths accessible only to vanguard elites and an accompanying antinomian contempt for established religious, moral, and political authority. These tendencies have manifested themselves to varying degrees in Communist, socialist, social-democratic, and even liberal societies. It is not enough, Kristol says, to recognize all this as a pernicious and failed ideology. Invoking Cardinal Newman, he argues that an erroneous idea can be expelled from the mind only by the active presence of a different idea.

THE different idea Kristol has in mind to combat the influence of the French-Continental Enlightenment is the tradition of liberal capitalism descended from the "Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment." This tradition, whose intellectual roots trace to such thinkers as John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith, assumed that it is men's natural instinct to "improve their condition" and that it is folly to attempt to construct social institutions on foundations that deny that instinct. Better to channel that self-interest in socially beneficial directions than to pretend that it does not exist: thus the economic marketplace and the processes of representative government may be seen as the "natural" institutional manifestations of our natures. In this view, man is taken as he is, with no assumption that the generality of people can be conditioned—or coerced—into behaving as heroes and saints.

This is not to suggest that the Anglo-Scottish perspective saw men as *purely* egocentric and self-regarding. It assumed that traditional moral and religious values would continue to act as a restraining influence on selfish behavior; indeed, it argued that as the beneficial workings of the market improved the economic conditions of all (however gradually or unequally), and as the experience of self-government developed and spread, people would become progressively more civil and humane in their dealings with one another. Thus the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment had its own vision of progress, but one that, unlike its French-Continental counterpart, did not depend on transformed environments or a transformed humanity. It did not deny the legitimacy of transcendent ideals of moral, aesthetic, or intellectual excellence: it simply supposed that those ideas properly belong to voluntary and private spheres and cannot be presumed to be the norm of social existence.

Even as the French Revolution expressed the exalted aspirations of the French-Continental Enlightenment, so the American Revolution reflected the more sober perspectives of the Anglo-Scottish tradition. It had its own heroic achievement: the liberal-capitalist society produced by the American Revolution built on its English antecedents to offer an unprecedented level of personal liberty to its citizens. (Kristol properly emphasizes that if capitalism is not a sufficient condition of political freedom, it does seem to be a necessary one; history provides no examples of societies that have offered civil and political liberty while forbidding liberty in the economic realm.) Beyond that, the Revolution's limited visions presupposed limited government, partly because of its distrust of centralized power and partly because of its disciplined

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ambitions. Because it had no grand expectations, it would produce no grand disillusionments. Between the French and American Revolutions, Kristol concludes, there exists an enormous gulf of political assumptions and expectations; indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that our relative estimates of the two revolutions can be taken as definitive of our political philosophies.

Liberal capitalism generally delivers on its limited promises, but, Kristol notes, its very modesty leaves it vulnerable to criticisms on grounds it never prepared itself to defend. Prosperity and freedom may recommend themselves to sober citizens, but they do not feed the soul. Lockean individualism cannot answer men's needs for community, for shared moral values, for participation in a common vision of the good life. Indeed, as capitalism succeeds, as it frees men and women from preoccupation with material concerns, it opens the way to brooding discontent over its social and spiritual thinness. The prosaic, even vulgar, nature of bourgeois society, Kristol says, generates—especially among the well-educated and the affluent—demands for something more, for higher and nobler expressions of mind and spirit than a commercial civilization can provide. Freed from economic necessity, the children of affluence experience more acutely than the age of scarcity could ever have imagined the inadequacy of purely economic models of human needs and aspirations.

The Adam Smith who wrote *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* did not entertain a reductionist view of human behavior and was indeed hopeful that bourgeois society would provide ample opportunity for the flowering of men's "benevolent affections." But he supposed that our higher moral and cultural needs were best met by freely-associating individuals and groups acting within the private realm. Smith relied, Kristol suggests, on the strength of family ties, traditional moral values, and religious beliefs to provide the resources by which individuals could attend to needs that the economic marketplace and the thin consensus of civil society were not designed to satisfy. But those traditional institutions and values have been subverted by modernity, a subversion in which capitalism itself, with its restless, questing temper and its habits of rational calculation, has ironically participated. Kristol wonders, in fact, whether the founders of bourgeois society did not originally err in assuming that it is possible for individuals, alone or in purely private association, to deal with the eternal dilemmas of human existence. He suggests that "the moral authority of tradition"—and some form of public sanction for that authority—may be required.

Kristol frequently expresses concern over the moral condition of bourgeois society. He notes with dismay that the sturdy bourgeois citizen—industrious, public-spirited, able to defer gratification—has been transformed into the bourgeois consumer, a self-centered hedonist who demands instant indulgence of his every appetite and who has been taught to expect happiness and a tension-free existence as a matter of right. Our wealth, Kristol argues, has not made us happier or better; instead it has bred social pathologies of every sort imaginable—crime, alcohol and drug addiction, sexual promiscuity and perversion, endemic cynicism, the decay of civic-mindedness, and on and on. Our moral decline may even have put our prosperity at risk. Kristol notes that for Smith it was not simply the beneficial workings of the market itself but the homely "domestic virtues" practiced by those who toiled within it that generated economic abundance. The accumulated moral capital that sustained the bourgeois order for so long may now be largely depleted.

It is not, as Kristol says, a pretty picture. The bourgeois order, threatened by decadence and nihilism among its presumed adherents, finds itself increasingly vulnerable to accusations from its critics concerning its moral and spiritual poverty. Its self-confidence shaken, it finds it difficult to resist the gnostic-antinomian assaults of the adversary culture. Secularism has undermined the claims of orthodox religion, and a variety of social and political religions has flooded in to fill the spiritual vacuum. (It turns out to be true, as Chesterton suggested, that when a man gives up traditional faith he will not then believe nothing, he will believe anything.)

SOCIALISM, in one form or another, is the most formidable of the new religions. It derives much of its moral passion from an essentially premodern appeal to community, but that moral passion is joined with the modernist illusion of control, borrowed from modern science and technological rationality, in which it is assumed that we can come to shape human destiny in such a way as to transcend all those limitations, scarcities, and imperfections that have previously been taken as being in the nature of things. "Scientific" Marxism, the radicalism of the Old Left, condemned capitalism because of its presumed economic wastefulness and irrationality. It perceived inherent contradictions in the capitalist system that would necessarily result in recurring economic crises and mounting class conflict. History has discredited Marxian science, and capitalism has managed, through a combination of economic growth and welfare-state guarantees, to deflect socialism's economic critique.

But the moral criticism of capitalism's "greed" and "selfishness" remains. Radicals today pay little attention to Marx's scientific analyses; they focus rather on the young "humanistic" Marx who wrote that "the enemy of being is having." As Kristol notes, it is the spirit of *that* radicalism that explains the famous statement by a student pro-

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tester of the 60's that "you don't know what hell is like unless you were raised in Scarsdale." The Old Left, Kristol concludes, condemned capitalism because it wrongly assumed that it would not allow many people to make it to Scarsdale; the New Left denounces capitalism for wanting people to live there.

It is the moral/religious essence of the socialist critique that makes it impervious to refutation on purely economic grounds and that no amount of capitalist success or socialist failure can repudiate. Bourgeois society's economic vitality is dismissed as an incidental by-product of economic modernization, while socialism's dismal inability to produce either freedom or prosperity becomes evidence only that *real* socialism has not yet been achieved. Which, in a sense, is true. Kristol points out that socialism, understood as a voluntary cooperative community, exists nowhere on earth. All we have, he says, are varying versions of coercive bureaucratic collectivism. But their squalid failure diminishes the ideal not at all, while capitalism is judged wanting by its inability to achieve utopian standards of social perfection.

As already indicated, it is intellectuals who are particularly inclined to radical critiques of bourgeois society, even when those critiques stop short of full or open support of socialism. The decline of orthodox religious belief is more advanced among intellectuals than in the general population, and they are thus the more drawn to political pseudo-religions. They have a genuine, even poignant, yearning for moral commitment and moral heroism, and they will not be content with a political economy that satisfies itself with general economic advance and bourgeois freedom. Thus they attach themselves with great fervor to such causes as economic equality, even though the mass of ordinary people, who would seem to be the most directly involved, indicate no compelling concern of their own. In Kristol's view, such attachments serve as surrogates for deeper, transpolitical discontents:

> [Intellectuals] may speak about "equality"; they may even be obsessed with statistics and pseudo-statistics about equality; but it is a religious vacuum—a lack of meaning in their own lives, and the absence of a sense of larger purpose in their society—that terrifies them and provokes them to "alienation" and unappeasable indignation. It is not too much to say that it is the death of God, not the emergence of any new social or economic trends, that haunts bourgeois society.

Kristol understands, of course, that there is more involved in intellectuals' susceptibility to radicalism than protest over capitalism's inadequacies or a search for substitutes for transcendence. As part of the "new class"—along with journalists, lawyers, artists, social workers, scientists, city planners, and others—they are engaged in a struggle for status and power with establishment politicians and the leaders of the business community. They find bourgeois society distasteful not only because its commercial preoccupations and its rootedness in the tastes and preferences of common people make it, by their standards, a coarse and vulgar social order; they resent it as well because, as Kristol notes, it offers them everything—freedom, popularity, affluence—but that which they want most: the chance to shape and move society in the direction they think it ought to go.

The direction the Left intellectuals have in mind is clear: essential libertarianism in matters of individual speech, expression, and action, and collectivist regulation (planning, controls, redistribution) in economic life. Their "idealism" in seeking expansion of the public sector need not be dismissed as hypocritical, but that idealism is not at all inconsistent with a yearning for power that history suggests ought to be kept under the closest scrutiny. The road to the worst political hells of our time has been paved with the idealistic intentions of those who know better than the rest of us what we *truly* want and need and who see the expansion of state power as the surest instrument for the inauguration of a new age of authentic freedom and virtue. The utopian impulse that lies behind those sentiments constitutes the enduring temptation of the Left. Kristol is fond of quoting the words of a 19th-century French utopian socialist: "Nothing is impossible for a government that *wants* the good of its citizens." Most contemporary leftists, of course, would not carry the argument that far, but neither have most of them entirely divorced themselves from the spirit behind it.

Kristol contends that the sturdiest defense against the utopianism of the intellectuals is the instinctive moderation and common sense of ordinary people. Most Americans, he notes, are immune to the waves of enthusiasm that periodically overwhelm the intellectual classes, and they do not expect of the political order more than the substantial but non-heroic attributes of the bourgeois common good: personal security under the law, personal liberty under the law, and the opportunity to improve one's material situation depending on effort, ability, and good fortune. Inequality does not automatically present itself to them as inequity, and they are notably resistant—recall the fate of George McGovern in 1972—to those who would translate religious impulses into millenarian politics.

Yet those same people, Kristol says, are disturbed and uncertain over the apparent inability of the defenders of capitalism to mount a credible defense against its critics. They certainly are *not* reassured by defenses offered by hard-eyed libertarians and Social Darwinists who know no virtue but possessive individualism and who extol a version of the marketplace in which only the most

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predatory can or should survive. A capitalism with no moral dimension or justification does not appeal to most people, even as, Kristol reminds us, it would not have appealed to Adam Smith. Kristol emphasizes that Smith and Edmund Burke were mutual admirers, and he thinks that only a bourgeois world in which market relations coexist comfortably with common moral conventions will hold the loyalty of the mass of people. In other words, values—like ideas—count, and the American system of democratic capitalism can be expected to survive only so long as its defenders muster plausible moral and intellectual arguments in its defense.

Thus the neoconservative project, which Kristol summarizes as the effort "to infuse American bourgeois orthodoxy with a new self-conscious intellectual vigor, while dispelling the feverish mélange of gnostic humors that, for more than a century now, has suffused our political beliefs and has tended to convert them into political religions." Neoconservatism is a movement not of politicians but of political intellectuals, and its job is to win arguments rather than elections—though, of course, it will not complain if its arguments help win elections.

Kristol, as we have seen, says that neoconservatism must be ideological, but he also argues that the movement's philosophical roots are to be found in classical, or pre-ideological, political thought. He himself is a deep admirer of the late political philosopher Leo Strauss, who had a strong animus against modern (i.e., post-Machiavellian) political theory. (Kristol includes in *Reflections of a Neoconservative* an essay on Machiavelli that clearly reflects the Straussian perspective.) Kristol often argues by allusion, and he best reveals the mix of philosophical influences that informs his own thought when he writes that neoconservatives are "admiring of Aristotle, respectful of Locke, distrustful of Rousseau."

The note of ambivalence in neoconservative political philosophy extends to its defense of democratic capitalism. Kristol suggests that neoconservatives characteristically look on the bourgeois ethos with an attitude of "detached attachment." They view it not as necessarily the best of all possible worlds, but as the best of available worlds. They lack that passionate devotion to the untrammeled free market that has normally characterized the American Right (in its political, not cultural, manifestation). That makes their association with traditional American conservatism wary and uneasy. To neoconservatives like Kristol, politics must always maintain primacy over economics, a view that strikes many conservative economists, businessmen, and politicians as heretical. (See, for example, the current conflict on the Right over the relative importance of balancing the federal budget.)

It is, perhaps, on the issue of the welfare state that neoconservatives diverge most obviously from traditional conservatives. Ever since the New Deal, the Right has rejected the welfare state on principle, even if it has often felt itself forced, for reasons of political expediency, to make concessions to it in practice. Neoconservatives have no desire to keep that argument alive, and they find no difficulty reconciling their respect for the disciplines of the free market with advocacy of the welfare state. (Their quarrel with the Left on this matter involves the latter's tendency to want to extend the welfare state into an omnicompetent and redistributive state.)

Kristol speaks of a "conservative welfare state" that will provide the social and economic security that modern citizens want and expect but that will limit as much as possible the paternalistic and intrusive tendencies of the welfare apparatus. Clear affirmation of the welfare state will also, he suggests, help meet the argument that capitalism is synonymous with heartlessness. Neoconservatism argues, in short, that by serving to attach citizens' loyalties to the capitalist system, a properly constructed welfare state will act to buttress rather than to weaken the bourgeois order.

And Kristol, like others of his persuasion, is convinced that, whatever its weaknesses and inadequacies, that order eminently deserves support. Neoconservatives find it ironic that those who profess a deep commitment to "social justice" can be so dismissive of a system that has enormously enriched the lives of millions of ordinary people by providing them political and social freedom and the opportunity to rise from economic squalor and dependency to economic decency and self-sufficiency. American conservatives have always noted the relationship between economic and political freedom, but Kristol reminds us that the symbiotic qualities of the system of democratic capitalism go beyond that. The economic growth provided by capitalism, he notes, has helped insure the survival of democracy; through its indispensable contribution to social and political stability, it has made it possible for us to think, against all the instincts of premodern political thought, that a democratic order might be made to work and survive after all.

If all that were not enough, Kristol concludes, we might endorse liberal capitalism simply by contemplating its alternatives. Democratic socialism, which intellectuals of the Left like to set against democratic capitalism, exists only as a utopian construct. It lives nowhere but in the imaginations of those so alienated from human realities and limitations that they can only engage in politics as an exercise in moral fantasy. When we look at the world as it exists, the alternatives to the liberal-capitalist order offered on either the Right or the Left make the sober decencies of that order seem glorious by comparison. And that,

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Kristol suggests, is more than enough to ask of any system of political economy.

III

NEOCONSERVATISM began some fifteen years ago as a struggle for the political soul of American liberalism. That struggle has been lost, but in the process a larger struggle for intellectual control of American political life has been fought to a standstill, and even holds out the prospect—faint but not inconceivable—of being won. And it appears in retrospect that Irving Kristol understood earlier and better than any of his compatriots where the real war was and what precisely were the issues at stake. What remains unclear is where the neoconservatives, having arrived after intense conflict at a rather different location than they first set out for, go from here.

As already indicated, when neoconservatism first made its appearance in the late 60's (the actual term was invented by Michael Harrington a decade later), most of its adherents saw themselves as part of a dissenting movement within the liberal community, hoping to stop liberalism's drift to the Left and anchor it in the moderate Center. They were uncomfortable with any association with conservatism; almost none of them were Republicans. Their accustomed political vehicle was the Democratic party, and they hoped, in working through such organizations as the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), to win the Democrats and the liberal community in general over to their way of thinking.

They failed. Liberal intellectuals were quick and vehement in their repudiation of the neoconservative impulse, and CDM has been able to exercise little influence within Democratic circles. The liberal church has excommunicated most of the neoconservative heretics, and those who have doggedly remained inside have been treated as apostates and pariahs. There is virtually nothing left of the once dominant Henry Jackson wing of the Democratic party; it died before its namesake did.

Yet neoconservatism has by no means been without influence. It has even made a difference on the Left. Much of the febrile radicalism of the New Left/New Politics spirit has been drained from the liberal community, and that which remains—centered mainly in church and university circles—finds itself more on the periphery than could have been anticipated in the heady days of the 60's. The Left's instruction in these matters no doubt can be traced more to events than to neoconservative admonitions: the political costs of inflation and stagnation at home and weakness and appeasement abroad taught many liberals that, whatever the inner longings of their hearts, they would have to adjust their policies to new political exigencies. The election of Ronald Reagan offered the Left more instruction in the virtues of political moderation than any conceivable exercise in ideological persuasion could have done. But events do not by themselves dictate national moods; the meaning of events comes only through interpretation, and neoconservative intellectuals have played a significant role in the interpretation of recent political events. That role may be unacknowledged on the Left, but it cannot credibly be denied.

If Reagan's election provoked consternation among liberals, it created both a dilemma and an opportunity for neoconservatives. Few if any of them had supported him prior to his nomination; most regarded him with varying mixtures of fear, skepticism, and condescension. After his nomination, however—even more after his election—neoconservatives had to make some awkward choices. Largely excluded from influence among liberals and Democrats, they had either to go into an uncommitted political exile or make some sort of accommodation with the Reagan Right. A choice of distanced neutrality was made difficult by the fact that there are few men about whom it is less possible to remain indifferent than Ronald Reagan. No President since Franklin Roosevelt has invited a more polarized response, and Reagan, like FDR, has the effect of driving people farther Left or Right than they would have gone in his absence. A noncommittal stance was further made difficult by the anti-Reagan hysteria that quickly developed on the Left.

Prompted to choose, then, a majority of neoconservatives appear to have edged warily into at least passive support for the new President. Many have gone further than that: they have become either official members or unofficial adjuncts of the administration, and have tried to move it in directions that advance the neoconservative agenda. Few of those who have done so appear to have found working with the administration an entirely uncongenial experience, and one expects that most neoconservatives will vote for the President's reelection in the fall.

Kristol seems to have sensed sooner and with less emotional distress than most of his friends that the Left was lost for those who had come to think as he did. On a wide range of issues—quotas, busing, open admissions, community control, environmental purism, no-growth economics, restriction of pornography, women's liberation, attitudes toward family, work, and religion, and a whole host of foreign-policy questions*—Kristol saw that he had arrived at positions closer to those held by contemporary conservatives than contemporary

* The present essay avoids discussion of foreign-policy issues in the development of neoconservatism, partly for reasons of convenience but also because Kristol has written less extensively on foreign policy than on other questions. None of the essays in his first two books discusses foreign affairs, and *Reflections of a Neoconservative* devotes just one brief section to the subject. The topic of neoconservatism and foreign policy obviously deserves treatment on its own.

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liberals. And unlike most neoconservatives, he followed without hesitation the political implications of what he had discovered.

Kristol's original candidate for the Republican nomination in 1980 was Congressman Jack Kemp, but the switch to support of Reagan required little ideological reorientation. What many neoconservatives agonized over, Kristol did as a matter of course. And in the process he has become, by common consent, one of the most influential political intellectuals in the nation. If it is difficult to measure precisely the role neoconservatives have played in the nation's shift to the Right in recent years, they have accomplished at the least the lifting to visibility and respectability of ideas that originate elsewhere than on the Left. That alone is an extraordinary development in American political thought. And Irving Kristol has been as responsible for it as anyone.

HAVING come this far, neoconservatives must now consider the direction their future political activities should take. How does a movement that originated in the peculiar political and cultural atmosphere of the late 60's adjust to the quite different circumstances of the 80's? Some critics, including a few within the movement itself, have suggested that neoconservatives occasionally appear not to understand how much they have won. Since neoconservatism is an intellectual movement, there is always the danger that its adherents might mistake conditions within the intellectual community for those in the nation at large. The Left may hold sway in the world of those who live by and for ideas, but in the America beyond—the America outside Manhattan, Cambridge, Madison, and Berkeley—it shrinks radically in significance. A country that has elected Ronald Reagan once and that gives every sign of being ready to do so again would not seem to be in any imminent danger of seduction by radical chic.

Life at the intellectual barricades, which is where neoconservatism has of necessity found itself resident, poses distinctive hazards and temptations. Wars of ideas sometimes drag on even after the conditions that gave rise to them have changed or disappeared; battles get refought that have already been won and that no one except the combatants themselves any longer has interest in. There is also the potential for finding oneself occupying ideological territory beyond what was originally intended. Because it began as a reaction against the excesses of the Left, neoconservatism has had a natural inclination to drift continuously to the Right. One result of that political dynamic is that it is less clear today than it used to be what distinguishes neoconservatism from any other conservative tendency or inclination. One does not hear much any more of what Kristol calls the "social-democratic wing" of the movement. It may have become a casualty of the political polarization of recent years. That is perhaps inevitable—politics ain't bean-bag, as they say—but one may regret it nonetheless.

The point need not be belabored and should not be made more of than is warranted. The Left, after all, is far from dead; it dominates the universities and pervades the mainstream churches and the media. It currently languishes politically, but it awaits only the right issue to take once again to the streets and to the political stumps. The Democratic party establishment embraces with no apparent reluctance ideas and policies—militant women's liberation, gay rights, racial and sexual quotas, a foreign policy of irresolution and retreat—that would not long ago have been considered radical or even bizarre. And these tendencies are most advanced—indeed they are the conventional wisdom—in the intellectual world, which is the special province of neoconservatives and within which the ideas that will later shape policy find their origin. It may be that neoconservatism looks as conservative as it does only because conventional liberalism has wandered so far to the Left.

Yet there are tensions and ambiguities in the neoconservative situation that deserve closer attention, and they show up in particularly acute form in Kristol's own work. His argument, it will be remembered, is that ours is an inescapably ideological age, and that under such conditions it will not suffice for conservatives to conceive of government simply as "tending to the arrangements of society" in a pragmatic manner. The Right cannot escape ideology: successful governance will require making a plausible claim to the future. "As between no claim to the future and a fraudulent claim," he says, "the latter will always prevail. . . ." Conservatives must therefore forsake their customary caution and devotion to the status quo and commit themselves to fighting the Left for the future through programmatic thinking and bold political risk-taking. Without such a "progressive" orientation, Kristol concludes, conservatism will be forever a lost cause.

In one sense, the argument is unexceptionable. If one has *no* ideological orientation, there is no way to think coherently about politics. We need to operate with some general system of related ideas and beliefs about how the political world does and should function. In the absence of such a system, our politics will be a helpless victim of the whimsical tides of fortune and history. Conservatives whose only claim to govern is that they can run the programs that liberals have established more effectively and economically than could the liberals themselves will not often find themselves in office, and when they do, they will come away from the experience frustrated and dispirited. That kind of nonideological politics is indeed "a politics disarmed."

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But the enduring strength of conservatism has been precisely its distrust of ideology. It knows that the ideologue's presumption in claiming to own the future can blind him to history's surprises and lead him to distort or deny reality because of his need to have it fit his preconceptions. It knows too that ideological enthusiasm tempts us to enlarge and deify politics and to expect of it more than it is meant to offer, a temptation suggested in Kristol's characterization of the present ideological age as one in which "human passions and frustrations find expression in politics rather than, as was once the case, in religion." The genius of conservatism—at least of the Burkean persuasion—resides in its resistance to the ideological impulse; it is, one may say, an ideology of anti-ideology. It sees politics, properly conceived, as an important but limited enterprise, one which understands that it must deal with the world as it is and not as it might be were its refractory human materials more amenable than they are to systematic shaping and direction.

Kristol is fully aware of all this, and sympathetic to it as well. His antipathy to the political religions of our time runs as a continuing thread through his writings, as do a number of other Burkean intuitions. He is even of two minds concerning Oakeshott's "premodern" version of conservative thought. The introduction to *Reflections of a Neoconservative* tells us that it is inadequate for modern circumstances, but a later essay notes approvingly that the "American political tradition" decrees that the major function of government is indeed simply to "tend to the arrangements of society." Kristol's ambivalence here is understandable: knowing all the objections to the ideological temper, he nonetheless worries that prudence by itself is not enough, that a conservatism insufficiently aware of what it wants to accomplish will lack the intellectual and volitional resources it needs in taking on the Left. For him, apparently, the bourgeois world view can at once provide the Right with an ideological compass and yet, because of its limited aims and its canny understanding of human diversity and fallibility, not fall victim to the dogmatisms and rigidities of the ideological temperament.

That is a plausible argument, but the recent history of the American Right offers some cautionary warnings of the dangers of thinking ideologically. Commitment to the principles of the market economy, for example, has often led post-New Deal conservatives into an excessive anti-government posture that has been neither intellectually persuasive nor politically appealing. One can see in the libertarian mind the results of inordinate ideological self-consciousness. Similarly, while postwar conservatives were surely correct in their anti-Communism and in their rejection of the anti-anti-Communism that some liberals indulged in, their susceptibility to McCarthyism suggests the ease with which a valid principle can be distorted into an ideological obsession. And in both these cases, ideology-become-pathology has had the ironic effect of damaging the cause its adherents sought to advance. Anti-Communism has still not fully recovered from its association with McCarthyism.

Kristol himself has a subtle and discriminating mind that frees him from dogmatic posturings, but he perhaps underestimates the general intellectual costs of ideological self-awareness. It is noteworthy, for example, how few references can be found in his writings to the New Right. We might expect that someone as alert to the ideological dangers of the New Left as Kristol has been would be sensitive to the emergence of similar propensities on the other end of the political spectrum. The New Left/New Right symmetry suggests the enduring danger of ideological thinking. Neoconservatives are not likely to be mistaken for New Rightists, but they do need to be careful that in combating the ideologues of the Left they do not turn themselves into mirror images of that which they oppose. One must always resist the temptation to allow oneself to be defined by his adversaries. Prudence, understood as practical wisdom, remains the great political virtue, and ideology is more often its enemy than its ally.

One is made uneasy, in this context, by Kristol's talk of "bourgeois populism." Populism in America has had a varied and complex history, but wherever it has arisen and whatever its other characteristics it has carried overtones of resentment, ignorance, and envy. Those are unattractive qualities anywhere one finds them, and there is no more excuse for them on the Right than on the Left. One assumes that Kristol would want to maintain a considerable distance between neoconservative thought and the sour rancor that passes for thought among certain elements of the New Right. Surely the bourgeois order can find more persuasive defenses than those encountered in such self-consciously "populist" organs as *Conservative Digest* or the *New Right Report*.

Neoconservatism needs to keep itself open to self-scrutiny because the contribution it has to make to American political life is so essential. For the past fifteen years, it has been the repository of moral realism in the nation's political thought. It understands that politics is not a fit substitute for religion, that man's alienation will not be cured through the ministrations of the social order, that those who would construct the beloved republic must do so in a realm beyond political society. What politics *is* about, people like Kristol perceive, is the preservation of a social order that struggles for decency without trying to persuade itself that people are other than what they are or that the establishment of altruism as a political ordering principle awaits

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only better instruments of moral education or the construction of improved political and economic institutions. It is in this light that neoconservatives argue that the American system is worth preserving. It holds out no utopian prospects, only the promise of a social order whose intricate blend of individualism and community concern, of incentives for self-advancement and dedication to the public interest, reflects with fair accuracy the moral reality of the people who inhabit it.

And thanks in no small part to the efforts of the neoconservative community, the prospects for preservation of the American bourgeois order are better than its defenders sometimes suppose. As a sober realist, Irving Kristol is occasionally given to moods of melancholy. The final essay in *Reflections of a Neoconservative* ponders the perverse tendency of the churches to prefer the lofty illusions of socialism to the mundane achievements of liberal capitalism and concludes on a disconsolate note: "It is all very sad." But perhaps it is not so sad after all. It is true that the mainstream churches have reduced their theology to the commonplaces of the adversary culture. But there are millions of ordinary Americans who are willing, even eager, to be instructed in the virtues of a system that has always been second nature to them and for which they have therefore never found it necessary to construct an elaborate philosophical defense.

Kristol and his neoconservative allies have done that work for them. They have provided sophisticated and nuanced arguments for the system's defenders and have demonstrated to them that intellectual and moral respectability need not require repudiation of the beliefs that experience and common sense have led them to embrace. It is of inestimable value to such people to be assured that moral education is not coextensive with alienation and that the measure of truth does not consist in its distance from traditional affirmations. In constructing an intellectual home for those already at home in America, Kristol and neoconservatism have helped sustain a society that has nourished them, and they have as well offered a reminder to all who might need it that negation and refusal do not exhaust the possibilities of the life of the mind.

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The Jewish Way of Crime

Jonathan D. Sarna

THE seamier side of modern Jewish life has in recent years become the subject of considerable scholarly interest. We now know more than we ever did before about the Jewish underworld in Germany dating back to the 17th century; the role played by Jewish convicts in the genesis of Australian Jewry; the Jewish criminal element in 18th- and 19th-century England; the activities of Jewish gangsters in America; and Jewish involvement in prostitution ranging over five continents. Historians who once hesitated to venture into these aspects of Jewish history, whether out of delicacy or for fear of fomenting anti-Semitism, are, it seems, now more than compensating for their earlier neglect. If a recent spate of books, articles, and lectures provides any indication of future trends, then studies of this dark side of Jewish life—what Gershom Scholem called the "basement" as distinct from the "salon" —will continue to preoccupy social historians for years to come.

The broad scope of recent research into Jewish criminal behavior is well illustrated in Jenna Weissman Joselit's comprehensive survey, *Our Gang: Jewish Crime and the New York Jewish Community 1900-1940.** Basing herself on extensive research in court records and old newspaper files, Mrs. Joselit paints a convincing picture of an evolving pattern, beginning with crimes typically associated with poverty and overcrowded ghetto conditions—disorderly conduct, pickpocketing, fencing, gang-related protection rackets, arson, and horse-poisoning; proceeding to better organized and more sophisticated criminal activities undertaken by the children of immigrants such as Prohibition-era bootlegging and racketeering; and culminating in Murder Incorporated, the infamous Italian-Jewish gang that in addition to everything else engaged in money-lending, bookmaking, and murder for hire.

As might be expected, both the numbers of Jews involved in criminal activities and the special Jewish character of the crimes committed declined over time. Early on, as Mrs. Joselit notes and others have noted before, some disgruntled Jewish immigrants "chose crime as their vehicle of upward mobility." Through robbery and fencing operations, they created a parasitic counter-industry that lived off the garment trade, skimming its profits for their personal benefit. Others made their living by exploiting Jewish religious practices (the standard history of the kosher-meat industry in New York is aptly entitled *Fraud, Corruption, and Holiness*), or by taking advantage of Jews on the High Holidays. But whatever they did, Jewish criminals did not usually engage in violence; that to them seemed decidedly "un-Jewish." "Christians commit crimes with their hands," the sociologist Arthur Ruppin once explained, "the Jews use their reason."

Reason continued to govern the activities of second-generation Jewish criminals, but their patterns of criminality also reflected their growing assimilation. Like many others in the post-World War I era, they became engaged in bootlegging. Mrs. Joselit believes that had it not been for Prohibition, Jewish criminality would gradually have disappeared. This seems doubtful, but she does have a point when she compares bootlegging with the rapidly growing movie industry, likewise disproportionately filled with Jews. Taking a page from Irving Howe, she points out that in both cases "a bright young Jew could get in at the start without having to trip over established Gentiles along the way." Bootlegging also broke down religious and social barriers, and led to more ethnic diversity not just in the underworld but in the country at large. In speakeasies, groups previously separated sat together, the lines between legitimate and illegitimate blurred, and those who went into crime seeking fortunes could hobnob with those whose fortunes dribbled into organized crime's coffers.

From Prohibition, Mrs. Joselit turns her attention to better-known chapters in the history of American Jewish criminal activity: racketeering scandals, the unsavory relationship between organized labor and organized crime, and the oft-told tales of Arnold Rothstein, Louis Lepke, and their ilk. The main characters here may be Jewish, but as Mrs. Joselit realizes, their history has less and less to do with the Jewish community as a whole. Whereas immigrant Jewish criminals had lived and worked almost completely in a Jewish milieu, their offspring moved out, went into partnership with non-Jews, and Americanized; increasingly, they engaged in the same kinds of criminal activities as Gentiles did.

Parallels between the rags-to-riches rise of the East European "Our Gang" and of Jewish immigrants generally spring readily to mind here, and should occasion no surprise. It would be more strange if licit and illicit paths up the ladder should have markedly diverged.

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* Indiana University Press, 224 pp., $19.95.

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What does make Mrs. Joselit's book unusual is her scrupulous attention to another side of the story: the reaction of the established Jewish community to the criminals in its midst.

Shock, embarrassment, anger, and an understandable desire to avoid bad publicity did not prevent the oft-maligned leaders of the Jewish community from taking appropriate and concerted action against lawbreakers. Such action bespoke a staunch commitment to keep American Jewry's house in order, and included the establishment of the first Jewish reformatory in America (the Hawthorne School) and of the Jewish Board of Guardians; the anti-crime measures of the New York Kehillah (an overarching communal body whose career lasted from 1908 to 1922); the campaign to replace ceremonial wine with ritually permissible grape juice during Prohibition; and the vigilant private monitoring of Jewish criminal behavior by Jewish institutions. Even those like Louis Marshall, who blamed Jewish crime not on Jews but on "conditions in *this* city and *this* country," still took upon themselves the burden of helping to stamp that crime out.

Mrs. Joselit suggests that this feeling of duty derived from an age-old Diaspora insecurity, a fear that criminals would jeopardize the status of American Jews generally. Given the nativist rhetoric of the day, such fears would hardly have been groundless. But it is also clear that Jewish anti-crime measures stemmed at least in part from a traditional sense of community responsibility, as well as from pride of heritage. "Judaism is morality," one Jewish newspaper insisted, and it encouraged religiously-based programs to wean errant Jews back to the values that the community held dear. In more recent decades this sense of overall responsibility may have declined somewhat, but its influence on an earlier generation cannot be underestimated. Many Jews worked hard to stamp out Jewish crime simply because, as Jews, they felt deeply ashamed of it.

IF JEWISH criminal activity of every kind covered the community with shame, Jewish involvement in the white-slave trade seemed particularly mortifying. Openly flouting law and tradition, Jews—scions, in some cases, of notable families——played a conspicuous role in the modern history of vice as pimps, prostitutes, and brothelkeepers. For over half a century they actually dominated the international traffic in Jewish women that was centered in Eastern Europe. This is a sad story, filled with grim evidence of social breakdown and exploitation, and for understandable reasons it is not one that most Jewish historians have sought to dwell upon. Now Edward J. Bristow, the author of an earlier book on the history of social-purity movements in Britain, has recounted the story at length in *Prostitution and Prejudice: The Jewish Fight Against White Slavery 1870-1939*.*

Mr. Bristow understands that Jews "were only one of many groups" involved in prostitution: "There were more French prostitutes in Paris than Jewish prostitutes throughout the world." He also appreciates the socioeconomic conditions and the weakening of traditional religious controls that made Jewish prostitution far more of a problem in the modern world than at any earlier time in Jewish history. Unfortunately, he proves not quite so skillful at penetrating the world in which Jewish prostitutes lived. He knows that some observed the Sabbath, holidays, and dietary laws, and that in Argentina they had their own synagogue and benefit organization. But he leaves unanswered such questions as how they reconciled their religion and their life, how they viewed themselves as Jews and as women, and how they maintained their dual existence as part of, yet apart from, the Jewish community in which they were domiciled.

Mr. Bristow devotes about a third of his book to the Jewish fight against white slavery. Parts of this story have been skillfully treated before by Lloyd Gartner and Marion Kaplan, but the focus here is far wider, embracing as it does the entire Jewish world. In Poland, Latin America, and the United States, for example, Mr. Bristow finds evidence of "well-directed mass [Jewish] working-class support" of anti-prostitution efforts, something not found in the general worldwide anti-slavery movement in which both Jews and non-Jews participated. Those involved in vice were often ostracized; some even met with violence. Of course, there were Jews who refused to confront the subject for fear of drawing further attention to it, and also Jews who insisted dogmatically that society itself had to be transformed before any solution to the problem could be attempted. But considering how many other pressing problems called for solutions, the Jewish battle against vice did attract more support than might have been predicted, both from men and from women.

Mr. Bristow repeatedly emphasizes his view that the "strongest rationale for attempting to combat white slavery" was "self-defense against anti-Semitism." This need not be taken too seriously. Once again, a contemporary historian is displaying too little regard for community responsibility as a critical factor in Jewish behavior. Some Jews really were motivated, just as they claimed, by the desire to "sanctify God's name" through humanitarian action. Others, as Marion Kaplan has shown, used the battle against white slavery as a vehicle for drawing attention to feminist concerns. The fact that anti-Semites, Hitler among them, linked "Jewry and prostitution" may have provoked some self-defense measures, but had far less impact than Mr. Bristow thinks. Hatemongers have regularly invoked against their victims inflammatory charges of sexual turpitude whether they have any substance to them or not. What in the end proves more important about the Jewish fight against prostitution is precisely what is important about the fight against Jewish crime in general: the fact that the organized Jewish community focused on its problems, assumed responsibility for those problems, and worked to bring about effective solutions.

* Schocken, 340 pp., $21.95.

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In their emphasis on Jewish responses to criminality and vice, Jenna Joselit and Edward Bristow set themselves apart from a host of other recent writers, both popular and scholarly, who have concentrated only on the evildoers—and treated them as if their character traits somehow merited them a place in the gallery of Jewish heroes.

A recent biography of Meyer Lansky, for example, highlights that Mafia mogul's belief that "a Jew should lead a normal life and a proud life . . . I've been ready at any time in my life to defend myself against insults to Jews or to me as a Jew." Susan Berman, daughter of Syndicate leader David Berman, seeks in her memoir, *Easy Street*, to "make the world understand that . . . Davie was a good man who acted out of the most basic desire, to see his family continue and survive." Davie, we are told, was a Jewish role model: "extremely proud of being Jewish. . . . He felt that for a Jewish child to be properly brought up, there must be a synagogue, a rabbi, and a cantor in evidence."

So proud have some become of American Jewry's criminal past that one recent writer in the *Journal of Ethnic Studies* has boasted that "the role of Jews in the beginnings of organized crime in America was as significant as that of the Italians." Lansky's biographer makes a similar claim, hoping that his book will "break the back of the myth that organized crime in America is the sole province of people of Italian origin." The Italian movie director Sergio Leone, in *Once Upon a Time in America*, seems to have taken this theme to its logical conclusion. The protagonist and many of the other characters in this film are supposed to be stereotypical Jews, and they are every bit as unpleasant as their Italian counterparts in crime.

If anyone still had any doubts that "Jews were gangsters too," Albert Fried's *The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster in America* (1980), with its breadth of scope and scholarly pretensions, surely dispels them. But in the process of destroying the myth of Jewish virtue, Mr. Fried does much to bolster the new and even more sinister notion that Jews should take pride in their gangsters. Mr. Fried assures us, for example, that it took "qualities of mind and character" to be a Jewish gangster. To succeed "required a good deal of tact, intelligence, command of the economics involved, and, most important, a close kinship with the gang/syndicate leaders, the 'old boy' network."

Mr. Fried does, to be sure, offer an occasional criticism of his subjects, but more often he seems to be gazing up at them in respectful awe. Jewish bootleggers, he exclaims, contributed to "the general resistance to the *Kulturkampf*" which nativists attempted "to impose on city folk, Jews and Catholics alike." Meyer Lansky "always" sought "to maintain the balance between competition and cooperation, between individual greed and the well-being of the community." Bugsy Siegel, the infamous racketeer, played such a "seminal role in the creation of Las Vegas" that he merits a "place of honor in the literature of organized crime, indeed in the history of American culture." "America," Fried concludes," is embracing Bugsy Siegel's vision; his martyrdom [*sic*] was not in vain."

Bombast of this sort is obviously meant, in part, to pander to a potential Jewish audience, trying to fashion for it folk heroes of the same "gentleman-bandit" type as non-Jews enjoy. Jewish criminals are thus portrayed as being proud of their heritage, big givers to charity, and strong supporters of the state of Israel. They respect brains, abhor violence, and always love their children.

More significantly, works on Jewish criminals and prostitutes seem to reflect a desire to prove Jews "normal," no less criminal or vice-ridden than other peoples. If an earlier generation of writers overemphasized Jewish virtues, leaving the rest for anti-Semites to tell, today's writers seem eager to go to the other extreme. By revealing the underside of Jewish life they seek to distance themselves from the "chauvinists" of the past, at the same time demonstrating their own "evenhandedness" and lack of bias.

Unfortunately, evenhandedness is not what has resulted. Instead, a kind of Gresham's law has come into play: works on bad Jews crowd out works on good ones. While the study of Jews involved in crime and prostitution marches forward, the study of (for example) the religious life of American Jews remains neglected. Full-scale volumes on Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox Judaism in America do not exist; no history of either the American synagogue or the American rabbinate has been written; although Meyer Lansky has been the subject of not one but two biographies, we lack even one good biographical study of some of American Jewry's most noteworthy religious figures, among them Rabbi Isaac Leeser and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver. The situation in other areas of American Jewish life is just as bad.

This is hardly to say that the more popular subjects are unworthy of attention; certainly there is much to learn from them. But the proliferation of celebratory books about the "basement" does suggest that we are developing a strangely distorted notion of what Jews need to know in order to maintain their heritage intact.

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What Really Happened on the "Bounty"

Richard Grenier

THEY stand within a few feet of each other on the quarterdeck of HMS *Bounty*. Fletcher Christian, the second in command, on the verge of hysteria, has in a wild, impulsive action "taken the ship," mutinied, a crime for which the Royal Articles of War allow only one punishment: hanging. Captain William Bligh, showing the composure under extreme duress that was his hallmark and made him one of the greatest "foul-weather commanders" of his age, efficiently prepares to set forth in an open boat with those who choose to follow him—as it happens, half of the *Bounty*'s crew. He orders his men about with rude confidence, and finally calls to Christian, whose eyes are frantic with uncertainty, "They are a rabble, Mr. Christian. They were hard enough for me to command, and I commanded in the name of the law! You have nothing!"

The battle over the *Bounty* is with us again. Those who get their notions of history from the movies and television may think that this romantic story first broke upon the world with the best-selling pop fictionalized trilogy by Charles Bernard Nordhoff and James Norman Hall in the 30's, followed by the hugely successful Hollywood film of 1935 with Clark Gable playing a noble Christian (could Clark Gable do any wrong?) and Charles Laughton a most villainous Captain Bligh. The movie was remade in 1962 with Marlon Brando playing a foppish, aristocratic Christian; although departing appreciably from the first version, this did not have the impact required to reverse the earlier stereotype.

Now we have still another version, a quite splendid film, with Australia's Mel Gibson as Christian and Britain's Anthony Hopkins as Bligh, both in superb performances. This version hews quite closely to the recent historical work, *Captain Bligh and Mr. Christian*, by Richard Hough. It displays a few examples of modest, forgivable artistic license and omits a great deal of material. But like the book, the movie gives as fair an evaluation as we are likely to get of the world's most famous mutiny.

IT TAKES a shaming ignorance of our own and British maritime history to call this movie "revisionist," as did one of America's leading liberal newspapers in its news columns. For the new film is revisionist only if Clark Gable is a major historian. The orthodox and prevailing view from Lord Byron and the British Admiralty on has been that Captain Bligh was no harsher than the other great captains of his age like Cook or Nelson; that he was in fact extraordinarily concerned with the health and well-being of his men; and that if he had an extremely unpleasant idiosyncrasy or two they were no more than his junior officers and men were expected to bear. According to this standard view, Christian was weak, indecisive, pampered; above all, he was no leader, as his behavior on Pitcairn Island later proved.

In the code of the sea, mutiny is the ultimate crime. (For the captain of a ship the French still use the archaic expression, *Maître après Dieu*, "Master after God.") And in the late 18th century, even though they sailed under the flags of societies in which personal freedom was evolving rapidly, ships were hardly little floating democracies. In their daily precarious battle for survival, the men lived in a Hobbesian universe: better a bad captain than anarchy. For under anarchy, they would perish, as indeed did almost every single man who followed Fletcher Christian—by sea, by his own hand, by the hand of native islanders, and worst of all by the hands of his shipmates.

By contrast, those who chose to follow Bligh in his open boat participated in one of the greatest ventures in the annals of the sea. Proceeding on one-fifth rations (i.e., on the verge of starvation), navigating largely by memory, with seven inches of freeboard and subject to swamping and drowning at any moment, Bligh took his frail vessel safely through the blood-chilling perils of the Great Barrier Reef and on to the island of Timor in the Dutch East Indies, crossing 4,000 miles of open water in a mere ship's boat. It was an exploit which struck awe in the hearts of all those who, in the old phrase, went "down to the sea in ships," and on Bligh's return to England he was received as a hero by the king.

BUT first, the movie. Brilliantly acted by Gibson, Hopkins, and Liam Neeson (as Churchill, the master-at-arms), expertly directed by Roger Donaldson of New Zealand, handsomely costumed, the film uses as its "frame story" Bligh's court-martial upon his return to England. In history this was the purest *pro-forma* ritual required by the Navy for every captain who "lost his ship" at sea, no matter what the cause. Bligh, a hero, was acquitted painlessly without the slightest doubt of the outcome. In the movie, however, the court-martial is shot with great tension as if Bligh might indeed be found guilty, and all the highly dramatic scenes surrounding the mutiny are shown in flashback. The shift (in terms of movie portrayals of the *Bounty* story) is that most of these scenes are now shown from the side of authority, from the point of view of Bligh who, halfway around the world, "Master after God," is responsible for the safety of his ship and its crew.

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We see Bligh, harsh but fearless, battling the winds of Cape Horn for a full, merciless month. Later we see the *Bounty* arriving at last at its goal of Tahiti, and the canoe-loads of beautiful, bare-breasted maidens coming forth to welcome it. Bligh's mission is to carry a shipload of breadfruit cuttings for transplantation in the West Indies. To get the cuttings to take root in the *Bounty*'s pots requires some six months, during which the crew avails itself to the full of the Polynesian women's notorious sexual promiscuity, and Christian himself forms a romantic liaison with a particularly lovely princess, daughter of the local chief. When the time comes to set to sea again, there are sad farewells—although nowhere in the film is there anything to suggest that the coming mutiny is prompted by a longing on the part of the men to return to their Tahitian mistresses.

But the *Bounty*, in its six months in Tahiti, has become a slack ship. Bligh is in extremely bad temper and the brunt of it falls on his former favorite, Christian. It is Bligh's unfortunate quirk to insult his officers in front of the crew—thereby diminishing their authority over the men. Distraught, tremulous, almost unstrung, Christian complains piteously (as the numerous records all concur), "I am in hell! I am in hell!" Note the complaint: not that Bligh is mistreating the crew, but only that he, Christian, is being mistreated.

Yet even with this strong dose of self-pity on Christian's part and Bligh's scathing remarks, there probably still would not have been a mutiny if it were not for the presence on the ship of an Iago, a twenty-one-year-old midshipman, Edward Young. In the film, catching Christian in the middle of the night as he prepares to cast off by himself on a tiny raft, an act equivalent to suicide, Young gently dissuades him and then in a soft, detached voice plants the seed of revolt. "If I were you, Christian, I would take the ship." Then Young disappears—a trick he has when violent actions he has stage-managed come to a violent head. Before long, in the darkness, the deed is done. At the head of probably no more than a dozen men (out of a crew of forty-four), Christian has mutinied and seized the ship.

THE present film, although far closer to the historical record than earlier movie versions, still prettifies, among other things, the *Bounty*'s return to Tahiti. In the film, King Tynah disapproves strongly of the mutiny, telling Christian he has "disgraced" Tahiti and that King George will be angry and seek retribution (he is certainly right there). He nonetheless allows Christian's men to rejoin their native consorts. Several of the mutineers prefer to take their chances on Tahiti rather than face the wide Pacific under Christian, and the king even assigns half-a-dozen Tahitians as seamen to Christian, who is shorthanded. And then the *Bounty* sets sail for its secret island, Pitcairn, carrying some dozen loving couples with a few spare Tahitians to man the yardarms. (In historic fact, Christian was ashamed to confess to the chief that he had mutinied, and invented some cock-and-bull story about Bligh having encountered his "father," Captain Cook, and gone off somewhere—a story which was not believed. Furthermore, besides himself only three of his mutineers had formed real attachments with the Tahitian girls, so, largely to solve the woman problem, Christian gave a big party aboard the *Bounty*, where the rum flowed like water and he surreptitiously hauled anchor and got under way. In short, all but four of the Tahitian women who formed the idyllic community on Pitcairn Island, and all of the Polynesian men, were shanghaied.)

In the film's next-to-last sequence we see Captain Bligh, back in England, found innocent of any wrongdoing at his court-martial and marching, relieved but proud, from the audience chamber. The mood of the movie's very last scene is utterly different, forlorn, even grim. Christian and his racially mixed crew are "safe" on their two-square-mile secret Eden, Pitcairn, and the *Bounty*—their last link with the outside world—is burning offshore. In the light of the flames the men's faces are stricken. "We'll never see England again," says Young mournfully.

Whereupon we read on the screen that eighteen years later the tiny island of Pitcairn was rediscovered by the American whaling ship *Topaz* under the command of Captain Mayhew Folger. He found alive on the island nine women and twenty-three children, but only one man. Given that the original mutineers averaged in their twenties, there is something ominous in the fact that only one of them was still alive at the arrival of the *Topaz*, but not one moviegoer in a thousand can know just how gruesome the ends of the other mutineers were. Presumably Roger Donaldson and Orion Pictures decided that, having rehabilitated Bligh, shown Christian to be a weakling, and suggested that life on Pitcairn was not all sweetness and light, there was only so much Hobbesianism an audience could take. The copious literature about the mutiny has not been so squeamish—of which more later.

EVEN the welcome corrections the movie does make are less than completely faithful to the historical record. Bligh, first of all, is nowhere near as "rehabilitated" in this movie as he deserves to be. For in point of fact he was universally acknowledged to be one of the greatest navigators and seamen of his day. No less a figure than Captain Cook himself had chosen Bligh as his sailing master. Bligh had phenomenal gifts as a cartographer, draughtsman, and descriptive naturalist, and for his scientific achievements alone was elected to Britain's Royal Society. He was such an obsessive and accurate keeper of logs and journals that, even half-starved on his prodigious 4,000-mile journey in an open boat, he drew the best charts and descriptions of those waters that the Royal Navy was to have for decades to come. The Admiralty was sufficiently pleased with Bligh after his first, abortive "breadfruit" run, mutiny or no mutiny, to have sent him out again immediately on exactly the same mission—this time completed without incident.

Nor was Bligh lacking in battle honors. He commanded one of Nelson's ships at the Battle of Camperdown and was decorated for valor

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by Nelson himself. The three white stripes on Royal Navy uniforms stand for Nelson's three greatest victories: Trafalgar, Copenhagen, and the Nile. And at one of these, Copenhagen, one of the commanders of Nelson's ships of the line was, again, Captain Bligh. His years were not without further turbulence, but the judgment of the Admiralty speaks for the general view of his career as a whole: William Bligh retired with the lofty rank of Vice Admiral of the Blue.

AND what of Christian and his romantic mutineers? Christian had no sooner sailed the *Bounty* to the badly charted Pitcairn, where it was ardently hoped that the Royal Navy would never find them, than it became clear he did not have it in him to exercise the leadership that would have been required to hold the community together. Anarchy and a series of revolts soon destroyed all but one of the eight Englishmen and one American (Isaac Martin of Nantucket) who had followed him on this adventure.

To begin with there was the shortage of women. At the start, each of the white men had his *tyo*, while the six Polynesians had to share two (or three) women among them. Since wife-sharing and some form of polyandry were common among the Polynesians, this was not initially as great a hardship as it might appear. But it was inconceivable from the very beginning that the white men—superior in their own eyes from the point of view of technology, literacy, religion, perseverance, and even bravery—were going to treat the Polynesian males as their equals, and the Polynesian men became virtually a slave caste.

The situation was compounded when two of the white men's *tyos* died, one from falling off a cliff and a second from some obscure disease, and John Williams, the ship's armorer and hence in a strong position, demanded one of the Polynesian men's women as a replacement. "Sarah" or "Mary," either would do. During a subsequent struggle, Sarah, thrilled at the prospect of becoming a white man's *tyo* instead of a native's, seized a huge stone and crushed her Tahitian husband's skull.

Even so things might not have soured so rapidly had not John Adams and Midshipman Young taken to "mixing with the natives," teaching them, among other things, to use the Englishmen's muskets. Young once again played Iago, planting the idea in the heads of the Polynesian males that they could kill the white men and take over command, and once again he disappeared at the height of the action as the Polynesians, armed with the white man's muskets, crept up on their unsuspecting quarry and, one by one, massacred Fletcher Christian and Seamen Martin, Williams (to the despair of his new wife), Mills, and Brown. The remaining Englishmen realized that they would not be safe while a male Polynesian remained alive on the island and, counterattacking vigorously, killed every last one.

But the final revolt was the revolt of the women. While every whaler, sailor, or merchant seaman knew that Polynesia was a paradise of female sexual promiscuity, it is extraordinary how discreet were the allusions to this in British and American writings of the 19th century. But a point that is missed even today about this nearly extinct culture is what it meant when these young Tahitian girls clambered aboard an incoming British vessel and freely and sometimes publicly, as Captain Cook wrote, "offered their persons." To put it simply, there was some kind of rough equality between men and women. In sex, both were promiscuous. In intertribal wars the men, being stronger, were the "warriors," but the women as well were combatants, throwing stones (a deadly weapon), and rushing in whenever an adversary was brought to earth to beat his brains out. So not only were Tahitian women highly promiscuous, they could be highly violent. Queen Iddeah, King Tynah's wife, who does not appear in even this latest version of the *Bounty*, was a wrestling champion in her youth and remained umpire of all wrestling matches. But it was her sexual habits that flabbergasted Bligh. King Tynah's efforts apparently being inadequate to quench her appetites, a male house servant, ennobled, was brought into the ménage, and the two men would labor in each other's presence to satisfy the queen. So there were King Tynah, and Queen Iddeah, and then there was the house servant, as it were Adjunct Fornicator to Her Majesty.

Now at this point on Pitcairn Island, the women far outnumbered the men, of whom only four remained alive. So when the women announced that they had had enough and were determined to return to Tahiti, the demand was not taken lightly, for the Tahitians being as fickle in their general loyalty as in their sexual habits, and a kind of polygamy having been introduced, with two or three women to every man, no man knew when he fell asleep at night whether he would awake the following morning. During the "counterrevolt," for example, Young's wife had beheaded one of the natives with an axe as he slept.

The four Englishmen built a deliberately unseaworthy craft and the women set forth with all their children; when the vessel, as intended, foundered in the harbor, the women and children all swam back to shore. The only seaworthy vessel still remaining on the island was the *Bounty*'s old cutter. But the women had been producing children at such a prodigious rate (and continued to do so for at least the next 150 years) that there was simply no way the cutter could hold both all the women and all their children. It was therefore fecundity that finally did in the women's revolt.

THE killing among the mutineers was not at an end, however. Of the four surviving men, two, McKoy and Quintal, were, or became, alcoholics. McKoy had worked in a distillery and before long the two were making a potent brew from one of the island's plants. But the liquor did not bring happiness. One of the other mutineers had been heard to say that he would rather be hanged from a yardarm at Spithead than spend the rest of his life on these accursed islands (so much for our South Seas Arcadia). Soon McKoy bound his own hands and feet, tied a heavy

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weight around his neck, and leapt from a cliff to his death. Quintal was next. His mind rotted with alcohol, he turned aggressive; Young and Adams, short of powder perhaps, cut his head to pieces with an axe.

But this last murder—or perhaps the increasing loneliness—brought about a startling change in the island's two remaining adult males. Young, who had played probably the most sinister role in the whole story, underwent a sharp religious conversion, repenting of his sins and ardently espousing the Christianity of his youth. So, too, did John Adams. But Young was dying of asthma, and John Adams was almost illiterate. In a desperate race against time, Young taught Adams to read and write so that, with the Book of Common Prayer and the Bible, he could Christianize the island.

Adams, in his new Christian mode, must have been a man of singular force of personality, because, all alone now as patriarch of a pack of Tahitian women and an ever-increasing throng of children and grandchildren, he, singlehandedly, not only converted them to a very devout form of Christianity but imposed on them the English language, English morals, and loyalty to the British crown. All by himself, and with no communications for decades, this ex-mutineer built on a two-mile rock in the middle of the Pacific a staunch outpost of the British empire. When a royal man-of-war finally found Pitcairn, Adams, now a white-haired old man, on being told Nelson had won a great victory over the French at Trafalgar, leapt into the air crying, "Old England forever!" It can be understood why the ship's captain could not find it in his heart to bring him back in irons and hang him.

But other than those who survived 4,000 miles in an open boat with their captain, and those who sailed with Christian to Pitcairn and—with the exception of Adams—to death, there was a third group from the crew of the *Bounty*, those who had chosen to be put ashore at Tahiti. This was a mixed bag of sixteen, some loyal to Bligh but for whom no room could be found in the boat, and others, mutineers, who preferred to take their chances on Tahiti. Charles Churchill, the *Bounty*'s master-at-arms and one of the most committed mutineers, went to another part of the island and succeeded in imposing himself as king of the local tribe. He was accompanied by his friend and shipmate Matthew Thompson, but the two men had a falling out. Thompson murdered Churchill, and for his pains was murdered in turn, his skull crushed with a heavy stone by Churchill's loyal tribesmen.

Meanwhile, no sooner had word reached England of the mutiny on the *Bounty* than the Admiralty began fitting out a 24-gun frigate, the *Pandora*, with a strong company of marines aboard, to scour the South Seas for the mutineers. It was commanded by Captain Edward Edwards, a ferocious martinet compared with whom Bligh and most of the other captains of the age looked like Snow White. Once the *Pandora* was sighted coming into the harbor of Tahiti, more than half of the *Bounty* survivors rushed to give themselves up as non-mutineers. Only a hardened half-dozen took to the hills to make a stand, and even they eventually surrendered. The whole lot, mutineers and non-mutineers alike, were placed in irons on the *Pandora*.

Unfortunately, Captain Edwards was not so good a navigator as he was a severe martinet. On the night of August 28, 1791, the *Pandora* smashed straight into the Great Barrier Reef. Some of the men got off the ship in boats but thirty-five drowned, and four from the *Bounty* went to the bottom still in irons. Back in England, following the court-martial, three more from the *Bounty* were hanged, while three were sentenced to be hanged but pardoned under circumstances which still seem dubious. Of the men from the *Bounty* who survived the sinking of the *Pandora* at the Great Barrier Reef, only four were acquitted: three whom Bligh certified had been prevented by force from joining him in his open boat, and one blind fiddler.

Eight dead on Pitcairn, two murdered on Tahiti, four in irons at the bottom of the sea, and three hanged at Spithead. All because Mr. Christian had been in "hell." By and large, it did not look as if the famous mutiny on the *Bounty* had been a paying proposition. It had been the indirect cause of other deaths as well: more than thirty men from the *Pandora* in addition to numerous Tahitians and other Polynesians. Even those who, with Bligh, survived the 4,000 miles in an open boat did not all make it back to England. In Batavia (now Jakarta), four of them caught malaria and died. Still another took passage on a Dutch ship which on its homeward journey was lost with all hands.

One of the things that has kept the story of the *Bounty* alive for so long is that so many of the people involved published their journals or memoirs. Captain Bligh, his perfunctory court-martial over, promptly wrote an account of the mutiny which became a best-seller. He later wrote still another version of the same story, also a best-seller. Lord Byron, whose grandfather had been an admiral, wrote a poem, *The Island*, based partly on Bligh's original narrative ("The gallant chief within his cabin slept . . ."). To muddy the waters, an attack came against Bligh that seems to have been inspired by the urge to save the honor of two powerful English families, the Christians and the Heywoods.

Peter Heywood was a *Bounty* midshipman whose implication in the mutiny was strong enough to get him condemned to death at his court-martial, but whose influence (his uncle was a commodore), wealth (he inherited a large fortune during the court-martial itself), and ardent professions of loyalty to Bligh led to his pardon. No sooner was he pardoned, however, than he turned to Christian's older brother, Edward, then one of England's leading barristers, inciting him to launch an attack on Bligh's character. This the elder Christian did in a vehement pamphlet.

Once Pitcairn was rediscovered, moreover, Adams, the mutineers' widows, and the older children were all interviewed. One of these widows managed to induce a passing ship to take her back to her native Tahiti, where she encoun-

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The abundance of documentation aside, there is a profusion of reasons why the *Bounty* should have become the most famous of mutinies. Most mutinies in those days began with the slaughter of the captain and all the ship's officers, followed by the later slaughter of most of the chief mutineers (as in the most renowned mutiny in U.S. naval annals, that of the celebrated whaling ship *Globe*). On the *Bounty*, providing dramatic counterpoint, the mutiny was bloodless and "nobly" conducted, and both sides survived, at least for a time. Bligh's voyage in an open boat across the Pacific was a stupendous feat of navigation and seamanship. The sinking of the *Pandora* added an extra note of tragedy. And then the surprise discovery of the remainder of Christian's colony on Pitcairn eighteen years later by the U.S. whaler *Topaz* provided not only melodrama but a dénouement of the mutiny that no reasonable person had any right to expect.

For at least a century the story of John Adams, the last Pitcairn mutineer, became an inspirational tale for British and American Christians. Years after Adams's death, when officials of the empire decided that his teeming colony of half-breeds would be happier with their "own people" and shipped them to Tahiti, the Pitcairners were disgusted by Tahitian mores and demanded to be sent back home. Such a very Christian place did Pitcairn become that even in the 1930's it remained a tourist attraction for Americans who wanted to see these people whose ancestors had erred, but who had been redeemed and now lived "without sin."

IN 1831, some forty-two years after the mutiny, Sir John Barrow, Secretary of the Admiralty, wrote what was to stand for a century as the "definitive" account. Although making no attempt to disguise Bligh's intemperate nature, he strongly stressed "the dreadful consequences that are almost certain to ensue from a state of insubordination and mutiny on board a ship of war" and laid down as an immutable law of the sea that officers and men must "remain faithful under all circumstances to their commanding officer." The latest edition of Sir John Barrow's account of the mutiny was published in 1981, exactly 150 years after the first edition (and almost 200 years after the mutiny). It carries in its introduction a statement by Gavin Kennedy, a modern *Bounty* scholar: "The fictional image of Bligh as a sadistic bully driving a demented and terrorized crew to mutiny by floggings and deprivations is such nonsense that it is hardly worth debunking. By 18th-century standards Bligh was, physically, a soft commander."

Still, what might have maintained the *Bounty*'s popularity over two centuries is precisely the preservation of Bligh as at least a highly authoritarian figure. For it was this image of Bligh that allowed the tale to acquire its resonance as a drama of order vs. justice, one of the ultimate problems facing men in an organized society. The Hobbesian principle could justify the most unlimited assumption of power; but under civilian conditions, on land, in time of peace, this seemed increasingly unacceptable in a dawning democratic age. (The mutiny on the *Bounty* took place in 1789, the same year as the fall of the Bastille in Paris.) The stage, therefore, was set. Beginning with the 1930's there emerged a new view, featuring a fictionalized Bligh as merciless tyrant and an equally fictionalized Christian as a combination of Tom Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington.

One factor in the shift, it now seems obvious, was the disappearance from popular memory of the true conditions of life at sea. The simplest illustration is flogging. Historically, its use was once quite general; in the Royal Navy it was not abolished until as late as 1881. Captain Cook had all men flogged who would not eat the malt extract British chemists had concocted to protect them from the scourge of scurvy. Nelson flogged his men, as did every other commander (which did not noticeably diminish their fighting spirit at Nelson's message before Trafalgar, "England expects

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every man to do his duty"). Once the age of flogging passed away, however, it became hard for a person of modern, humane sensibilities to read a detailed description of a flogging—let alone see it enacted in a film—without feeling he was witnessing a "cruel and unusual punishment." So Bligh, a "soft" commander for his time, by one description a "lamb," by this shift in mores was converted into a sadistic brute, and the framework of the whole story changed.

By a quirk of fate, though, the people who brought this particular version of the *Bounty* mutiny before the mass public were not pacifists, leftists, anti-imperialists, or anti-militarists, but two genuine war heroes from World War I, Charles Bernard Nordhoff and James Norman Hall. Both men had flown in combat in the same Lafayette Escadrille, Nordhoff winning the *Croix de Guerre* and Hall the *Croix de Guerre* with five palms, the *Légion d'Honneur*, and the *Medaille Militaire*, France's high military decoration. In 1918, both transferred to the newly formed U.S. Air Services, where Hall became one of the first two Americans in history to win the Distinguished Service Cross.

It is perhaps worth noting, however, that in the highly individualistic way in which aerial combat was conducted in World War I, with glamorized dogfights of "ace" against "ace," neither of the two had ever commanded anybody. This was a part of military life of which they had no experience. They were, moreover, both highly romantic. Brought together to do a book on the Lafayette Escadrille, they discovered that they shared a desire to continue their life of adventure. Hall's favorite writer was Joseph Conrad (whose writing his own does not much resemble, unfortunately). Whereas Ernest Hemingway and Scott Fitzgerald went to Paris, Nordhoff and Hall went to Tahiti.

For Hall, a hard-core Arcadian who even hated the automobile (odd in a fighter pilot), it was a love affair that lasted a lifetime. For Nordhoff it lasted at least many years. They both married Tahitian women and had numerous children of mixed blood. Unquestionably, at the time they published the *Mutiny on the Bounty* trilogy (beginning in 1932), they still felt that Polynesians were the "true successors of Adam and Eve in innocence, for here was Eden before the Fall." So their own life experience led them to romanticize to the full the attraction that Tahiti had for Fletcher Christian and other 18th-century British seamen. When research material on the mutiny was sent them from London—they did not bother to go themselves—it no doubt struck them that Captain Bligh was a very mean person. And thus a great best-seller was born.

It is interesting to note that although the Nordhoff-Hall version conquered popular audiences, helped immensely by the Clark Gable movie, it was considered wildly unhistorical in academic circles. It is perhaps also worth pointing out that Nordhoff's passion for "the islands" at some point snapped. Having already divorced a Tahitian woman to take a Tahitian mistress, he suddenly threw the whole game up and went to California, leaving behind no fewer than six half-breed children, some legitimate, some illegitimate, none of whom he ever saw again. Curiously he brought three daughters (all legitimate) back with him to California, where they were raised by his sister. But he remained quite cold to Hall's plaintive letters warning that if he did not help his illegitimate Tahitian children financially they would "go bush." What published evidence I can uncover seems to suggest that this is exactly what happened. In the end, Nordhoff took to drinking heavily and seems to have committed suicide.

Hall, for his part, never abandoned his Tahitian wife (herself a half-breed) and two children, but his Tahitian Arcadia was highly selective. Although during his trips through the islands he rejoiced in the absence of doctors, which he took as further indication of the Polynesians' prelapsarian state, at the first hint of a personal ailment of his own he was off to the Harvard Medical School or the Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston. He, but not Nordhoff, was at

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least spared the ultimate prelapsarian experience: returning home one afternoon to be greeted by one of his children with the cry, "Daddy, daddy! Mummy's in bed with the new chauffeur!" These men, with varying elements of self-deception and hypocrisy, were living out in Tahiti some kind of daydream; their Fletcher Christian was a daydream; and their *Mutiny on the Bounty* was a daydream made to match.

But every age has its fashions. In 1965 (one is surprised it took so long) a book was written advancing the thesis that there had been a homosexual love affair between Bligh and Christian, and that the mutiny was the result of a lover's quarrel between the two. Richard Hough's *Captain Bligh and Mr. Christian*, like some intervening works, follows this line, although the author, in my view, twists his *pièce à conviction* unconscionably.

Midshipman Heywood was the last person to speak to Christian on the beach at Tahiti before the mutineer took the *Bounty* out to sea and, eventually, to Pitcairn. Since Heywood was his best friend, Christian entrusted to him a secret to be communicated to his family: "Other circumstances" connected with the mutiny, although they would in no way justify the "crime he committed against the laws of his country," would nonetheless serve to "extenuate" his responsibility. At least this is what Heywood said in a letter to a fellow naval officer. What this secret was we do not know, since nothing has come down to us in either the Heywood or Christian family papers.

This, needless to say, has not stopped historians from guessing. The first guess has traditionally been venereal disease, which had affected nearly half the *Bounty*'s crew and, we now know, was widespread in Polynesia before the arrival of Europeans. A homosexual connection is also not implausible. (Winston Churchill, with his catchy way of phrasing things, once said that the Royal Navy was ruled by "rum, sodomy, and the lash.") But Hough is rather naughty in omitting that Heywood, in the same letter in which he refers to Christian's claim that there were extenuating circumstances, wrote that these circumstances "can implicate none but himself [Christian]." Since a homosexual relationship would normally involve more than one person, this does not exactly support Hough's theory. Barring an unexpected find, we shall probably never have an answer to this question, but in any event the film, mercifully, steers clear of the whole subject.

To my mind, a far deeper mystery is what drove these "iron men in wooden ships" to the far corners of the earth under such arduous and brutal circumstances. Even allowing for the practice of impressing seamen on the high seas and in the taverns of Navy towns, those impressed were usually already sailors, for the Navy wanted men who knew the work. If they had not gone to sea these men might have remained agricultural laborers or shopkeepers' assistants; they would have led lives of poverty, admittedly, but with any kind of luck they would not have been flogged, or starved, or drowned. But this was a period in history when a strange vitality drove the people of Europe—not just Britons but almost all Europeans—to expand, to leave their mark upon the entire earth, to see what lay beyond the beyond.

At almost the exact period of the *Bounty* mutiny, the great African explorer Mungo Park (who had the same patron as Bligh, Sir Joseph Banks) was tracing the course of the Niger. As he made his way across West Africa, buying his right of passage from a series of extraordinarily acquisitive African chiefs—many of whom ruled small empires, having enslaved neighboring tribes they had conquered—Park encountered one who asked what he was about, his skin so pale, wandering so far from home. Park told the chief he wanted to see the Niger. The chief did not understand. Were there no great rivers in Park's homeland? Park admitted there were. Well then, said the chief, why did he not just go look at one of them? This is a question that is harder to answer than it seems, and I am not certain that Park ever gave the chief satisfaction.

After writing his classic *Travels in the Interior of Africa* (1799), which had great success, Park returned to his native Scotland where he resumed the practice of medicine near Edinburgh. He was a close friend of Sir Walter Scott (Fletcher Christian, implausibly, had been a schoolmate of William Wordsworth), but the practice of medicine in Scotland was boring after Africa, and when the government asked Park to lead another expedition to the Niger he accepted with alacrity. Commissioned a captain for the purpose, he led a British force of forty-six inland from the coast. By the time they reached the Niger, thirty-five of them had died from fever or dysentery. But before his departure, Park had written that it was his fixed resolution to trace the entire, mysterious course of the great river. "Though all the Europeans who are with me should die, and though I were myself half dead, I would still persevere, and if I could not succeed in the object of my journey, I would at least die on the Niger." Such, indeed, was to be his lot. During the last stage of his journey down the Niger by canoe, only four Europeans remained alive. Under attack from hostile natives on the banks, their canoe struck a rock and they all drowned except for one African bearer, who lived to tell the tale.

Captain Bligh in the South Pacific, Captain Park in Africa, there were thousands of them, daring men who never for one moment questioned the value of their missions or, to be frank, the primacy of their civilization. In their age, they were supported with boundless enthusiasm by the crown, the government, the aristocracy, the scientific and literary classes. Even Fletcher Christian felt he had committed a terrible crime against his country, and wherever he wandered in the islands of the Pacific, mutineer though he was, he planted the Union Jack.

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Good Press, Bad Press

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE STORY. By JODY POWELL. *Morrow. 322 pp. $15.95.*

Reviewed by JOSHUA MURAVCHIK

JODY POWELL'S four years as White House press secretary left him "upset," even "angry" at the press corps, and he has written a book to explain why. Too much of the news, he says, "seemed to me, then and now, to be wrong, unsupportable, and unfair." Reporters do not merely make errors; they err, according to Powell, because they are motivated by aims other than those of accuracy, objectivity, and balance.

As an example, Powell cites a story carried by ABC News alleging that UN Ambassador Andrew Young's unauthorized 1979 meeting with representatives of the PLO was discovered through illegal domestic surveillance. Actually, it was much more likely that the discovery had been made through perfectly legal and routine surveillance of the Arab diplomats who arranged the meeting or of the PLO participants. Although the administration could not acknowledge this publicly, it hinted as much to ABC. But ABC, out of reluctance either to admit error or to give up a good story, would not back down. When the Attorney General and the director of the FBI corroborated White House denials that any bugging of Young had occurred, ABC responded by airing a story that these two officials had denied *knowledge* of the bugging.

Powell is angry, too, at the media's lust for scandal, which often entails a disregard for rigorous standards of accuracy and an indifference to the fact that people holding public office (and their families) are human beings, vulnerable to personal and professional injury through accusations recklessly made or recklessly broadcast. He is especially bitter about the experience of his colleague Hamilton Jordan, the White House chief of staff, who was plagued by three highly publicized allegations of personal misconduct. Powell believes that Jordan was blameless, but the time and energy expended in the effort to refute these charges inevitably cut into the more serious business of the administration and hence of the public. None of the allegations was ever pressed, and Jordan was exonerated of the most serious and the most thoroughly investigated of them, pertaining to the use of cocaine, but he was left with a crushing debt from legal bills.

Powell compellingly identifies the central source of irresponsibility in the media: "We leave the question of right and wrong in the press . . . to the individual conscience of reporters and editors." As individuals, journalists are no better or worse than members of other influential occupations—politicians, labor leaders, business executives, doctors, or lawyers. Each such group, as Powell puts it, has a tendency to exploit "the rationalization process by which the pursuit of selfish goals is ascribed to unselfish motivations." Yet each of these groups is also subject to the outside scrutiny of the press—with the exception of the press itself—and this serves to some degree as a check against miscreants and against the miscreant impulses that lurk in all of us. "What sets journalists apart," says Powell correctly, "is that no one is looking over their shoulder, at least no one who is in a position to do much about what is seen."

Powell has one good suggestion for a partial remedy to this problem. He reminds us that politicians are kept in line not only by the press but also by other politicians. Republicans versus Democrats, liberals versus conservatives, executive versus legislature, each is constantly alert to the errors of its antagonists. In the press, by contrast, there seems to be an unwritten rule that prohibits one major news outlet from criticizing another. Powell proposes to abolish this rule:

> If ABC blows its coverage of a major story, thereby misinforming tens of millions of people, why shouldn't CBS and NBC and CNN accept the responsibility for answering the public's legitimate questions about what happened and why, and what is being done to keep it from happening again?

Why not, indeed? Doing so would provide a healthy corrective while infringing not at all on press freedom. (The same cannot be said for some of the other remedies Powell proposes, such as obliging journalists to file financial-disclosure statements akin to those required of government officials.)

ALTHOUGH some of Powell's generalizations about the press are persuasive, his book is disappointingly short on supporting evidence. The reason for this may be that his presumptive theme—the unscrutinized and therefore irresponsible press—is quickly elbowed aside by another with a much more powerful grip on his mind—the doing-in of a fine President, Jimmy Carter, by a *biased* press.

Powell contrasts the unduly harsh treatment which he says the press accorded Carter with what he sees as the unduly soft treatment it has given Ronald Reagan. With the election of Reagan, he writes,

> the fourth estate had reached that blessed realm where lions become lambs, typewriters are beaten into plowshares, and rear ends in the White House become objects for kissing rather than kicking.

If this seems a bit hard to understand—reputable and widely reported survey data reveal the

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press as a whole to be markedly more liberal in outlook and more Democratic in allegiance than the national average—Powell has a reply. The real bias of the press, he says, "is not political but economic—news judgment based on what is interesting and salable." It is this bias which, according to Powell, explains the way the press underplayed the significance of the Carter briefing book that ended up in the hands of the Reagan campaign in 1980. "Most of the powers that be decided initially that stories about dirty tricks against the Carter administration had no market."

But this is self-contradictory. If it is true that the news business has a bias toward the "interesting and salable," a really important scandal involving misconduct among the highest officials of the Reagan administration—for such Powell alleges "Briefing-gate" to have been—should have received exceptionally heavy treatment in the press. Powell, indeed, seems to sense the weakness of this line of argument, for elsewhere he reverts to an explanation from politics. Although journalists "are about as apolitical a group as you are likely to find anywhere," a minority of journalists, he concedes, do care about political issues, and their views do tend to be liberal—but this, paradoxically, makes them tougher, not easier, on liberal Presidents:

> Those journalists who really care about certain policy positions tend to hold Democratic Presidents to a higher standard. They don't expect Republicans to do much for women or minorities or poor people, and they don't raise much hell when they don't. They expect Republicans to be a good bit laxer about conflicts of interest and other improprieties and don't pursue such stories, at least since Watergate, with as much zeal in a GOP administration.

Powell calls this the "screwball spin," and it applies, according to him, to presidential candidates as well as to sitting Presidents. Thus, in the 1980 election campaign, journalists

> overcompensated for their ideological preferences. Knowing that they disagreed with Reagan's positions, they went out of their way not to be overly critical of them in their reporting, and to be particularly skeptical of what Carter had to say.

But apparently the "screwball spin" does not always apply. In 1980, when Carter was challenged in the primaries by the liberal Senator Kennedy, the liberal press, according to Powell, was entirely biased in favor of Kennedy and against Carter. He writes:

> The Washington *Post* gave witness to the kid-glove treatment generally accorded the Senator by agreeing to an interview on Chappaquiddick in which the questions had to be presented in advance, and the Senator and his staff retained the right to edit the responses before they were published. This arrangement raised eyebrows among politicians, and journalists, some of the latter at the *Post*.

Unfortunately for Powell's argument, there was no such interview with the *Post*. The New York *Times* did publish an interview with Kennedy about Chappaquiddick in July 1979, in which questions were submitted in advance, although it does not seem that Kennedy retained a right to edit.

Nor was the treatment of Kennedy by the *Times* as Powell describes it. Together with the Kennedy interview, the *Times* published an interview with the parents of Mary Jo Kopechne, at the heart of which was their expressed feeling that they still "don't know the whole story" about the events surrounding their daughter's death. The previous month there had appeared in the *Times Magazine* an unusual two-part piece, "The Kennedy Mystique," of which the subhead read: "He's ahead in the presidential polls, sparring with Jimmy Carter. But as his boosters' enthusiasm mounts, the key question about Edward Kennedy is his character." A few months later a *Times* editorial on "The Legacy of Chappaquiddick" took the view:

> There ought to be no hesitation to rake over this puzzling affair. . . . If Mr. Kennedy used his enormous influence to protect himself and his career by leading a cover-up of misconduct—and the known facts lead to that suspicion—there would hang over him not just a cloud of tragedy but also one of corruption, of the Watergate kind.

Nor does Powell mention the columns on Chappaquiddick by William Safire that the *Times* carried in 1979, none of which would qualify as "kid-glove treatment."

THE matter does not end there. The most damning indictment of media misconduct in Powell's book has to do with "blind"—i.e., unattributed—quotes. According to Powell, "the problem of blind quotes goes all the way to the manufacturing of, or doctoring of, comments to give a story more punch. Few journalists deny that this takes place." Disappointingly, he gives not a single example of this practice. Powell himself, however, may be committing this very same offense in his discussion of the phantom Washington *Post* interview with Senator Kennedy:

> "It was," said one *Post* reporter, "a total embarrassment. I never understood why you people [in the White House] never raised hell about it. If you had tried to set up that sort of thing for the President to talk about nuclear weapons, or Bert Lance to talk about his problem, or Billy Carter to talk about Libya, we would have laughed in your face, and then run an editorial crucifying you for even asking."

Whom is Powell quoting here? He must know, and he must have in hand a corroborating tape or piece of paper. Since he certainly also knows which reporters work for the *Times* and which for the *Post*, it is hard to imagine how the quote could have failed to remind him which newspaper he was talking about and therefore hard not to wonder about the authenticity and accuracy of the quotation.

IF POWELL is more confusing than convincing in the explanations he offers for the source of the alleged bias of the press against Carter, he is even less convincing in his attempt to prove that the bias was real. Take the coverage of the March 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which Carter

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mediated. Powell says that "When the treaty was signed . . . the President received little credit for his accomplishments. Indeed, the entire Middle East peace effort, taken as a whole, was decidedly a net minus for Jimmy Carter politically." This, he writes, was due in part to domestic politics and in part to "the way the President's efforts were covered in the press." After the signing of the treaty, "the coverage generally in the days that followed was not good. The focus was on the cost in increased aid and on all the things that could go wrong and on the problems yet to be solved." Powell cites snippets from the Washington *Post* and New York *Times* of March 14 and 15 to illustrate his complaint.

The reader who troubles to go back to the press of the week in question will be startled by the contrast between Powell's description and what actually appeared. The March 14 *Post* carried a banner headline, "Carter Wins Breakthrough in Mideast"; beneath it were two stories, one saying Carter had achieved "a major diplomatic breakthrough that could rewrite the history of the Middle East," the other asserting that even if the treaty were to fall apart, "the accomplishment of Jimmy Carter is now established as a personal success—and if peace becomes reality it will go down as one of the true diplomatic triumphs." The day's lead editorial began:

> If peace between Israel and Egypt is to be consummated, as now seems virtually certain, the leaders of those two countries deserve profound tribute. But it seems to us undeniable that it was only by Jimmy Carter's transcendent vision and steadiness that such a result could be achieved.

As for Powell's complaint about the *Post*'s harping on the costs of the treaty to American taxpayers, its page-one story said:

> Members of Congress who were informed late yesterday at the White House of estimates of the costs and commitments said they appeared more modest than anticipated, and predicted that Congress would approve the necessary legislation. "If this is a fair estimate of the cost, it's a real bargain," said Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn) whose sentiment was echoed by other lawmakers.

In its news stories, the *Times* was characteristically more restrained than the *Post*, but hardly negative. Its lead editorial, of which Powell quotes phrases out of context to give the impression that it was negative, was in fact overwhelmingly positive. It began:

> Thanks to Jimmy Carter, the making of a peace treaty has become as exciting for Americans as the waging of war. That alone is a singular achievement in a nation so obviously yearning for dreams to dream. . . . Had the President failed in Cairo and Jerusalem, this would have been a noble failure, certainly a worthier response to Iran than some Bay of Pigs or Mayaguez. Now that he appears to have been successful, we rejoice particularly for that aspect of Mr. Carter's performance.

After five paragraphs including more such praise, the *Times* said: "Indeed, the Carter administration gave far from a flawless diplomatic performance in this drama. But the President had a profound understanding of his part." Of these two sentences Powell quotes only the first, suggesting that it is representative of the editorial as a whole.

The next weekly issue of *Time* magazine also featured the Middle East treaty. Its story was summarized on the contents page: "Carter pulls it off again. With a dazzling display of eleventh-hour virtuosity, he leads Egypt and Israel to the brink of peace." The story's subhead read: "Carter's diplomatic coup was masterful." *Newsweek* was not to be outdone. Its summary read: "Jimmy Carter brought home another of his patented last-minute breakthroughs. His faith and grit had finally given Egypt and Israel a peace treaty to sign." One of its subheads read "Pax Jimmyana," and its spread featured no fewer than fourteen photographs of the President.

Jody Powell is correct that poor journalism is shielded, even encouraged, by the absence of any mechanism by which journalists can be scrutinized as they scrutinize everyone else. But the other side of this particular coin is that politicians and other people in power tend to blame a "bad press" whenever their actions, as reported in the press, prove unpopular. So common is this habit that it has inoculated even the most responsible of journalists against even the most responsible of critics. By writing a book that will only strengthen this syndrome, Powell has tossed a "screwball spin" of his own. Perhaps his book should be read not as a failed indictment but as itself an example of the folly to which journalists are prey.

Muslims & Modernity

In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power. By Daniel Pipes. *Basic Books. 373 pp. $22.50.*

Reviewed by Elie Kedourie

Daniel Pipes's book is divided into three parts. He begins by delineating the premodern legacy of Islam, he goes on to describe the encounter of Islam and the West with all the problems which this encounter entailed for Muslims, and—in the largest section of his work—he examines the characteristics of the Islamic revival which in recent years has taken the world by surprise. This section also deals with the effect which the enormous rise in the price of oil—a rise coinciding with the spread of a new revivalist fervor in the Muslim world—has had on Muslim attitudes vis-à-vis the non-Muslim world. Pipes also considers here the new possibilities which this wealth opened up to various Muslim states of pursuing an active Islamic policy. This last section contains a great deal of valuable information about the Muslim population of the world, and a country-by-country survey of

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the various Islamic movements prominent in recent decades.

Islamic fundamentalism is best understood as the aspiration to revert to the original Islamic way of life as it is thought to have been in the days of the Prophet and his immediate successors. It is one particular outcome of the encounter in modern times between the Muslim world and the West. In this encounter Muslims were, and saw themselves as, the weaker party. They were weaker politically, economically, and militarily. What is perhaps more serious, Muslims seemed to have no defenses against Western modes of thought, or a Western way of life. Indeed, Western thought and Western ways seemed to pose a more insidious and a more formidable threat than outright military conquest or political domination. Apart from fundamentalism, the world of Islam has seen two other ways by which it was thought possible to cope with the threat posed by the West. These are secularism and reformism.

Secularism is the belief that Muslim society could defend itself, and could prosper, only if it adopted the cast of mind, the institutions, and the way of life associated with the West. Specifically, secularism meant the separation of state and religion and the relegation of religion to the private sphere. Secularism became very influential among the educated and official classes in many parts of the Muslim world. In the Ottoman empire, the highlight of their influence and power was reached with the Young Turk revolution of 1908, and with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who inherited the Young Turk ideals and incorporated secularism in Kemalism, the official ideology of the Turkish republic which he founded and ruled until his death in 1938. Secularism also marked the outlook of Muhammad Ali and the dynasty which he founded in Egypt. The outlook was shared by most of the prominent Egyptian politicians under the monarchy, as well as by the Arab political leaders who appeared on the scene in Syria and Iraq after the destruction of the Ottoman empire. Again, the nationalists who supplanted the Dutch in the East Indies were profoundly secular in outlook and, like Atatürk, made secularism a pillar of the Indonesian state.

But secularism as a method of coping with modernity—a creation of the Western genius—has proved a failure. It has failed in that it has not secured the power and prosperity which its proponents had hoped for. It has also failed in that the secularist state of mind has remained the affair of a small official and intellectual class, and has not been able to penetrate into the society at large. What it has done is, on the contrary, to create a gap between the traditional mass and the secularized rulers, who now inhabit two distinct universes of discourse.

Reformism, the other reaction to the West, proceeded in the belief that there was, and ought to be, no contradiction between modernity and Islam. On the contrary, Islam and modernity were in reality fully compatible. It is only because obscurantism, superstition, and tyranny had laid their dead hand on Islam in previous centuries that Muslim social and political institutions fell into decay and corruption, and the Muslim intellect lost originality and inventiveness. Islam had only to be purified from these alien accretions for it to resume its place in the vanguard of civilization. Theology had to be made rational, education likewise, and rulers made responsive to the needs of their society—and such a program was fully practicable.

Alas, it was not to be so. There was no easy or practicable way by which "true" Islam could be recovered from the adulterations in which it had been lost. Intellectually, reformism entailed all kinds of painful contortions, of unconvincing apologias, of transparent and feeble stratagems. It was not a position which could be sustained for long, and it ineluctably led either to fundamentalism or to agnosticism.

Muhammad 'Abduh, the Grand Mufti of Egypt at the turn of the century, is the most eminent figure associated with Islamic reformism. Lord Cromer, who was his patron, who admired him greatly, and who hoped for great things from his followers, expressed the view in *Modern Egypt* that 'Abduh was in reality an agnostic, and there is a great deal to be said for such a view. On the other hand, Rashid Rida, 'Abduh's devoted disciple and biographer (and a much more distinguished figure than his master), developed reformism into something closely approaching fundamentalism. Reformism proved to be not only an intellectual, but also a practical, fiasco. Cromer likened 'Abduh's followers to the Girondins in the French Revolution. He wrote better than he knew, since the reformists, whether in Egypt or Central Asia or North Africa, in the end fell victim to one or another variety of rough and ruthless Jacobins, or else were emasculated by operators and office-seekers.

So, it has finally come to fundamentalism. Its most striking manifestation is, of course, Ayatollah Khomeini's success in toppling the Shah and establishing an Islamic republic in Iran, supposedly on pure Islamic lines. Pakistan under General Zia has also attempted to shed Western influences and restore what is believed to be an authentic Muslim way of life. There are also powerful and well-established fundamentalist movements, notably in Egypt, where a small conspiratorial group of fundamentalists succeeded in assassinating Sadat; in the Sudan, where they seem to have compelled Numayri to proclaim Muslim law as the law of a country in which Christians and pagans form an appreciable part of the population; and in Syria, where they have posed a formidable threat to Assad's regime (in suppressing a revolt in Hama in February 1982, Assad had to launch a military expedition that destroyed a large part of the city and killed thousands of its inhabitants).

Pipes points out that the recent upsurge of fundamentalism, and the enthusiasm this trend has evoked in Muslims everywhere, has much to do with the OPEC bonanza:

> Buoyed by unexpected good fortune, Muslims allowed themselves to imagine that they had solved their basic problem, the inability to come to terms with the West. As the deluge of free wealth improved the [Muslim community's]

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> economic and political position without requiring it to deal with this problem, fundamentalists sounded increasingly convincing; it did appear that the [community] could modernize without confronting its reluctance to Westernize. When some of the most primitive and observant Muslims flourished without effort, seemingly through the strength of faith alone, false hopes were raised, giving many Muslims the unrealistic expectation that God's bounty might allow them to retreat into faith, to glorify their heritage, and to reject Western ways.

But the bonanza, Pipes rightly points out, must sooner or later come to an end. It will then become apparent that fundamentalism has led Muslims down a blind alley. Pipes believes that reformist and secularist approaches will eventually prevail. Whether he is right nobody can tell, but the omens are not auspicious.

In support of his argument, Pipes points to the Jewish experience: it took some two hundred years for Jews to come to terms with modernity. But as he himself recognizes, there are many important differences between the situation, the traditional attitudes, and the expectations of Jews and Muslims. Whatever the ultimate outcome, the travails of the Muslims (who number over 800 million) in trying to come to terms with themselves and with modern civilization cannot fail to be a matter of intense interest and of profound concern to the rest of the world.

At the Lord's Table

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF COTTON MATHER. By KENNETH SILVERMAN. *Harper & Row. 479 pp. $29.95.*

Reviewed by FERNANDA EBERSTADT

ANY biographer of Cotton Mather is faced with a lot of wrongs to redress. Lampooned and scourged in his lifetime by a rising political class of populist merchants who had displaced his family's religious authority, Cotton Mather went down in the books as an authoritarian bigot, a witch-burner who sought to keep America in its theocratic swaddling clothes well into the 18th century.

In the last twenty years, the territory has shifted: Cotton Mather has been forgiven, for his art. Literary historians like Sacvan Bercovitch and Kenneth Silverman have raised and installed Mather as the first American to explain America to Europe. In his newsletters reporting earthquakes, miraculous cures, and monstrous births, in his "Curiosa Americana" addressed to the British Royal Society (of which he was the first American member), and, above all, in his voluminous history of New England, *Magnalia Christi Americana*, Cotton Mather seemed determined to make his country noticed, if not admired.

This current line on Mather is taken as far as it will go in Kenneth Silverman's new biography, which claims that in his "curiousness, epic reach, and quirkily ingenious individualism," Mather initiated a tradition culminating in Gertrude Stein, Charles Ives, and Jackson Pollock. In an earlier introduction to Mather's *Letters*, Silverman asserted that in the "gaudy novelty and elephantine scale" of his work, Mather anticipated "later Californian or Niagaran excesses" and the "latest state university system and urban culture palace." If there seems something condescending about this judgment, whose very extravagance undercuts the praise bestowed, it is a condescension characteristic of Silverman's biography as a whole: a large undertaking which is finally made little by the biographer's reductive scorn for his hero.

COTTON MATHER was born in Boston in 1663. His grandfathers were two of the founders of Congregationalism and leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. His father, Increase Mather, was minister of North Church and president of Harvard, until his refusal to live in backwater Cambridge forced him out. Cotton Mather entered Harvard at the age of eleven, a sickly child with a sense of mission and an appetite for learning and self-laceration. The hopes united in his name were matched by the punishments he devised for himself: with two grandfathers, five uncles, and a father in the ministry, Cotton developed a stutter which threatened to bar him from the pulpit. But as he later wryly observed, "There is nothing more frequent than for stammerers to speak ten times more than they need to." In compensation, he became a prodigious public speaker and the most prolific writer and correspondent in American history.

At the age of sixteen, he received God's grace and began preaching informally. By the time he was ordained in the North Church in 1685, Mather had already built a reputation as the "young pope" of Boston.

It was a time when New England and its future as a religious and political entity were in question. Charles II had no liking for the Puritan New World. Having hinted without much success that if the colony could not admit Episcopalians and Presbyterians as Christians, it might at least give them the vote, in 1686 he finally revoked the Massachusetts charter. Silverman marks this as the turning point in New England's history and in the fortunes of the Mather family.

The original Massachusetts charter had been little more than a license establishing the Bay Colony as a commercial enterprise, but in time it had come to seem to New Englanders a constitution granting the region virtual autonomy. It had been further reinforced by the Cambridge Platform of 1648 (drafted by Cotton's grandfather) which cemented church and state, giving civil courts the power to enforce religious orthodoxy in New England. Its revocation by Charles reduced the City on the Hill to a crown possession feeling the weight of sovereign displeasure. When the first royal governor arrived with orders to disband the Assembly and cut back town meetings, stack the courts with non-Congregationalists, and set up the Church of England

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in Puritan meeting houses, the Mathers raised a Maccabean revolt.

From the pulpit of North Church, Increase reminded his congregation that within Puritanism's strait confines there was room for the Church Militant, and that when true religion was threatened, "the ministers of God must then stand in the forefront of the battle and be the first that shall be shot down." With a warrant out for his arrest, he escaped to England to negotiate a new charter for the colony from James II. Cotton, at the head of a cabal of elderly statesmen, led a popular revolt that seized New England in a day, imprisoned the royal envoys, and issued from the Town Hall a "Declaration" listing the royal governor's violations of New England's rights.

THE Mathers' revolutionary career ended in 1692, with the new charter Increase Mather brought back from London, and with it ended their power. From then on, they lived in Boston like deposed monarchs in a new republic, alternately neglected and reviled. Cotton Mather's life, in particular, had the dogged unrelievedness of a penny dreadful. The gargantuan labors of his long career—four hundred written works in the service of a world reformation and a lifetime of "doing good"—were rewarded by scandal and misprision, illness, lawsuits, and bankruptcy. He buried two wives and was hounded to debtors' jail and death by a lunatic third. Thirteen of his fifteen children died in his lifetime. His greatest work, a biblical concordance and commentary crammed with such delights as a history of the Jews from Adam to their present Diaspora, went unpublished. For his mission to save America from smallpox by inoculation, a bomb was thrown through his window. What recognition Mather received in his lifetime came from two places where he never set foot: from Europe, his fellowship in the Royal Society and his doctorate from the University of Glasgow, his correspondence with Newton, Addison, Defoe, and Francke; from heaven, his communion with angels.

The miscarriage of all Mather's American doings and his inability to assume the power in New England which he had every right to expect, Silverman blames in part on the changed landscape brought about by the new charter, in part on Mather's poor judgment. The new charter, which Increase negotiated and Cotton Mather lauded, radically transformed the character and destiny of New England, dispossessing the Mathers in the process. For political freedom it substituted religious freedom, an innovation for which England could expect small thanks from the Puritans who had ventured into "the horrid thickets of America" to exercise exclusive rights to religion throughout the land and who hanged any persistently intruding Quakers or Catholics. (Nathanael Ward, in his *Simple Cobler of Aggawam*, best summed up the Puritan idea of tolerance. Tolerance was for "things tolerable," but "God does nowhere in His written word tolerate Christian states to give toleration to such adversaries of His truth if they have power in their hands to suppress them.") This new invitation to heresy was compounded by the Act of Toleration, which, in issuing freedom of worship to all nonconformists within the Protestant Church, removed the cause which had first led the Puritan fathers into exile. The Puritans' voice in the wilderness was to become a Babel of clamoring sects.

THE new charter's religious dispensation brought about a corresponding shift in Cotton Mather's position. According to Silverman, the shift amounted to a conversion from the orthodox Congregationalism of his fathers to a warmed-over ecumenism. When the first Anglican ministers were sent to Boston by Charles II, Cotton had preached inflammatorily against "the high place" being set up among the Puritans. Yet when the new charter went so far as to open local government to Anglicans, Episcopalians, and Presbyterians, Mather raised a call not to arms but to disarmament, urging his congregation not to "monopolize all godliness unto our own small party" but to welcome all comers.

Silverman has several explanations for this first in a series of about-faces that were to mark Mather's political life. Most slightingly, he presents Mather as a compulsive negotiator whose anxiousness to ingratiate himself with England, to be a fixer brokering every deal, suspended any notions he once had of a true religion threatened by accommodation with heresy.

Certainly it is true that Mather had a sense of America's cultural inferiority to Europe, unalleviated by the old belief that New Englanders were a chosen, or covenanted, people and the American Zion a model to all the world. Addressing the English, Mather warned solemnly that "they will not find New England a New Jerusalem" and even suspected that New England was already superfluous, having "done the most that it was intended for." Worse, Mather not only denied America's future greatness, he diminished its past. In his *Magnalia*, Mather asserted that his forebears never wished to break with the Church of England, but only with certain papistical prelates within it at the time. This revisionism in effect repudiated the entire claim behind the Puritan fathers' mission in the wilderness.

More creditably, perhaps, Cotton Mather was an inveterate internationalist, who preferred rejoining the universal visible church and corresponding with German pietists, French Huguenots, and Scottish Presbyterians, to being a lone if righteous diner at the Lord's Table. In the year of the new charter, Mather wrote in his diary: "I think I am the only minister living in the land that have testified against the suppression of heresy by persecution." In a clear departure from Congregationalist doctrine, Cotton feared that "the zeal of my country formerly had in it more fire than should have been," and that Quakers should not have been hanged but put in lunatic asylums.

SILVERMAN, though attributing low motives to Mather, does make much

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of his tolerance, his calls for interchurch councils and synods, his pacifism, his permissiveness as a doting husband and father, and above all, the vaunted ecumenism that marked much of his career. In other words, Silverman's Cotton Mather comes across as a kind of liberal. Yet in truth Mather's idea of "things tolerable" was extremely changeable, and his purposes not ones to which the ACLU would likely subscribe. Rather, he had concluded that since a religious monopoly was no longer possible in New England, benign accommodation was a more effective lever than persecution in the mission to which God had appointed him.

That mission was a world revolution that would bring on the End of Days. To this end, Mather published treatises in France exhorting rebellion after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, taught himself Spanish on the strength of a revelation that the Spanish colonies would soon be converted, set up Negro prayer meetings, sent gazettes around the globe on the progress of the conversion of the Indians, and prayed to God that he might not only be apprised in advance of the conversion of the Jews but might live to convert and baptize a Jew himself. At times, Cotton Mather seems to have believed that the Lord would allow him to usher in the millennium single-handed.

In the spring of 1693, shortly after devils had begun to besiege New England souls, Cotton Mather made a pact with God. "My special errand unto the Lord was this . . . that He would please to grant me the enjoyment of all those angelical kindnesses which use to be done by His order for His chosen servants." He asked for nothing more than what Abraham or Jacob had received, only that the signals of favor be delivered in "a manner and measure more transcendent" than those accorded the rest of mankind. His presumption was rewarded:

> The spirit of the Lord came near unto me; doubtless the angel of the Lord made me sensible of his approaches. I was wondrously irradiated. My Lord Jesus Christ shall be yet more known in the vast regions of America, and by means of poor vile sinful *me* He shall be so.

The dangers of such flights of fancy were obvious. The church authorities, Mather's father included, warned against the desire to converse with angels as leading either to satanic imposition or to idolatry. Diabolic deception, moreover, was a phenomenon with which Mather was familiar: his own recent experience with possessed children had proved to him that devils could quite convincingly masquerade as angels of the Lord. And the heretical implications were equally familiar. Fifty years earlier, his grandfather John Cotton had been forced to pronounce the excommunication of his disciple Anne Hutchinson for the heresy of preferring private revelation to the written word.

Cotton Mather must have been aware of the antinomian tinge to his secret "angel days," on which he sang hymns about angels, contemplated their many attributes, and ransacked his old diaries for events which could be reascribed to angelic intervention. But he was staving off something more fearsome than devils or heresy: his own bouts of atheism. For much of his life Mather seems to have been seized by religious doubts: indeed, both the overreaching pride of his "errand unto the Lord" and the overheated superstitiousness of his angel worship seem, if not aspects of atheism, at least accomplices to it.

But more than that, Cotton Mather's visions illustrate how great a change in religious thought had occurred from John Cotton to his grandson. For the central tenet of Puritan faith, that of being God's chosen people whose "special relation to Him" (as William Stoughton put it) "hath been written upon us in capital letters from the beginning," Cotton Mather substituted his own individual and transcendent relation to God. Where an entire people had been called to serve as a spark setting off a universal conflagration, Cotton Mather intended to be a lone incendiary, single-handedly hurrying on the apocalypse. No liberal and no ecumenicist, he was, rather, an inspired near-heretic.

It is the failing of Kenneth Silverman's biography that in removing (without warrant) the brand of dogmatism and authoritarianism from Mather's name, he misses the scale and audacity of Cotton Mather's enterprise and leaves him a temporizing whiner. This reading of Mather's character is given a certain specious justification by Silverman's heavy reliance on psychology in telling his story. We are forced to spend altogether too much time trapped in the prison of Cotton Mather's psyche, fed too exclusively on his diaries: a place where a man generally bares not his soul but his self-pitying and posturing delusions. The range of human emotions is after all narrow; of actions, immense.

Consumed though he might have been by hidden resentments and unbecoming ambitions, Cotton Mather did great deeds. That his tremendous accomplishments are here all but eclipsed by the motives which may have fueled them is regrettable. Moreover, Silverman's character analysis itself is willfully selective. Nowhere in his 479 pages does one capture any scent of the sharp wit, the sometimes disconcerting casualness, the huge good humor and imagination of the Olympian presence that presides over Cotton Mather's prose and animates his recorded conversation.

With this latest biography, Cotton Mather has been demoted in history from local tyrant to devious nag. We have yet to wait for an account that does him justice.

Primer for Diplomats

THE NEW DIPLOMACY. By ABBA EBAN. *Random House. 427 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by MARTIN SIEFF

Any work on diplomacy by a man who was his country's UN representative and Foreign Minister for successive decades deserves serious consideration. Abba Eban's new work has, in addition,

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enough solid virtues of its own to recommend it. Eban here presents not merely a primer but a guide to post-World War II diplomatic history. Region by region, he leads us through the records compiled by the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, the Third World, and the Middle East. His style is elegant as always, his scope comprehensive, and felicitous judgments abound, particularly in connection with the U.S. and the European Community.

On the art and practice of diplomacy, Eban is "empirical, pragmatic, and intuitive"—all qualities he endorses for the practice of the trade, in the nuclear age as in any other. He is scathing on the quantitative and behavioral approaches to the study of international relations that bloomed in the U.S. in the early 60's, the practitioners of which looked upon history and intuition as outmoded techniques and sought liberation "from the laborious duty of exploring particular cases." By contrast, Eban approvingly quotes Paul Valéry's view that "History is the science of things that do not repeat themselves."

For him, revealingly, diplomacy's "period of grace" was the century between 1815 and 1914, the age of the Concert of Europe. In the modern age, he points out, the democracies with their fickle public opinion and their volatile, inquiring press must cope with the long, slow, stable purposes of Soviet diplomacy, as exemplified by the notoriously lengthy career of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. "Nobody," remarks Eban, "has heard of a Soviet negotiator having to face critical domestic opinion if he comes home without a signed accord." By contrast, in the West, "We find a built-in conflict of interest between the diplomat and the journalist."

Rhetoric, to Eban, has a significant place in the diplomatic armory. He cites Egyptian President Sadat's November 1977 visit to Jerusalem as a prime case in point: through the exceptionally skillful use of a positive rhetoric of peace, Sadat was virtually able to insure beforehand the successful accomplishment of his major policy goal, namely, the return of the Sinai. On the negative side, Eban offers the examples of Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 and the Communist invasion of South Korea in 1950, both of which followed upon unwise rhetoric (by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in the first instance and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the second) indicating such moves would be met only by passivity and apathy.

Despite Eban's skepticism concerning the place of theory in the practice of diplomacy, however, his own world view seems colored by certain preconceptions. At home with the subtleties and essential moderation, indeed decency, of the Western powers, he tends to project the same qualities onto the whole world. Thus, he can conclude that the Soviet Union

> has been transformed; from being the center of world revolution dedicated to the downfall of existing social and political order, it has evolved into a mature global power whose interest in stability balances its revolutionary zeal.

This reads curiously in the light of his own stress on the personality of the leaders who have to make decisions. "Khomeini or Qaddafi might do what 'Iran' or 'Libya' might not," he writes; surely this applies as well to the men in the Kremlin.

When it comes to the Middle East, Eban endorses Henry Kissinger's "step-by-step" approach as opposed to the penchant for comprehensive settlements which characterized the Carter administration. "If we have to wait until all twenty-two Arab states and the Palestinians are ready to move forward together, it will be necessary to suspend all action until President Qaddafi of Libya experiences a unique spasm of lucidity," he writes. He notes, too:

> If the Arab-Israeli conflict were settled tomorrow, Soviet troops would not retire from Afghanistan; Iran and Iraq would not cease fighting each other . . . Syria's claim to virtual control of Lebanon would not expire . . . Khomeini would not abandon his anti-Western vendetta [and] Libya would not end its subversion in Africa.

Indeed, he concludes:

> There is a strong case . . . for the proposition that international diplomacy has been too persistent and intrusive in the Israeli-Arab conflict . . . and too passive and inert in other regional conflicts.

Such judgments become Eban well. Yet they sit strangely with a curious thread of naiveté which repeatedly surfaces in his work. Can we really be confident that future Soviet policies "will tend to be moderate"? And that the central themes of those policies will be "security and equality"? In the light of the Soviet Union's relations with Qaddafi's Libya, Khomeini's Iran, Mengistu's Ethiopia, and Assad's Syria, has "the ideological gain for Communism" in the Arab world really been "small"? And are the Arab states themselves, which according to Eban have been "left in growing solitude with the doctrine that Israel is a temporary and illegitimate intrusion into Middle East history," really just engaging in a "last-ditch stand"?

As the quintessential diplomat, Eban is dedicated to a world view that holds mutual communication to be both possible and positive. This, no doubt, is why he reserves his greatest enthusiasm for the achievements of the Congress of Vienna and for the era of (relative) stability which followed it. Yet our century, needless to say, has been otherwise. Even apart from the grand climacteric of 1914 itself, the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the 1933 Nazi revolution in Germany, and the 1978-79 Islamic revolution in Iran all established intensely ideological regimes committed to vast programs of international destabilization and aggression, with ultimate aims one can only describe as eschatological. In dealing with these, as with others of their kind, the assumption of shared rationality is a poor guide. A pointed and elegant shaft directed by Eban at Qaddafi does not make the latter any less formidable.

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But we ultimately judge our teachers by what they do rather than by what they say. Eban had the chance to practice his "new diplomacy" for nine years as Israel's Foreign Minister from 1965 to 1974, a period during which the Jewish state twice faced the threat of total annihilation. On the first occasion, in May 1967, Eban urged Israel to put its trust in an American-led international flotilla that would, supposedly, break the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. When this hope failed, a major crisis of confidence in the Israeli leadership forced the appointment of General Moshe Dayan as Minister of Defense.

On the second such occasion, in early October 1973, the Israeli government totally misread Anwar Sadat's policy intentions. Even though the strength of the Egyptian build-up on the Suez Canal was known, those responsible for the foreign-policy and diplomatic assessment of Egyptian intentions failed to recognize the danger of war.

In 1973, as in 1967, the brilliant military victories won by Israel's soldiers should not be allowed to obscure the diplomatic failures which preceded them. It would be unrealistic to absolve Eban of implication in these failures: on both occasions he was his country's chief of foreign affairs.

THESE questions about Eban's track record in practical affairs cast a shadow over the lessons he would teach us. As an admirer of the 19th-century world, when diplomacy meant harmoniously regulating the conduct of several powers within a common civilization, none of them propelled by ideological or religious imperatives toward all-out war, Eban is not well-suited to face the realities of a world where diplomacy must acknowledge and anticipate the movements of ideological forces in fundamental conflict. We live now in the world of Orwell, not Metternich, a world in which we—and Abba Eban—would do better to keep in mind the diplomatic advice of the Prophet Amos: "Can two walk together, except they be agreed?"

Feminism Ad Absurdum

SEX AND DESTINY: THE POLITICS OF HUMAN FERTILITY. By GERMAINE GREER. *Harper & Row. 541 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by CAROL IANNONE

ANYONE reading this book might find it hard to believe that its author also wrote one of contemporary feminism's pioneering texts. *The Female Eunuch* (1970) was a racy, radical, best-selling manifesto that posited sexual freedom as the key to women's liberation. Germaine Greer, with her disheveled Anna Magnani-style sexiness and sharp dry Cambridge wit, became a talk-show and counterculture celebrity, shocking her then perhaps eager-to-be-shocked audiences with outrageous ideas, such as the obsolescence of marriage and the dispensability of underwear.

Times of course have changed, but even changing times cannot fully account for what appear to be the violent reversals of her newest book. To be sure, Miss Greer has not lost her power to shock. Where *The Female Eunuch* deplored every inhibition placed on women by the patriarchal West, the present book manages a good word for such Third World practices as the veil, menstrual segregation, and even polygamy. Where *The Female Eunuch* preached spontaneous self-realization against the oppressive forces of civilization, the present book speaks glowingly of the self-sacrificing collectivity of extended families in underdeveloped countries. Where *The Female Eunuch* suggested that we find ways to deepen our sexual delight (because "the sexual personality is basically anti-authoritarian"), the present book decries the cooptation of sex by consumer society and tersely recommends chastity as a form of birth control.

In Miss Greer's current view, the West is now oversexed, subfertile, and hopelessly materialistic. Our skimpy nuclear families are centered on the consumer-oriented "copulating couple," who indulge in "recreational sex" and barely manage to turn out a child or two as they contend for orgasmic bliss. In addition, because of our insistence on genital sex without conception, we have accepted the dangerous pharmacological hardware of modern birth control, and lost the ability to remain chaste or to employ the healthy varieties of anal sex and coitus interruptus.

Moreover—and this is the second theme of the book—we are, true to our imperialist selves, enforcing our own corrosive arrangements all over the world. Miss Greer excoriates Western efforts at birth control in developing countries. Declaring that overpopulation is a myth concocted by elderly right-wing millionaires, she argues that we are imposing our own hatred of children, together with our fevered consumerism, on countries where children are loved and enjoyed—all to insure that the darker races not inherit the earth.

Sex and Destiny contains so many startling shifts in thought that one might expect they would be accompanied by deep soul-searching and lengthy explanations. In fact, they are barely acknowledged. A few superficial admissions here and there cannot disguise the profound lack of self-insight that is one of the book's presiding deficiencies. Nowhere in this 500-page harangue, for instance, is there any speculation on how Miss Greer's own former beliefs helped prepare the ground for the state of affairs she perceives today. Traditions she attacked and helped destroy in *The Female Eunuch* still receive from her nothing like the sympathy she now extends to traditions supposedly threatened by the advance of imperialist capitalism.

The book's weighty scholarship is suspiciously one-sided in its deployment. Miss Greer catalogues anything incriminating she can find in Western practices and omits anything that might serve as balance. One needs to read between the lines to surmise that great numbers of women in developing countries are gladly availing themselves of birth-control devices, Miss Greer's rehearsal of the horrors as-

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sociated with them notwithstanding. After hearing idealized stories of the tender care afforded the elderly in traditional societies, one is startled to be reminded (in a separate context, of course) that there are far fewer old people in these countries than in our own—a factor that might well influence differing approaches to the problem.

IN TRUTH, despite plentiful research, most of *Sex and Destiny* is simply an angry, impressionistic, and tendentious tirade against the Western way of life. Traditional societies are described at their best; ours at its worst. Sunny Third World moppets disport themselves with loving female kin while irate Western mothers stuff sweets into the mouths of their screaming young to quiet their greed. Stately, beloved matriarchs are contrasted with our own lonely "blue-rinse widows." When Miss Greer speaks of the hapless Indian surrounded by children he cannot afford, she compassionately invokes the mysterious powers of sensuality under which he has struggled and lost. Our own failures at chastity, however, are simply due to selfishness, laziness, and irresponsibility. Even the book's one or two tender moments are edged and sharpened by disdain for the West. She remarks on the sweetness of children, but cannot resist adding that this sweetness is more apparent to people worn out from toil than to our own "smooth-skinned, overfed selves."

The West, then, is utterly worthless, and Miss Greer cannot use the word democracy without putting it in quotation marks. We have, according to her, no values; what values we think we have, we have no right to promote. She openly declares that the annihilation of our whole civilization would be of little consequence. A feminist counterpart of those starry-eyed Western travelers to totalitarian dictatorships, Miss Greer praises or condones practices in underdeveloped countries—abruptly dismissing clitoridectomy and the unbelievably barbaric practice of female circumcision—that she would never tolerate in her own.

Miss Greer thinks as little of the natural processes which gave her life as she does of the civilization that nurtured her. Despite, or perhaps because of, her own prodigious and much chronicled sexual indulgence, her hatred of sex, men, and biology itself runs deep. She remarks with irritation on the wastefulness of the human reproductive process: "billions of sperm are doomed to struggle and die completely pointlessly." But sperm at least call up some admiration in her for being "lively," while their female counterpart, the blastocyst, earns Miss Greer's contempt: "torpid," "passive," "lumbering." In her promotion of anal sex, one senses a scorn of the womb; despite her frenzied enthusiasm for large families, she commends the Marquis de Sade for calling this form of sex "'*la plus délicieuse*' of the ways of cheating nature." In the insistent way in which she argues for coitus interruptus, one senses a disdain for male potency (she characterizes male ejaculation as the "trivial spasm," although elsewhere she is forced to concede that it is this "spasm" that produces life).

Ironically enough, given her "liberation," Miss Greer does not really seem capable of handling the immense freedom of Western women; certainly she praises more prohibitive arrangements as superior. Although she reasserts in this book her old sentimental belief that it is only the consumerization of sex she deplores, and that human libido can renew the earth, she means by this nothing so definite as the urge to reproduce. This libido, rather, appears to be an ideological construct, Miss Greer's vague and fitful version of the God she cannot bring herself to believe in.

In the end, after one has considered the startling reversals of Miss Greer's earlier views, a certain demented continuity emerges. For what *Sex and Destiny* most clearly reveals is that feminism—at least in its messianic, world-transforming manifestations—was less a rational program with fixed goals than an irrational shriek of hatred against the human condition itself, one that will not be silenced until every aspect of life, with its attendant irregularity, imperfection, and inequality, has been eradicated. This book is a reversal of feminism only if one assumes that feminism is the humane movement it purports to be. In fact the book is no reversal at all, but a logical, if absurd, conclusion.

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